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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is divided into an introductory chapter and four essays. Chapter one discusses 
the importance of the study and describes the development and growth of the market as well. 
The first part (Chapters 2 & 3) examines stock returns behaviour and trading activity around 
earnings announcements. The second part (Chapters 4 & 5) examines price impact asymmetry 
and the price effects of block trades in the market microstructure context. Each essay addresses 
some aspects of market microstructure and stock returns behaviour in order to aid researchers, 
investors and regulators to understand a market which lacks research coverage. 
 
 
The research provides empirical evidence on issues such as the efficiency of the market, 
information asymmetry, liquidity and price impact of block trades. In first part of the thesis, 
event study and regression analysis were used to measure the price reaction around earnings 
announcements and to examine trading activity, information asymmetry and liquidity. In second 
part the determinants of the price impact of block trades were examined with regard to trade 
size, market condition and time of the day effects using transaction data. Liquidity and 
information asymmetry issues of block trades were also studied in this part.  
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chapter 1 : Saudi Stock Market- An Introduction 
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1.1  Motivation and Importance  
 
The thesis  is motivated by many factors: first, I investigate the Saudi stock market (hereafter, 
SSM) to provide out-of-sample evidence regarding the on-going debate about Post-Earnings 
Announcements Drift (PEAD) and the way in which it can be explained, because the nature of 
this anomaly is not well understood. I also extensively examine and provide evidence on trading 
activity, information asymmetry, market liquidity, and price impact of block trades. There is 
almost no evidence on block trades in emerging markets, this is the first study to analyse the 
price impact of block trades in the SSM and in the region.   Second, the SSM is dominated by 
retail investors, more than 90% of its total trading is individual trading, which provides an ideal 
setting for studying how investors react to informational events. Third, the SSM has certain 
characteristics which distinguish it from many developed and emerging markets (e.g., high 
government ownership, larger market capitalisation and company size coupled with relatively 
few listed companies, highly active trading and finally lack of options , short selling and 
institutional investment). Moreover, few analysts follow the market and reports are scarce and 
not regularly published, which makes the level of information asymmetry high.   Fourth, the 
SSM has experienced remarkable structural change implemented by the newly establish capital 
market authority (CMA). Unlike most previous studies, we use data that is more recent which 
reflect those changes. 
It is of great value to both academics and practitioners to study the effect of these unique 
aspects of the SSM on stock trading and return behaviour especially in a market that lacks 
research coverage which is my primary objective of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Contribution 
The research is divided in four essays. Essay one is titled “How Markets React to Earnings 
Announcements in the Absence of Analysts and Institutions” and is organised in two parts. In 
part one, I document the functionality of the SSM and compare it with those of developed 
markets. The objective of this part is to describe the differences of the SSM and how these 
differences might affect its behaviour. In part 2, I use standard event study to measure price 
reaction to earnings announcements where I find post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD).   I 
further analyse the market reaction using different measures of abnormal returns and 
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constructing various portfolios and event windows. I also conduct sector-level analysis to 
examine whether government ownership and company size can have effects on the magnitude of 
the price drift. The results of this study strongly suggest the predictability of subsequent returns 
especially around earnings announcement. 
Essay two is titled “Information Asymmetry, Trading Activity and Investor Behaviour 
around Quarterly Earnings Announcements”. Covering 2,437 earnings announcements, it 
analyses the variation in stock returns, trading activity, volatility, information asymmetry and 
liquidity caused by earnings announcements for the period 2002-2009. I also examine traders‟ 
placement strategy around earnings announcements through constructing Order Imbalance 
where I classify investors into small and large. I first use standard event study to measure 
informativeness of earnings news and I then construct various measures of abnormal trading 
activity, information asymmetry, and volatility around earnings announcements. These measures 
were then compared to non-event measures “control period” to analyse changes in various event 
windows. Overall, this essay shows higher level of private information acquisition in the pre-
announcement period and persistent information asymmetry in post-announcement period which 
can be attributed to the difference in investors‟ ability to interpret news  .I further use regression 
analysis to investigate the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around earnings 
announcements. I also investigate the bid-ask spread in general and the information asymmetry 
component in particular using cross-section regression. 
The third essay is titled “Bid-Ask Spread and Price Impact Asymmetry of Block 
Trades”. In this essay, I investigate the price impact of block trades in the SSM for the period 
2005-2008. Using a unique dataset of intraday data consisting of 2.3 million block buys and 1.9 
million block sales, I document an asymmetry in the price reaction between buyer-and seller-
initiated block trades. The price impact asymmetry indicates that buy block trades have 
persistent impact while sell blocks do not. The larger block trades have even higher permanent 
price impact asymmetry between purchases and sales. The price impact asymmetry still persists 
even when using prices that are purged of bid-ask spread biases suggesting order-driven markets 
such as SSM may not be able to deal with informed trading without designated market makers. 
The final essay explores the determinants of price impact of block trade and liquidity in 
the market and is titled “Liquidity and Price Impact of Block Trades”. In this essay, I 
empirically analyse three types of price impacts using intraday trade data for all stock 
transactions in the period 2005-2008. I investigate further the price impact using, trade size 
category, trade sign  and market condition. I also compare the intraday patterns of liquidity and 
price impact using time of the day dummy variables. The bid-ask spread was decomposed using 
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Huang and Stoll model (1997).  Price impact and information asymmetry follow the inverse J-
shaped pattern through the day. The study also reveals that the price impact asymmetry is an 
increasing function of trade size. 
Numerous obstacles had to be overcome to carry out this research. For example, the data 
had to be collected and compiled from different sources, especially historical firm-level and 
intraday data. A significant amount of research efforts were devoted to data collection and 
manipulation. Data regarding earnings announcements were recorded manually from the stock 
exchange website, documenting date and content of each announcement.  Data regarding daily 
stock prices were obtained from the stock exchange (Tadawul). Intraday data which have been 
used extensively in this thesis were constructed with programming capability which stores and 
processes all historical data because data vendors don‟t provide historical trade and intraday 
data. Some of these data were obtained using personal networks of private chartists and 
programmers. 
 
Overall, our results contribute to our understanding of the behaviour of emerging 
markets where certain characteristics distinguish these markets (i.e., high information 
asymmetry level, weaker corporate governance and disclosure practices, lower level of analysts 
coverage and inactive institutional investing).Chapters two and three provide evidence regarding 
the efficiency of the market. In the absence of analysts, the SSM undereacts to good news and 
overreact to bad news in the first week of earnings release date, then a price drift (reversal) is 
observed for good (bad) news firms. The levels of information asymmetry and trading activity 
are high around the time of earnings announcement and remain high in the post announcement 
period which can be attributed to the difference in investors‟ ability to interpret news. In other 
words, some investors can turn public news into private.  
Chapters four and five produce results from market microstructure prospective. Price impact 
asymmetry has been documented in the SSM between buy and sell block trades. The asymmetry 
in price reaction is an increasing function of trade size indicating that informed traders prefer to 
trade a large amount at any given price. On average, the price effect of a block trade is small and 
short-lived suggesting that resiliency is high in the market. Moreover, price discovery is very 
quick; the five minutes prior to a block trade contain a significant portion of the price impact. 
When analysing time of the day effect, we find  Information asymmetry is  higher in the 
beginning of the day (after the open) then shows diurnal pattern through the day followed by a 
slight increase toward the end of the trading day. 
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1.3 The Saudi Stock Market (background) 
The literature overwhelmingly agrees that emerging markets, in general, are characterised by 
less information efficiency, weaker corporate governance, lack of shareholders‟ rights and 
enforcements, higher volatility and greater information asymmetries (Harvey, 1995; La Porta et 
al., 1998; and Bekaert and Harvey, 2002). Moreover, Lasfer et al. (2003) find that post-shock 
abnormal performances are significantly larger for emerging markets. 
 
Bekaert and Harvey (2002) summarise the academic evidence into three main points: 1) 
higher autocorrelations in emerging market indices; 2) information leakage prior to public 
announcements; and 3) high returns to cross-sectional characteristic trading strategies in 
emerging markets. All these attributes surely create acute information problems in less 
developed markets. 
The last 20 years have seen the focus by investors , mutual funds and academics alike 
shifting to the emerging markets, with the availability of more stock and trading data. However, 
there is still a need for more research to enable us to understand how these markets work. The 
SSM is no stranger to these problems, as it is relatively new and started to attract attention only 
at the start of the new millennium with the rapid growth in its market capitalisation, trading 
volume and number of companies. 
Only a few studies have attempted to cover some behavioural aspects of the SSM, owing 
to the lack of market data. However, though some of the issues which have arisen cover a range 
of subjects, most of the focus has been from an accounting standpoint, more precisely the 
timeliness and usefulness of financial statements and investors‟ valuation methods. While we do 
not intend to list all the studies which have been made of the SSM, some studies worth 
mentioning include those of (Butler and Malaikah, 1992, for market efficiency; Abdeslalam, 
1990; Al-bogami et al., 1997; and Alsehali and Spear, 2004, for the usefulness of financial 
statements and investors‟ attitudes to them; Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowsky, 2000a and 2000b, 
for market microstructure studies; and Alsubaie and Najnad, 2009, for trading volume and 
volatility). 
 
Most of the previous research on the SSM has primarily extracted data of the time span 
preceding the introduction of the CMA in 2004, which was a milestone in the SSM‟s 
development. Data analysed after the creation of CMA will be of significance not only to the 
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CMA‟s existence itself but to the rules, developments and changes which have faced the SSM 
since then. 
 
Table  1-1. Major SSM Development and Events for the period 1985-2008 
                         Event Date 
 Official start of the Saudi stock market. 1985 
 ESIS (Electronic Security Information System). 1990 
 Earning Announcements posted on the Exchange website with time 
and date recorded. 
2001 
 Introduction of Capital Market Law. 2003 
 Establishment of Capital Market Authority (CMA). 2004 
 Foreign (residing in Saudi) Investors Access to the Market.   
 New corporate governance guidance.  
 Stock Split for the whole market (5:1) to reduce par value and 
market value. 
2006 
 Changing of trading time (one session per day instead of two 
sessions). 
 
 Change in the calculation of the index to reflect only free-floating 
stock excluding major ownership (Government, foreign partner and 
10% ownership) 
 
 Swap Agreements with non-resident foreign investors (broker 
retains legal ownership, foreign investor has the economic 
benefits). 
 
2008 
   Notes: this table summarises the major developments that have taken place and are believed to 
have affected the market in general for the period 1985 -2008. Since the establishment of the CMA, 
very great changes have been enforced in the market. Its disclosure practice has become timely 
and is closely monitored by the CMA. 
 
Development and Growth 
 The SSM has in recent years grown impressively, in terms of market value, number of listed 
firms and trading volume. For example, the number of shares traded and number of transactions 
have grown remarkably in the period 2000-2006, averaging around 192% and 212% per year, 
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respectively. The SSM has some unique characteristics among developed and emerging markets 
(e.g., a high percentage of government ownership, larger market capitalisation and company 
size, highly active trading market, regulations against options and short selling and finally being 
dominated by individuals).   
 
 
Figure  1-1 :Tadawul All Shares Index (TASI) performance  for the period (1985-2009) 
 
Notes: Figure (1) shows the market index performance for the period 1985-2009. The graph 
clearly shows that the SSM has grown rapidly since 2002, coinciding with oil price movement. The 
high growth is mainly attributed to the growth of GDP and other economic indicators, such as 
money supply and credit. However, some of it can be ascribed to irrational exuberance, due to the 
entry into the market of new, less informed and less sophisticated investors each year. 
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Table  1-2 : Summary of Some of the Main Market and Economic Indicators in Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Notes: Source: Saudi Central Bank (SAMA), 45th  Annual Report .The Saudi Arabian Riyal                                                          
is effectively pegged to the dollar at a value of USD1=SAR 3.75. 
*2009 data for the first 6 months only. 
 
Institutional setting of the SSM   
The SSM is a pure order-driven market where most of the activities taking place are initiated by 
private and not by institutional investors. In fact, more than 90% of trading is individually 
initiated. The presence of institutional investors is still new and hesitant. Moreover, foreign 
direct investment is restricted and does not confer full ownership of the shares bought. Only 
common stocks are traded with options and short selling is not allowed in the market. 
Nonetheless, it is a very active market in terms of trading volume and market capitalisation 
compared with other regional markets.
 1
   
 
Ownership structure in the SSM is highly concentrated; government funds, foreign 
partners and major business families with 10% ownership have a stake in the market of more 
than 65%.  However, the market lacks the presence of institutional investment, because 
government funds and other mentioned parties usually follow a buy-and-hold strategy. Even 
though only 38% are free floating stocks (tradable stocks), trading volume is high in the SSM 
compared with other markets. The turnover ratio for the SSM in 2008 is the highest of all Arab 
markets, the value of traded shares to GDP standing at 212% compared with an average of 70% 
of the value of traded shares relative to GDP for the other 15 Arab markets. The SSM, however, 
                                                        
1 The SSM is by far the biggest stock exchange in the Middle East. According to the Arab Monetary Fund‟s annual 
report for the year 2008, which provides statistics for 15 stock markets, the capitalisation of the SSM represents 
41% of the total market capitalisation of all these markets, while the value traded of the SSM represents 67% of the 
total value traded in the markets of all the members. 
Year 
GDP 
Billion 
No. of  
Investors 
‘000 
N0. of 
Shares traded 
Million 
No. of 
transactions 
‘000 
Market 
Value in 
Billions 
 
Index 
(Value-
weighted) 
2002  707 N/A 1,735 1,033 280 2,518 
2003  804 N/A 5,565 3,763 589 4,437 
2004  938 1,383 10,298 13,319 1,148 8,206 
2005  1,182 2,573 12,281 46,607 2,438 16.712 
2006  1,335 3,577 54,440 96,095 1,225 7,933 
2007  1,430 3,669 57.829 65,665 1,946 11,176 
2008  1,758 3,954 58,727 52,135 924 4,803 
2009*  N/A N/A 37,950 22.591 1,074 5,964 
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suffers from the absence of financial analysts who issue regular reports, recommendations and 
forecasts for each security. The SSM provides a natural experimental setting to test for all the 
previous factors (e.g., no short selling, individual dominance, absence of analysts‟ forecasts). It 
is interesting to study the effect of these unique aspects of the SSM on stock trading and returns, 
especially around earnings announcements. 
 
Since mid 2001, the stock exchange bulletin (Tadawul) provides a medium in which all 
companies must post their earnings announcements on its official website before any other 
medium. Investors actively search for private information during the period before each 
announcement, but investors rarely have any method for anticipating news and earnings. Some 
investors rely on informal sources, such as Internet forums which are very active in speculating 
on companies‟ earnings, forecasts and news; this is a time when wild rumours are rife. Some 
large investors may depend on insider information and react to information leakage ahead of an 
announcement. The disclosure and corporate governance practices of SSM are still weak, 
compared to more developed markets. It is notable for showing unusual trading activities, in 
terms of volume and abnormal returns, in some stocks before an announcement is officially 
made. More recently, investment houses and brokerage companies, which are newly established 
entities, have begun to issue reports and recommendations which could help investors to reach 
more informed decisions. 
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Table  1-3  :Main SSM Structural Elements Compared with those of Developed Markets. 
Feature Developed countries Developing countries (SSM) 
Regulation Established 
Early stage of establishment 
(undergoing development) 
Financial institution 
Investment banks, Commercial 
banks, Consulting and brokerage 
houses 
 
-Commercial banks exercise   most 
of the functions. 
-Recently brokerage firms have 
begun to operate in the market, but 
are not yet important players. 
Market maker Specialists, Brokers and dealers 
Not found (liquidity supplied by 
limit order traders) 
Analyst forecasts Available 
Weak presence (a few reports,  not 
regular) 
Earning 
announcements 
Scheduled 
Allowance period after each quarter 
(2 weeks) but no specific date 
Number of 
participating firms 
Many A few 
Information 
asymmetry 
Exists 
Evidence of high level of 
information asymmetry 
Institutional 
investors 
Varieties (mutual funds, pension 
funds, other funds, individuals) 
-A few large inactive government 
funds and some commercial mutual 
funds. 
-Large number of active individual 
investors. 
Market Design 
Quote-driven market makers. 
Examples: NYSE. 
 
-Order-driven market. 
-Only stock traded, no options , 
short sales  or any other financial 
instruments. 
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chapter 2 : How Markets React to Earnings Announcements in the 
Absence of Analysts and Institutions  
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2.1 Introduction  
 
This paper makes several contributions. First, we test the existence of Post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) in a comprehensive sample in a less developed market. Second, we 
provide a perspective on the way in which a market reacts to earnings announcements in the 
absence of analysts‟ forecasts and institutions. We test for PEAD effects not only in general, but 
also across industries on the stocks listed on the Saudi stock exchange. Third, the Saudi Stock 
Market (hereafter, SSM) is dominated by retail investors, which provides a perfect setting for 
studying investor behaviour and reaction to informational events. Fourth, the SSM has certain 
characteristics  which distinguish it from  many developed and emerging markets (e.g., high 
government ownership, larger market capitalisation and company size, highly active trading,  
lack of options and short selling and finally a market that is dominated by individuals)
2
. It is 
interesting to study the effect of these unique aspects of the SSM on stock trading and returns, 
especially in regard to earnings announcements. 
What is interesting to investigate is how a market might behave without strong presence of 
information intermediaries such as financial analysts. Many stock markets in developing 
countries such as Saudi Arabia have no financial analysts who – regularly – follow stocks and 
issue forecasts and recommendations. We can assume the level of information asymmetry in 
such markets to be high. There is supporting evidence of high information asymmetry in 
developing stock markets which can be attributed to many other factors, including information 
intermediaries and corporate disclosure practice. To our knowledge, no-one has examined the 
impact of earning news  on market behaviour if there are no financial analysts providing 
information to investors (that is to say, analysts and informed traders are essential for the 
efficient market to work, as they are believed to facilitate and speed the impounding of 
information into stock prices). Would the market be better off without analysts‟ forecasts? 
Would natural market forces (demand and supply) have an effect on the market without the 
influence of analysts? Could the market reaction to news be the best explanation of the surprise 
factor?   
Any attempt to measure market reaction to news in the SSM is essentially measuring retail 
investors reaction because they dominate the markets.  We aim in this study to examine how the 
absence of analysts can impact the behaviour of the market. If  there is no price drift in the 
market, we can infer that PEAD is caused by analysts herding and bias. However, if the price 
                                                        
2 Individual trading exceeds 92% in 2008. 
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drift is larger in magnitude, we can safely infer that analysts are important agents for the price 
impounding process to take place and for the market efficiency in general 
 
Throughout the study, we form two portfolios of positive and negative news based on 
the earnings announcement return (EAR) methodology suggested by Brandt et al. (2008) among 
others. We evaluate portfolios in reaction to news and overall performance by computing both 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR).  
 
It is found that market-adjusted abnormal returns continue to drift upward for the good 
news firms (companies which react positively on the announcement date) and market-adjusted 
abnormal returns reverse their price movements after one week of the announcements for the 
bad news firms (companies which react negatively on the announcement date). 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review  
 
One of the most puzzling tendencies in capital markets is the drift in prices after particular 
corporate events (earnings announcements, mergers, stock splits, etc). Studies which focus on 
the drift in prices, such as event studies, are considered to be joint test studies for the price 
model chosen (the model of expected rate of return) and for market efficiency. 
 
In other words, if prices continue to drift we either question the model used, such as 
CAPM, or the efficiency of the market. The continuous  drift in prices in particular after the 
earnings announcement is called the Post-Earning Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a 
phenomenon which has been overwhelmingly confirmed and is now widely accepted among 
researchers. However, there is no agreed theoretical explanation for such a phenomenon. 
Moreover, most of the price reaction studies are conducted in the more developed stock markets 
where agents play an important role in formulating prices and channelling information. We 
focus on the behaviour and reaction of the SSM to earnings announcements for many reasons. 
We aim to provide a different perspective by focusing on a less developed market which has 
some unique characteristics and structure. We study, indirectly, the impact of different market 
characteristics (the SSM being, for example, a market less followed by analysts, with inactive 
institutional investors and where short sales are not allowed) on market behaviour in regard to 
earnings news. We believe that the SSM is distinct from other developed and emerging markets 
14 
 
in that it lacks active presence of analysts who are important information intermediaries in the 
market.  Because the functionality of developed markets, such as the NYSE and other markets is 
well documented in the literature, we first describe this benchmark functionality briefly and then 
compare it with the current functions of the SSM.  
In the following section, we describe how capital markets work in terms of price 
anticipation and the role of analysts in the market. Then we compare price anticipation and the 
role of information intermediaries in mature capital markets with those in the SSM. 
 
Anticipation of news and post earnings announcement drifts (PEAD) 
Information plays a vital role through having the potential to change investors‟ beliefs regarding 
investment strategies and behaviour. Investors naturally require information to aid them in their 
evaluating and investment decisions. Beaver (1998) indicates that there are various sources of 
information, including financial reports, announcements, analysts‟ reports, newspaper articles 
and other publicly available information which can alter investors‟ beliefs about the value of an 
asset.  How investors perceive, interpret and react to news has been an active area of research 
since the seminal work of Ball and Brown (1968). They empirically investigated the association 
between accounting earnings as the core information in financial statements and stock returns in 
order to assess the usefulness of accounting information. They were the first to report a drift in 
the stock returns after earnings announcements, a phenomenon which was later given the name 
of the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). Since then, many researchers have 
confirmed the robustness of PEAD using different techniques and different data (e.g., Bernard 
and Thomas, 1998, 1990; Ball, 1992; Ball and Bartov, 1996; and Chordia and Shivakumar, 
2005).  Capital market research findings suggest that earnings announcements contain 
information which is believed to alter investors‟ opinion about the value of stocks through the 
process of impounding information on prices.  
The earnings-returns studies can be classified into two groups: event studies and 
association studies. In the latter, the focus is on the long term association between earnings and 
stock prices, while in the former, short-window returns are usually examined, to verify the 
market reaction to earnings announcements. Recently, event studies have gained popularity over 
other methods as a credible method for measuring the economic impact of earnings 
announcements on stock returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). 
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  Liu et al. (2003) define PEAD as “cumulative abnormal returns for stock, announcing 
extreme positive (negative) unexpected earnings drift upward (downwards) for an extended 
period after the announcement”.  The price drift is the result of a persistent underreaction to 
earnings news. It suggests that the market underreacts to information on earnings 
announcements and hence that future returns are somewhat predictable. 
   This phenomenon refers to generating continuous returns over and above the expected 
return, as measured by a valuation model, such as capital asset pricing model (CAPM). PEAD is 
considered one of the most robust stock market anomalies in the financial literature. The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that prices should fully and instantaneously reflect all 
publicly available information.
3
 Hence, an efficient market should incorporate all information 
(factual or predicted) into prices in a quick and unbiased way.  A price drift in general indicates 
that the market fails to translate the information into prices.  For this reason, many researchers 
consider price drift to be a serious empirical challenge to the EMH. 
While most of the PEAD studies concentrated first on US markets and data, more recent 
studies have expanded the coverage to other European and emerging markets worldwide. 
However, the mainstream evidence comes from US data and other stock markets have attracted 
little research (Liu et al., 2003). Naturally, the UK market has become the second most studied 
market in terms of price drift but beyond this only a few other European or Asian markets have 
been the subject of studies, a mere handful, and other markets in the Middle East and North 
Africa have hardly been studied at all. The studies which have been conducted in non-US 
markets include  but are not limited to  those by (  Hew et al., 1996;  Liu et al., 2003, for the UK 
market; Gajewski and Quéré, 2001, for the French market;  Forner et al, 2008, for the Spanish 
market and Booth et al., 1996 , for the Finnish market). Since most of these studies have found a 
similar pattern in the price drift in different markets, it can be called a global pattern. The most 
common pattern found is that stock returns continue to drift upwards (downwards) for stocks 
with unexpected positive (negative) earnings announcement surprises. 
Ball (1992) assumes that the post-earnings announcement drift in mature markets may 
differ by the level of disclosure. This is confirmed for an emerging market (Helsinki Exchanges) 
by Schadewitz et al. (2005), who suggest that similar patterns may exist in other emerging 
markets. 
 
                                                        
3 A theory stating that stock prices reflect all available information at any given time; see Fama (1965) "Random 
Walks in Stock Market Prices".  
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Why stock prices drift after the earnings announcement 
While the PEAD is well documented in the literature, the reasons for the persistent 
underreaction to earnings announcements are not well understood .This phenomenon can be 
explained with a number of hypotheses, but two competing hypotheses and explanations 
dominate the debate. The first is the rational explanation and the second comes from the 
behavioural school which suggests that investors are irrational.  Advocates for the rational and 
efficient market claim that PEAD can be explained by the inaccuracy of the tools used by 
researchers to detect the price drift, an inaccuracy which may stem from returns 
mismeasurement, risk mismeasurement or methodological biases in general. They also attribute 
rational risk premium and transaction cost as important causes for the drift. This rational 
explanation views the price drift anomaly as a compensation for risk associated with shocks in 
the earnings news. For instance, Ball et al. (1993) discuss pricing models which ignore the 
change in equity risk, since news is positively associated with risk. Garfinkel and Sokobin 
(2006) assert that the price drift is related to the risk factors attributed to the divergence in 
investors‟ opinions.  
 
Kothari (2001) in a review of capital market research concludes that the literature has 
exposed the drift anomaly to a battery of tests, but a rational, economic explanation for it 
remains elusive. 
 
The difficulty in explaining the PEAD  by an argument consistent with market efficiency 
has caused much research effort in seeking an alternative explanation for the price drift when the 
rational explanation was not satisfactory. This effort has led to the second set of explanations for 
financial anomalies, behavioural explanations. The price drift is attributed to irrational factors 
which result from financial behaviour and this sort of explanation has gained some prominence 
in the financial literature.
4
 Behavioural finance generally argues that irrationality in the form of 
one or more cognitive biases has led to observed patterns of abnormal returns. Because of 
shared human attributes, such as overconfidence, greed or fear, people make errors of judgment, 
which are a deviation from the assumption of rational expectations in economics and the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. Findings suggest that PEAD is related to investors‟ underraction 
or overreaction to earning news (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Bernard and 
Thomas, 1998; and Daniel et al., 1998). A common explanation for this phenomenon is that 
                                                        
4   Contrary to traditional finance, behavioural finance asserts that some agents in the market are not fully rational 
which can explain financial phenomena .See Barberis and Thaler (2004) for a review of behavioural finance. 
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investors underreact to earnings news and they also fail to recognise the serial autocorrelation 
patterns in quarterly earnings (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Ball and Bartov, 1996).  
More recent studies have sought a more broadly rational explanation. For example, 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2005) argue that the post-earnings announcement drift is related to 
investors‟ underestimation of the impact of expected inflation on future earnings growth. 
Another line of research, more relevant to our paper, is aimed to distinguish between 
individual trading and institutional trading. Several studies suggest that institutional trading is 
more sophisticated than individual trading and accordingly that individual trading may be more 
closely related to the PEAD than institutional trading (see, for instance, De Franco et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, individual trading may be more responsible for the PEAD than institutional 
trading is.  Hirshleifer et al. (2008) call it the individual trading hypothesis. Bhattacharya (2001) 
and Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) provide evidence consistent with the conjecture that 
individuals cause the PEAD. 
The magnitude of the drift may differ for good and bad news. Management plays an 
important part in explaining overreaction and underreaction to news. When there is good news, 
it is announced immediately. It benefits the management to announce all positive news. 
However, when there is negative news, management tends to announce it at some point in time 
but maybe to delay it (see, for example, Hong et al., 2000), in other words, when withholding 
negative news from the public can no longer be postponed. At the event, all positive news would 
have been announced but not all negative news would have been announced. Some 
managements believe that they can turn news from negative to positive before it is announced 
and do not see why they should announce something too soon which will damage their 
reputation. Moreover many management and influential agents may benefit from withholding 
negative news by selling at a higher price before it is announced. 
 
2.2.1 The role of the financial analyst as financial intermediary 
Financial analysts are those professional persons or bodies who analyse financial data (news, 
disclosures, reports and private information) and interpret it in order to forecast the future 
prospects of the assets being analysed to ultimately issue recommendations regarding 
investments to buy, hold or sell the stock.  The role of analysts‟ forecasts in the market and the 
way in which their opinions are reflected in prices were early recognised by Douglas (1933); he 
states, “even though an investor has neither the time, money, nor intelligence to assimilate the 
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mass of information in the registration statement, there will be those who can and who will do 
so, whenever there is a broad market. The judgment of those experts will be reflected in the 
market price.” 
Financial analysts are important players in the stock market. They add value to the 
market through collecting, processing and aggregating information from diverse sources and 
then producing added value information and communications through earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations. Regulators and other market participants view analysts‟ activities and 
the competition between them as enhancing the information efficiency of security prices, 
specifically, how analysts can speed up the reflection of public information in stock prices 
(Frankel et al., 2006).   
The SEC acknowledges on its website that “Research analysts study publicly traded 
companies and make recommendations on the securities of those companies. Most specialize in 
a particular industry or sector of the economy. They exert considerable influence in today's 
marketplace." 
Studies of the value of intermediaries mainly focus on financial analysts.  Academic 
studies focus on the information provided to investors from two summary measures produced by 
analysts – earnings forecasts and buy/hold/sell recommendations. Overall, the evidence 
indicates that financial analysts add value in the capital market .Prior research confirms that 
analysts‟ reports and forecasts, in general, convey information to the capital market which 
speeds up the price impounding of information into prices (e.g., Fried and Givoly, 1982; Francis 
and Soffer, 1997; Hong et al., 2000).  
No doubt, analysts‟ forecasts play an important role in the capital market by conveying 
information (presumably valuable information) to investors. However, the properties of the 
analysts‟ forecasts – whether individual or consensus – have been questioned and tested in many 
studies.
5
 Analysts are not perfect financial intermediaries because they too can be irrational 
(e.g., too optimistic, over-reacting to some information and under-reacting to other 
information).
6
 
 
                                                        
5 Kothari‟ review  (2001) of the subject was a section on his paper “Capital market research in accounting” 
6 See Schipper (1991) and Brown (1993) for comprehensive reviews.   
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2.2.2 Market Expectation proxy (the Earning Surprise) 
One of the main activities of the capital market research is the branch which associates financial 
statement information with security returns. This type of literature often uses a model of 
expectation for earnings to isolate the surprise component of earnings from the anticipated 
components (Kothari, 2001). Kothari emphasises that the degree of return-earnings association 
is crucially affected by the accuracy of the proxy set by the researcher for the unexpected 
earnings.  
It has been standard for most market reaction studies to measure standard unexpected 
earnings (SUE), which are defined as actual earnings minus expected earnings. Unexpected 
earning is considered the independent factor in the regression analysis which enables us to 
understand why the market reacts in such a way.  
Many measures have served as proxies for unexpected earnings or the surprise component 
of earnings, the two most popular of which are the time-series property of earnings and analysts‟ 
forecasts. Time-series forecasts of earnings (yearly or quarterly) emerged first as a proxy which  
researchers often used to model expected earnings (see, for instance, Foster, 1977; and  Brown, 
1993). These studies typically use a time-series model to predict earnings, forming two 
portfolios, one composed of companies with higher earnings than predicted and the other of 
companies with lower earnings than predicted by the time-series model. Analysts‟ forecasts are 
nowadays the most frequently followed proxy for unexpected earnings. Many researchers agree 
that it is a better substitute proxy for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-series 
models; see, for example, Fried and Givoly (1982) and Kothari (2001). Consensus forecasts are 
often used where the average of analysts‟ forecasts is considered to be the market expectation of 
earnings. However, despite the growing dependence on analysts‟ forecasts, there are major 
issues related to the accuracy of these forecasts, such as underreaction and incentive bias. Often 
these forecasts are optimistic and made by sell-side analysts who are, typically, working in an 
investment bank which has a business relationship with the firm whose security is being 
analysed.  It has indeed been established that analysts‟ earnings forecasts are biased and 
optimistic (see, for instance, Brown, 1993; Dugar and Nathan, 1995).  
In capital market research, a relatively new measure has been used, namely, Earning 
Announcement Returns (hereafter, EAR). The scarcity of analysts in the SSM creates the need 
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for EAR to be used as a proxy for market expectations for earnings.
7
  The actual market reaction 
to the information contained in the announcement could be the best estimator of the surprise.  
Assuming investors‟ rationality and in line with the market‟s  “Efficiency”, the market on the 
aggregate level should react to the earning announcements in the same direction. For example, if 
a firm announces a large increase in earnings growth, the stock price should move upward to 
reflect this change in the firm‟s fundamental value. When the market does fail to fully react  to 
the information disseminated in the earnings announcement, we expect the anomaly of “PEAD” 
to occur. The EAR can  be extended to a multi-period event window.  The logic for constructing 
more than a one-day earnings announcement window is that announcements are sometimes 
made public toward the end of the day or there could be a leakage in the market before the 
announcement is due.  
Cumulative abnormal return (hereafter, CAR) is the tool used to capture the market 
reaction to the information content of the earning announcements.  Brandt et al. (2008) have 
used this measure and call it the earnings announcement return (EAR). In their study, they find 
the post earnings announcement drift for EAR strategy is stronger than post earnings 
announcement drift for SUE. We follow the methodology of Chan et al. (1996) in using the 
cumulative abnormal market adjusted return around the announcement date. They accumulate 
the returns over a four-day period (-2 to +1) to account for the possibility of a delayed stock 
price reaction to earnings news and use it as a measure of the earnings surprise to predict 
subsequent returns. They also believe this to be a clean measure of earning surprise because it is 
free of the bias which is typically associated with earning expectation models. They find that 
this proxy predicts subsequent returns roughly as well as the seasonal random walk model. This 
proxy for earning surprise has also been used by many others (see, for example, Garfinkel and 
Sokbin, 2006; Shivakumar, 2006;Lerman et al., 2008).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 Recently, some regional and local investment banks have started to issue general forecasts for major companies, 
but these forecasts tend to be general, few and irregular. 
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2.3 The Saudi Stock Market: characteristics and structure  
SSM is a relatively new and still emerging market, operating formally only since 1985. 
However, long before this, many public companies were traded in an informal and unregulated 
market through unlicensed dealers and trade offices.  
In 1985, the responsibility for the regulation of the market was delegated to the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Saudi Central Bank. Each ministry 
or agency has a different function: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry regulates the primary 
market through which new company listings are made; the Ministry of Finance determines the 
market‟s general policy; while the central bank (the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, SAMA) 
operates and manages the market.
8
 
SAMA established the Security Control Department (SCD), which was responsible for 
the day-to-day operations of the market and, in addition, all related issues such as disclosure 
requirements and market statistics. Under this scheme, only commercial banks were given the 
privilege of stock intermediation function. Settling and clearing facilities for all equity 
transactions, together with central regulation facilities for joint stock companies, were 
introduced with the establishment of the Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC) in 1985 
(source: Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority). 
 
  The SSRC coordinates all buying and selling orders from different banks through a 
central clearing house.
9
 Potential buyers and sellers have to go to the bank and fill out an Order 
form (Buy). Then the bank has to meet the order on the other side (Sell) from other traders in its 
own listing. If no match can be found, the bank has to contact other banks via telephone or telex.  
It is possible to witness transactions of the same stocks taking place in different banks at 
different prices, as banks prefer to match the order within their own listing of traders or clients. 
Moreover, a delay (of days or weeks) in fulfilling orders used to be common, as banks are not 
allowed to buy or sell shares for their own accounts or maintain an inventory for trading 
purposes.  Clearly, a lack of official liquidity providers or market makers made an opportunity 
for a group of investors to be, unofficially, the market makers. These market makers provide 
liquidity through posting their own bid-ask prices and trade for their own account. 
 
                                                        
8 Source: Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority.  
9 The SSRC was established with equal ownership by the twelve commercial banks. 
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Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS) 
One of the major developments in the SSM occurred in 1990, when SAMA introduced the new 
electronic screen-based trading system called the Electronic Securities Information System 
(ESIS). This overcomes all the previous issues and obstacles in the old system and provides 
operational efficiency, accuracy in trading process and rapid settlement. Following this 
development, banks established Central Trading Units (CTU), at some of their branches, which 
are all linked to the central system at SAMA.   
  An advanced version of the ESIS, Tadawul, was introduced in October 2001, as the new 
service system for the trading, clearing and settlement of shares in enabled real-time share 
trading, as well as same day settlement and clearing of transactions .  
Investment in the SSM was not open to foreigners, except indirectly through 
subscription in designated mutual funds. Recently, the market opened to foreign investments 
through equity swaps bought through local brokers. 
 
Capital Market Authority    
The capital market environment in Saudi Arabia had lacked independent legislative and control 
bodies which regulate the market and delegate its operation to a sub-unit (currently Tadawul). 
Based on the need for such bodies, the Capital Market Authority was established by the Capital 
Market Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/30, dated 16th June, 2003. The Capital Market Law 
has created the legal environment for establishing the Capital Market Authority, CMA, with a 
five-member governing board (appointed in July 2004), a Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes and a Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange with the status of a joint-stock 
company
10
. This company consists of Tadawul, the electronic share trading system hitherto run 
at the central bank (SAMA). 
  The CMA is a government organisation with financial, legal and administrative 
independence. It reports directly to the Prime Minister. The CMA‟s function is to regulate and 
develop the Saudi market. It issues the required rules and regulations for implementing the 
provisions of Capital Market Law, aimed at creating an appropriate investment environment.  
 
                                                        
10 Owned initially by the Pubic Investment Fund and then will be offered partially to the public. 
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Development and growth    
Since 2000, the SSM has achieved impressive growth in terms of market capitalisation, volume 
and value of the stocks traded. The Tadawul All-Share Index, TASI, grew in athree-year period 
more than five-fold; it rose from 2,518 points by the end of 2002 to 16,715 points by the end of 
2005.  
The stock market has witnessed an increase in the number of individual portfolios 
created and even in the number of companies listed (from 67 companies in 2002 to 134 
companies by September 2009). Oil prices are the main incentive for Saudi economic growth; 
when they go up, the whole economy anticipates growth.  However, the SSM is a very volatile 
market; for example, in 2006 it collapsed by 62% after briefly reaching an all-time high of over 
20,966 points in February, 2006.  The market is fairly new compared to other developed markets 
and it is still undergoing many changes.   
The period 1985-2000 was an inactive stable market which does not accurately reflect 
the economic activities of the Saudi economy. This period is characterised by less market 
participation and investment, lower disclosure practices and slow but steady growth. Starting 
with the new millennium, the SSM experienced an unprecedented boom in investments and 
trading activities. This boom was mainly attributed to the liquidity generated by higher oil 
prices. Then the SSM started to attract the attention of wealthy business families and individuals 
alike. The years 2001-2007 witnessed an average annual growth of 22% and 29% for the market 
capitalisation and the index, respectively. The number of participating investors in this period 
increased four-fold.  During this period, average annual growth for the value of traded shares 
amounts to 58% whereas the average annual growth in the number of transactions was 84%. The 
high growth is mainly attributed to the growth of GDP and other economic indicators, such as 
money supply and credit. However, some of it can be ascribed to irrational exuberance, due to 
the entry into the market of new, less informed and less sophisticated investors each year. 
 
2.3.1 Number and concentration of Listed Shares      
 
 In 1999, 74 different companies were traded on the Saudi stock market, compared to an average 
of 350 companies in other emerging markets (Bakheet, 1999). One of the main reasons for the 
low number is that the government imposes rigorous requirements for companies wishing to be 
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publicly listed corporations, in order to encourage only large, efficient and well-established 
companies to have this privilege. The market has a higher degree of concentration as the top ten 
companies represent 60-70 percent of the overall market, measured by any indicator: size, 
turnover or profit (Bakheet , 1999).  The government has a majority ownership stakes in major 
companies such as SABIC, Saudi Electricity and the Riyadh Bank, of 71%, 76% and 43%, 
respectively. Moreover, approximately 44% of the total market value of shares listed in the 
market are not traded because they are owned by government or semi-governmental entities (i.e. 
the Pensions Fund and GOSI), or by foreign partners and other joint stock companies. 
11
 
Although the SSM is the largest stock market in the Middle East, representing 47 per 
cent of the total capitalization of Arab stock exchanges, the number of listed stocks and the size 
of the free-float of shares is small.
12
 Therefore, it is considered a thin market in comparison with 
more developed and mature markets. 
The SSM is dominated by a few leading major companies which have significant share 
holdings either by government or by certain families, business houses and joint venture partners. 
This high level of holdings saps the free float available for trading. Ultimately, it leads to a low 
market turnover ratio. However, the repatriation of capital from the West after 9/11 and new 
companies listing have attracted more liquidity into the market and this raised the average 
turnover ratio to a level of 71% in 2006.  Overall, the number of listed stocks and the size of the 
free-float of shares in the SSM are small, giving the government strong control over the stock 
market. However, these features of the SSM are changing; for instance, the number of 
companies grew at an exceptionally high rate in 2006 and 2007. Moreover, more small and 
family companies have been listed on the market. Finally, starting in April 2008, the CMA has 
changed the way of calculating the general Index so as to reflect only floating stocks, which 
represent 36.76% of the total outstanding stocks.  
 
2.3.2 Characteristics of Saudi stock market (Microstructure) 
 
Despite the growth and development which the SSM has witnessed over the last decade, it has 
been regarded as more thinly traded, less liquid and less efficient than developed stock markets . 
 
                                                        
11 (Saudi Stock Market Review, SABB, 2003). 
12 http://www.ameinfo.com/78125.html 
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The stock exchange lacks depth, as the shares listed are limited to a few large industrial 
companies and domestic companies, mainly banks. Currently, there are 134 publicly traded 
companies, whereas some experts claim that the market can accommodate 200 companies at 
least, considering the size of the economy and the number of registered private companies in 
Saudi.
13
  
In a recent country assessment report by the IMF (2006), the Saudi equity market is 
regarded as buoyant,
14
 with significant turnover but with limited provision of investment 
information. Butler and Malaikah (1992) were the first to study the efficiency in the SSM in a 
study which also covered the Kuwaiti market;  they find huge one-day negative autocorrelations 
of -0.47  and attribute the market inefficiency to many institutional factors ,some of which 
include illiquidity, market fragmentation, trading and reporting delays and the absence of 
official market makers. 
  Awwad (2000) states that the financial systems in the country are bank dominated, with 
several large institutions exerting significant influence on the pattern and structure of market 
activities. He concludes that the absence of non-bank intermediaries within the financial system 
has meant that the Saudi market is structurally less developed. Al-Abdulqader (2003) finds that 
the SSM can be described as „weak-form inefficient‟ and investors can earn excess returns by 
using trading strategies such as filter rules and moving averages. Moreover, investors use mainly 
fundamental analysis when valuing shares. However, technical analysis is also employed by a 
sizable number of those surveyed. He concludes that large shareholders appear to be relatively 
sophisticated when valuing shares.  
Alsubaie and Najand (2009), in a study of volatility/volume relationship and using 
different measures of volatility and information arrival, find that the sequential reaction to 
information suggests that asset price volatility is potentially forecastable with knowledge of 
trading volume. 
A few studies have attempted to cover some microstructural aspects of the Saudi stock market 
(i.e., Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowsky, 2000a, 2000b). The study by Al-Suhaibani and 
Kryzanowsky (2000a) of the microstructure of the SSM analyses the patterns in the order book, 
the dynamics of order flow, the time of execution and the probability of executing limit orders.  
These writers examine the behaviour of market participants in order to understand the effect of 
order placement on market liquidity and to identify some trading patterns. Some of the main 
findings are as follows: 
                                                        
13 As of September 2009. 
14 A market in which prices have a tendency to rise easily with a considerable show of strength. 
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 Intraday patterns are similar to those found in other markets, even those with a different 
structure. These patterns include U-shaped patterns in traded volume, number of 
transactions and volatility. 
 When measured by width and depth, as it commonly is, liquidity is relatively low on the 
SSM. Nevertheless, liquidity is exceptionally high when measured by immediacy.
15
 
 Limit orders when priced reasonably, have on average a shorter expected time to 
executions and have a high probability of subsequent execution.                        
Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowsky in another study (2000b) assess the information content of a 
newly submitted order and investigate not only the order size effect but also the information 
content of orders with different levels of aggressiveness. They find that: 
 Larger and more aggressive orders are more informative. 
 A large amount of asymmetric information is present in the SSM.  
 The relative measure of order informativeness implies that private information is more 
important for infrequently traded stocks. 
 
Most of the previous research on the SSM has primarily extracted data of the time span 
preceding the introduction of the CMA in 2004, which was a milestone in the SSM‟s 
development. Data analysed after the creation of CMA will be of significance not only to the 
CMA‟s existence itself but to the rules, developments and changes which have faced the SSM 
since then. We will briefly explain some of the main characteristics of the SSM and highlight 
the aspects needed to understand its structure. 
 
 
Sustainable Liquidity (specialists and market makers) 
 
There are no designated market makers in the  SSM; large investors sustain the liquidity of the 
market with large orders which reflect their own investment strategies. In extreme 
circumstances, it is common to witness Buy (Sell) orders only, with no quantity of stocks 
supplied (demanded) on the other side.  The stock exchange imposes on all stocks listed a daily 
price cap to limit price movement to 10 per cent. Occasionally, trading in a stock stops if the 
price hits its daily limit, a situation called limit-up or limit-down, depending on direction. 
Traders cannot place limit orders at a price beyond the daily limit; hence, trading stops 
                                                        
15 Immediacy refers to the speed of order execution with specific quantity and cost. 
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temporarily because there are no traders willing to take the other side in the trading. This kind of 
situation generally accompanies extremely good or bad news.  
Large trades may set the direction of the market because large investors can manipulate 
prices easily with large orders, due to the absence of market makers and institutional investors. 
Al-Rodhan (2005) states in his paper that hyping, dumping and rumoured investing are all too 
common in the Gulf Countries, including Saudi. Moreover, although short selling and margin 
trading are not allowed in the market, investors can borrow from banks against their holding of 
stocks.  
Institutional Investors 
 
There are a few open-end mutual funds run by commercial banks whose investment strategies 
are not known. They publish only their weekly returns. By the end of 2007, the number of 
investors participating in bank-managed mutual funds was around 426,100. In addition, the 
autonomous government institutions (AGIs),
16
 together with the specialised credit institution 
(Public Investment Fund), have equity ownership in many of the listed companies in the SSM. 
They play an important role as institutional investors in the market. Nevertheless, these 
institutions are not active traders in the secondary market. 
The limited participation of institutional investors in the secondary market, with buy-
and-hold strategies, constrains the intermediation of information and an effort to encourage such 
services could be an important method of ensuring that more investors act on the basis of real 
fundamentals rather than rumours (IMF, 2006). 
The SSM lacks the presence of major institutional players, who usually form the 
backbone of such markets, and foreign investors are not allowed direct market participation.  
Analysts’ forecasts 
Analysts‟ forecasts play an important role in any market by conveying information to the public 
of the expected earnings and performance of companies; many investors rely on these in making 
their investment decisions. Moreover, these forecasts are considered as a communication 
channel from the professional world to the public. Without independent analysts, less 
information is conveyed to the public, as happens in the case of the SSM. Alsehali and Spear 
(2004) describe the SSM as weakly monitored by analysts and other stakeholders. 
                                                        
16 There are three AGIs: the Pension Fund, the General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) and the Saudi 
Fund for Development (SFD). 
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  This situation could promote more dependence on informal and unreliable sources, such 
as rumours and Internet forums. Some investors turned to international consultant houses to seek 
advice and reports regarding investment opportunities in the SSM. Other investors lost the 
whole concept of investment and dropped fundamental analysis entirely. Many traders adopted 
short-time investment strategy (speculating), focusing on techniques and news which help to 
achieve returns in the short run, regardless of company financial performance. For all these 
reasons, the SSM is very volatile and dominated by waves of speculation which are fuelled by 
news and rumours.  Clearly the lack of institutional investments worsens the situation. 
According to Tadawul monthly reports, individual trading in the SSM in 2008 amounted to 92% 
of all trading in the market. 
Anticipation of news 
News regarding earnings and other issues of importance to investors is announced on the official 
website of the stock exchange. There are no scheduled events or expected announcement dates. 
However, all listed companies must announce the annual and quarterly reporting of financial 
results. They are required to submit quarterly financial statements within 2 weeks from the end 
of each quarter. Annual financial statements reviewed by auditors are to be submitted within 40 
days of the end of the financial year. 
Before the announcement day, investors in general have no means of anticipating news 
and earnings. Some investors rely on informal sources such as Internet forums, which are very 
active in speculating companies‟ earnings, forecasts and news.17 Some large investors could 
depend on insider information and react to information leakage in advance of announcements. It 
is notable in the SSM to see unusual trading activities, in terms of volume and returns, in some 
stocks before announcements are officially made. More recently, investment houses and 
brokerage companies, which are newly established entities, have begun to issue reports and 
recommendations which could help investors make more informed decisions. 
In general, disclosure norms and announcement practices in the SSM are poor, in 
particular regarding items of voluntary disclosure, such as earning forecasts and management 
activities. Al-Bogami et al. (1997) investigate the timeliness of publishing and reporting in the 
SSM. Covering 39 Saudi listed companies from the first quarter of 1987 to the end of 1991, they 
calculate the number of days from each company‟s quarter-end to the release of the quarterly 
financial statement in the local newspaper. Companies on average publish their fourth quarter‟s 
                                                        
17 Personal correspondence with Remal IT www.remal.com (one of the biggest software companies in Saudi which 
manages and maintains Internet forums and sites) reveals that the number of daily visitors to economic and share 
Internet forums in Saudi ranges between  200k and 300k. One forum alone has 45-60k daily visitors. 
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reports within 108 days of the quarter end and publish their first three quarterly statements 
within 50 days after the end of the quarter. In a more recent study Aljabr (2007) shows that 
Saudi publicly listed firms have taken less time to publish their annual reports since the 
establishment of the CMA. He finds on average that the number of days between the end of the 
financial year and the publication of annual reports decreased to 28 in 2005.   The CMA recently 
started to take action against companies which failed to meet the deadline for either quarterly or 
yearly statements, de-listing them temporarily or permanently. Moreover, publishing practice 
has greatly improved with automation and Internet access being available to all investors. As 
mentioned earlier, the Tadawul website carries announcements and news facilities which allow 
companies to announce their news promptly and efficiently. Furthermore, the CMA recently 
suspended two stocks from being traded in the market because those two companies made losses 
exceeding 75% of their capital.
18
   
AL-Bogami et al. (1997) observe that stock returns do not seem to respond to 
announcements of the first three quarters but respond significantly to the fourth quarter 
announcement. Al-sehali and Spear (2004) investigate the decision relevance and timeliness of 
accounting information in the SSM, using a sample period during 1995-1999 and covering 52 
firms‟ annual financial reports. They suggest that the publication of accounting earnings leads 
individual investors to revise their security holdings. They also suggest that earnings are timely 
in terms of their association with security returns 
 
 
Access to the market 
All citizens of Saudi and the Gulf States (GCC) can invest in the SSM. Foreigners who reside in 
Saudi have recently (since 2006) been allowed to invest directly in the market but it is closed to 
foreign direct investors and institutional investors. However, there are some mutual funds which  
allow foreign investors to buy shares in funds which invest in the SSM (the SAIF is a closed-
end fund listed on the London Stock Exchange and is managed by SAMBA). Investment by 
foreigners who live outside the country is restricted by a scheme called “Equity Swap”, under 
which they can buy shares in Saudi companies through a local broker who retains the legal 
ownership (i.e., voting rights ), giving the foreign investor only entitled to the economic benefits 
(e.g., dividends and equity issuance) Some officials and analysts believe that the CMA is 
working toward full opening of the market in the future. 
 
                                                        
18 According to the regulations of the Capital Market Act, 2004. 
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Brokerage and Dealership 
 
The SSM is purely an order-driven market with no physical trading floor, regulated brokers or 
market makers (Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski, 2000a). It runs only on automated systems 
which allow commercial banks through their trading units to receive orders to buy and sell with 
different types of specifications (limit order vs. market orders). Trading units in commercial 
banks at Saudi are like discount brokers who transact buy and sell orders at a reduced 
commission, but provide no investment advisory service, unlike a full-service broker. 
 Recently, the CMA has granted some companies licences to operate in the market, 
which vary in the services they are authorised to provide. Moreover, commercial banks are not 
permitted to provide brokerage service directly. Instead Commercial banks were allowed to 
establish separate entities for their brokerage activity like any other broker in the market, 
however, brokerage companies that are owned by commercial banks still enjoy the majority of 
the market share. Some of the newly established brokerage firms exercise full licence, including 
advice, dealing and the management and custody of funds. Others hold licenses which cover one 
area only. Brokerage and dealership firms have already started to operate, some of which issue 
reports and general forecasts about market prospects or recommendations;
19
 however, these 
forecasts tend to be general in nature and cover only a few “blue chip” companies. Moreover, 
they are not managed in a timely way, unlike their counterparts in developed markets, where 
each stock is followed by a group of analysts who issue timely reports and revise them in the 
light of new information as it emerges.  
 
Expectations 
As we have seen from the literature discussion section, analysts‟ forecasts play an important role 
in disseminating information to the market and speeding up the stock price impounding of 
information. Moreover, many characteristics of the SSM have been discussed regarding the 
interactions between different agents in the market, showing how strong is the element of 
individual trading.  The absence of market makers, coupled with inactive institutional investing, 
may be expected to increase the level of information asymmetry in the SSM. Information 
asymmetry can make patterns of financial anomaly such as PEAD more persistent as price 
adjustments to information will take longer and show predictable patterns in stock returns, such 
as momentum trends.   
                                                        
19 The CMA has granted licences to 80 brokers and dealers. 
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All the previous factors lead us to hypothesise that PEAD exists in the SSM. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the drift is expected to be higher than in other developed markets, while the longer 
persistence of the drift is consistent with Lasfer et al. (2003), who find that emerging markets 
respond much more strongly to market shocks than developed markets do. We also expect 
higher price drift in industries that have small sized firms in general and low share holding by 
institutional investors and government. 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
 The dataset covers all companies in the SSM but excludes new companies which have not so 
far made any earnings announcements. It includes 89 companies (banking =10, industry =35, 
cement=8, service=23, electricity=1, agriculture=9, telecommunication=2 and insurance=1). It 
covers quarterly earnings announcements for listed  companies in the SSM during the period 
between the first quarter of 2001 and the third quarter of 2007. 1667 earnings announcements 
were documented from the Tadawul website after removing those announcements for which the 
exact timing and date of dissemination to the market could not be verified. Data regarding stock 
daily prices were provided by the official stock exchange. They include the following fields: 
Close, High, Low, Volume, Value and Trades for the seven-year period 2001-2007 where the 
following values obtain: 
Prices:  the daily  closing  prices for all stocks in the market and  the daily high/low.  
Volume :  the total number of shares traded over a given day, as reported by all market 
participants 
Value :  the total Saudi Riyal value (1$=3.75SR, fixed rate) of all shares traded over a given 
day, as reported by all market participants. 
Trades (transactions) : the total number of trades reported in one day. 
  
2.4.1 Characteristics of Earnings Announcements  
 
The Saudi Stock Market normally disseminates earnings information through the official 
website, www.tadawul.com.sa  and later in other media. Three kinds of quarterly earnings report 
are published: first, the quarter‟s income “forecast” or guidance by the company or the company 
executives in the official website.  Normally, this is published before or toward the end of the 
quarter; second, the official announcement of the earnings in Tadawul; and third, the completed 
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interim (quarterly) report which is also published in the stock exchange official website and 
published to newspapers. The first type of announcement, which is management forecast or 
guidance, is often precise;
20
 recently, in particular, the forecast has been almost identical to an 
official announcement. Given that forecasts contain the same income figures as the official 
announcements do, effectively the announcement date is the date of issue of the company 
management‟s guidance, if it exists. However, such management guidance is not issued by all 
companies and as a rule it is an abstract of the official earnings announcement. It usually 
contains the gross revenue and net income, with no further details.  We treat the management 
guidance day as the announcement day. Alternatively, if no forecast was made, we use the date 
of the official announcement. The official earnings announcement usually contains more details 
of the revenue, income and costs. Later, after the announcement day, companies publish their 
interim statements in different media channels (the stock exchange website, the company‟s own 
website and newspapers). 
All listed companies in the SSM are required to publish their announcements within two 
weeks of the end of the quarter, but the exact timing of the announcement is not known until it is 
published. End-of-year announcements must be made within the first forty days of the end of the 
company‟s financial year. 
There is no standard format to which companies should adhere  in their announcements; 
each company has its own style of wording and has control over the content. In general, the 
announcements contain the current quarter‟s sales, operating profit and any extraordinary or 
non-recurring items which might affect its earnings. The current quarter‟s earnings are usually 
compared (in percentages) with the previous quarter or the equivalent quarter in the previous 
year (the most common). Some companies include general future expectations of the company‟s 
earnings. 
It should be noted that companies tend to give better and more detailed treatment of 
positive news than negative news, e.g., the percentage of an increase in earnings is usually 
mentioned whereas the percentage of a decrease is omitted sometimes. 
Moreover, some companies announce accumulated earnings up to date, i.e., they 
announce earnings as an accumulated figure without specifying what percentages or proportion 
should be attributed to each quarter (i.e., a figure for the earnings in  all quarters of the financial 
year  without breaking them down into quarterly numbers). Readers must refer to previous 
                                                        
20 A few loss companies have disputes with the auditing firms, usually announcing a forecast which could be 
different later in the completed report because accounting standards and treatment applied. These companies are 
usually small, loss and few in number.  
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quarters to know the exact figures for them all; such a method could be misleading and 
confusing, whereas the quarter net contribution figure could easily be shown. A company may 
have done better in the aggregate number, but worse in the last quarter  or vice versa.  We   look 
at any systematic bias which could be associated with  the announcements practice in the SSM, 
such as the clustering or overlapping of events and timing patterns of the announcments. In  the 
following section, we look at the yearly, weekly and daily  distribution of the earnings  
announcement dates. 
 
Announcements per year  
 
From Figure 2-1, we can see clearly that the number of announcements has increased, with last 
recorded year making up one-fifth of all announcements, though it covers only the first three-
quarters of the year 2007. This growth trend can be attributed to three factors. First, recent years 
have witnessed an increase in the number of listed companies (new IPOs). Second, the increased 
investment awareness of the importance of timely and accurate information has created pressure 
on firms to announce theirs in a timely manner. Third, the capital market authority (CMA) 
established and enforced disclosure laws and regulations. For instance, the CMA started to 
impose fines for companies which announced their earnings late. Previously, some companies 
could announce their quarterly or yearly earnings after a long delay (which could extend to 
months), allowing for speculation and insider trading to benefit from this private information. A 
company could publish its announcement only in a local newspaper, thus favouring 
geographically local investors. Information can take a long time to reach all market participants. 
Since the beginning of 2001, however, Tadawul has made announcements on its website which 
the whole public can access. This is the main reason that we concentrate on data starting from 
2001. 
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Figure2-1: Distirbution of Announcement Dates Per Year. 
 
Notes : Figure ‎2-1 exhibits the development of announcement practice. Recent years show a higher 
percentage of announcements. In 2007, almost all companies have announced their earnings on 
time, whereas in 2001 the practice was not strict. Some of the observations were dropped from 
2001-2002 because the exact time of the announcement cannot be verified. Moreover, more 
observations are added to the sample each year because of new companies listing on the market. 
 
Announcements by week number 
 
Announcements were fairly evenly distributed in all weeks throughout the year. Weeks 
4,16,30,43 and 44 have the highest frequency, as they occur at the same distance from  the end 
of each quarter in turn. A careful look at the dates of events in Figure (2-2) shows, however, that 
many announcements are made outside these specified weeks. Announcements are made almost 
evenly throughout   the announcments period  allowed by the Capital Market Authority (a two-
week period from the end of each company‟s quarter end for the quarterly statements and a 40-
day period from the end of the year for the yearly statements). 
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Figure ‎2-2:  Clustering of Announcements per Week. 
 
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of earnings releases by the week number. Some week 
numbers, typically, have a higher percentage of announcements because these weeks fall in the 
announcement period (after the end of the quarter). The total number of observations is 1667 
earnings announcements. 
 
As mentioned earler, there are no scheduled announcements for companies in the SSM. 
However, an announcment period of 2 weeks starting from the last day of  each firm‟s quarter is 
the period in which each company should report its earnings, or face a penatly levied by the 
CMA.  The fact that companies have longer announcement periods helps us to better interpret 
normal returns results, since not all announcement are clustered around any particular date. 
 
Day of the week analysis 
The announcements data were further investigated for any pattern which could be of interest, 
such as the day of the week effect. One of the implications of the day of the week effect is that 
news announced on a Friday, which is the last trading day of the week in any developed market, 
or Wednesday in the case of the SSM, might not attract investors‟ attention at the time and 
might therefore produce a delayed reaction. Moreover, many researchers (e.g., Damodaran, 
1989, Defusco et al., 1993) have suggested that managements tend to release negative news 
regarding their companies at the weekend.  
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Events were categorised by the day of the week when they occurred, including events 
announced at the weekend. The SSM used to operate from Saturday through Thursday, with 
Friday as the weekend. With effect from 15/06/2006, the weekend was extended to two days 
(Thursday and Friday), after the cancellation of trading on Thursdays.  In September 2006, also, 
the trading hours were reduced from two sessions (morning and evening) to one. Before this 
date, it was customary for firms to make their announcement between sessions. As seen in 
Figure (2-3), announcements occur fairly evenly throughout the week. Only 4% of 
annoucnments were made at weekends, which indicate the lack of evidence of when 
managements  time their annouuncements. 
 
           Figure  2-3 : Announcements by the Day of the Week 
 
Notes: this figure plots event occurrence by the day of the week. Starting from September 2006, 
Thursday and Friday became non-trading days. The number of observations of quarterly earnings 
announcements is 1667. Only 67 earnings news reports were made at the weekend, with the rest 
being reported throughout the week and no day showing a significantly higher number of earnings 
announcements than any other. 
 
 
2.5 Methodology  
In order to measure the market reaction to the earnings announcements, we use event study 
methodology (see Kothari , 2001, for comprehensive review ) . Event studies techniques were 
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investment decisions, new laws and regulations effects. The aim of the event study is to measure 
the economic impact of an event on a firm or asset value. This measurement is done through 
econometric techniques which emphasis on the flow of the analysis or procedures that are 
needed to conduct event studies. Most event studies suggest similar procedures or flow of 
analysis (See for instance, MacKinlay ,1997; Binder, 1998 ;  Kothari and Warner,2007).  The 
general steps in event studies are listed briefly below then our own event study steps are 
discussed in more details: 
1. Identify the Event and the relevant Event Window. Events should be clearly 
identified and date of event should be investigated to be certain, as the assumption here 
is that the event date is clearly known to the researcher or at least within reasonable 
range. In this step the researcher should decide on the appropriate event window which 
could extend to more than one period or day. Moreover, the length of the estimation 
window, which could be before or after the event, should be decided and identified. An 
estimation period should be long enough to produce asymptotic properties of the 
parameters. Issues such as daily or weekly assets returns should be considered also here. 
 
2. Estimate normal return using a Return Expectation Model.  The choice of the model 
could be a crucial step because event studies are joint tests of market efficiency and the 
model used.  Results leading to market inefficiency could be attributed to the bad model 
chosen. Two main categories of models are often used; statistical models and economic 
models where the latter have economic assumption regarding the behavior of the assets 
and the former depends on statistical assumptions regarding the assets return 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
3. Analysing abnormal returns and average abnormal returns.  Calendar dates are 
converted to event calendar where t=0 is defined to be the event day or announcement 
day for all companies regardless of their calendar announcements dates. Once abnormal 
returns AR are computed for all firms in the sample, average abnormal returns AAR, 
typically are computed over all events so the researcher can easily infer and generalise 
the results to the whole sample and to eliminate specific company movement that is 
unrelated to the event. It is common for most event studies to classify assets or stocks 
returns to Good (positive) and Bad (negative) news portfolios as each one should, in 
theory, react in different direction. 
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4. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) or Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal 
Returns (BHAR).  Cumulating the effects of the event by summing or compounding all 
the abnormal returns for specific periods gives an indication of the wealth formation and 
how portfolios would have performed over multiple periods. The cumulating process can 
be used also to measure the anticipation of the news or leakage of information in the 
market. 
5. t-statistics.  To test whether the average abnormal returns or the cumulative abnormal 
returns would be statistically significant or different than zero, parametric or non-
parametric tests are used for this purpose. The standard test is to compute the standard 
deviation of all excess returns of the firms in the sample (cross –section) or pre-event 
standard deviation of the time-series of the excess returns. 
Return generating Model (Expected Returns) 
 
In event study methodology, the interest is to measure the performance of a security following 
an “event”. An important step in this process is to define what a “normal” or expected 
performance is or should be, then it will be a matter of computation to realise what can be 
considered as “abnormal” performance. The Abnormal return represents the difference between 
the “expected” return and the actual return. Several methods are used in prior research to 
estimate expected or normal return; Mean Adjusted Model, Market Adjusted Model, Market 
Model, the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) and more recently Fama-French Three Factor 
Model.   The essence of all these models is to subtract the actual performance from the expected 
performance. In other words, abnormal returns are the differences between event returns and 
non event returns (expected returns unconditional on the event). To show this concept, we can 
use the following equation:  
 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑬(𝑹𝒊𝒕)  (1)  
Where: 
   
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 Is the abnormal return for firm i over time interval t, 
 𝑹𝒊𝒕  Is the actual return for firm i over time interval t, 
𝑬(𝑹𝒊𝒕) Is the expected / predicted return for firm i over time interval t. 
What differ among these models are the assumptions about the expected return E(Rit ) 
and the risk for the security with regards to the market portfolio reflected in the coefficients.  
For example, in both mean adjusted model and CAPM: It is assumed each stock has an expected 
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return which is a constant over some period of time; however this expected return varies across 
firms. In practice, the gains from using more sophisticated models are limited because the 
variance of abnormal return is not reduced significantly by choosing the more sophisticated 
model (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985).  
It is common to find an event study using two or three models simultaneously.  The 
choice over which model should be used usually doesn‟t matter a lot .Brown and Warner (1980) 
test three methods of calculating the expected return: 1)Mean adjusted returns,2)Market adjusted 
returns, and3) market and risk adjusted returns  .They indicate that even though mean adjusted 
return is perhaps the simplest model, it often yields similar results to those more advanced 
models and it is as effective as the other methods. Precisely, they find  that  the market and 
market-adjusted models perform better than the mean-adjusted model when there is a clustering 
of event dates. 
Kothari and Warner (1997) use  all four methods for their return generating process  that 
is ;1)  Market-adjusted return model ,2)  Market model ,3) Capital assets pricing model (CAPM) 
, and  4)  Fama–French three factor model. MacKinlay(1997) evaluate in depth the alternative 
models and classify them in either statistical or economics models. He states that the 
insensitivity to the model chosen could be accredited to the fact that when choosing more 
sophisticated models, they often do not reduce the variance of abnormal return.  
 
Market-Adjusted Model (method chosen) 
This model takes into account the market return as a benchmark to determine the normal return 
of a particular stock at point of time t.  The market-adjusted model assumes the expected returns 
are equal across all stocks at a point of time t, but not necessarily constant for a stock at different 
times.  The abnormal return for a stock is defined to be the residual which is calculated as the 
difference between the return on the stock  𝑹𝒊𝒕 and the return on the market portfolio𝑹𝒎𝒕  
written as: 
    𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕 (2)  
 
This model has been used in many event studies for its simplicity and easiness of 
calculation. MacKinlay(1997) shows that Market adjusted model can be regarded  as a restricted  
market model with  coefficients α = 0 , and β=1. Such restriction of beta equals to one assumes 
that each security has the same systemic risk as the market.   Because the coefficients are pre-
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specified, there is no need for an estimation period prior to the event period in order to find 
parameter estimates. Such situation could happen when new IPO‟s are introduced to the market. 
The Market-Adjusted Model assumes stocks have the same property for average returns and risk 
as the market. It is plausible in our data to use the Market-Adjusted Model where the bias in the 
model is mitigated through sample selection of the firms that nearly represent the whole Market. 
Binder (1998) when evaluating this model concludes that, in large sample the bias will usually 
average to zero if the average beta of the sample firms is one. We choose the Market-Adjusted 
Model because it is the most appropriate model that could accommodate the nature of our data.  
SSM is relatively a new growing market with many IPOs introduced each year. For example in 
the first quarter in the data (1
st
 quarter of 2001), there are 55 observations whereas in the last 
quarter in the data (3rd quarter of 2007), there are 85 observations.  It would be impractical to 
choose any other model that requires pre –event estimation data which is not available in such 
situation. 
For each company, calendar time of the announcement is converted to event time by 
defining the date on of announcement (t=0).  For announcements on Thursday and Friday (when 
the markets are closed) and on stock exchange holidays, we use the next available trading day as 
the event day, t=0. 
Next, we calculate the daily stock returns of the listed companies from 2001 to 2007 and 
the daily returns of the Tadawul All Share Index (TASI), by using historical prices obtained 
from Tadawul as shown below; 
 
𝑹𝒊𝒕 =
𝑷𝒊𝒕 − 𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏
, 𝒂𝒏𝒅   𝑹𝒎𝒕 =
𝑻𝒕 –𝑻𝒕−𝟏
𝑻𝒕−𝟏
,  
 
(3)  
Where 𝑷𝒊𝒕 is the stock price of the ith firm at time t, 𝑹𝒊𝒕 refers to its rate of return, 𝑻𝒕  represents 
TASI(index)  value at time t , and 𝑹𝒎𝒕 is its rate of return. 
 
 
Aggregating abnormal returns 
We aggregate abnormal returns across several stocks and events for selected time intervals to 
form an overall inference about the impact of the event being studied on the market in general, 
since individual stocks historically show higher variance and could be subject to other factors 
than the event itself. We aggregate the abnormal returns across two dimensions, across events or 
firms (Cross-section) and across a time interval [t1, t2]. 
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Cross-Section Aggregation 
The abnormal returns are aggregated through two dimensions: cross-sectional aggregation and 
time aggregation. Abnormal returns are calculated over a 40-day period which extends from 
event days -19 to +20 (-19, +20), using the Market-Adjusted Model :  𝑨𝑹𝒊= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕  to 
obtain residuals which we call Abnormal Returns. In the cross-sectional aggregation,  𝐴𝑅𝑖  are 
averaged across the N firms in the sample on each day t to form the average abnormal returns 
AAR, as can be shown in the following equation:  
 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 =
𝟏
𝑵  
 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
 
(4)  
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡  = The average abnormal return across event observations N (number of companies) 
Time Aggregation 
One drawback of examining AARs in an event study is that they do not accurately reflect the 
return realized by actual investors, as Fama (1998) suggests. There are two common ways of 
calculating the impact of the event on the returns of security and an investor‟s wealth: 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHARs). BHAR is 
calculated by compounding each period‟s abnormal return (subtracting the stock returns from 
the benchmark or market returns). Abnormal returns are calculated into a buy-and-hold measure 
to accurately reflect the change of investor wealth:     
 
 
𝐁𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐢,𝐭 =   𝟏 + 𝐀𝐑𝐢,𝐭   
𝐓
𝐭=𝟎
 
 
(5)  
Barber and Lyone (1997) favour  the use of BHAR, showing that CARs suffer the bias of not 
reflecting the experience of investors. However, BHAR suffer from a rebalancing bias in long-
run studies, when using equally-weighted reference portfolios with periodic rebalancing.  
CAR measures the investor wealth change around the event by summing each period‟s 
abnormal return over the event window. Many studies suggest using CAR, e.g. Fama (1998) and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), as this is judged to be a better, less biased method in particular in 
long-run returns. Lyon et al. (1999) indicate that CARs might be used because they are less 
skewed and less problematic statistically. The BHAR method can exaggerate over- or under -
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performance even in one single period, as the compounding effect will show up in subsequent 
periods. But CAR can eliminate the compounding effect associated with BHAR for single-
period abnormal returns. It is worth noting that both methods suffer some biases and drawbacks, 
in particular in long horizon event studies. These biases could be skewness (long-term abnormal 
returns are positively skewed), survival-related bias, rebalancing bias (benchmark portfolio 
returns are calculated assuming periodic rebalancing) and new listing bias (new firms entering 
the benchmark, index and portfolio in each period or year).  However, most of these biases are 
found in long-run events. In short-horizon event studies, this study included, CAR seems to be 
an appropriate choice. Simply put, most short-run tests are well specified while most long-run 
tests are not. The latter are more susceptible to bias in the method of calculating and testing the 
abnormal returns.  
Kothari and Warner (1997) find that long-horizon event studies suffer misspecification 
in the test statistic, due to the methods of calculating abnormal returns and their standard 
deviations. Kothari and Warner (2007) state that the results of short-horizon tests are more 
reliable than long-horizon tests. They emphasise that short-horizon event study methods are 
relatively straightforward and trouble-free.    
To estimate a performance measure for any time interval or event window for the total 
sample, CAAR, the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return is computed. It is a measure of 
abnormal performance which adds up each day‟s average abnormal return  AARt . In other 
words, CAAR corresponds to the way in which an investor (sample) portfolio would perform 
around the event window in terms of wealth change. Tests using CAAR can also be used to infer 
the market efficiency as systematic non-zero cumulative abnormal returns following an event 
which contradicts the market efficiency hypothesis. Furthermore, one could hypothetically 
benefit by trading on this anomaly (ignoring trading costs). CAAR is defined as: 
 
𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑹(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐) =   𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕
𝒕𝟐
𝒕=𝒕𝟏,
 
 
(6)  
Where  𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑹(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐)  represents the cumulative market -adjusted abnormal return on a portfolio 
of N events over the time period 𝑡1 to 𝑡2.  For example, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 −1, +1  is the cumulative 
average abnormal return across event observations from day  𝑡1 = −1  to day 𝑡2 = +1. 
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2.6 Results 
 
Figure  2-4 : Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) and Buy-and-Hold Returns 
(BHAR). 
 
 
Notes: Figure (2-4) reports daily cumulative abnormal returns for an all-firms equally-weighted 
portfolio for the period (-19, +20). BHAR reports the compounding performance of an all-firms 
weighted portfolio for the same period. Anticipation of news starts from the pre-announcement 
date which indicates information leakage in the market. We can see that  CAAR is continuing to 
react in the same direction up to day 6, when price reversal takes place forming a U-shaped pattern 
of CAAR and BHAR for the period (-5,+19).There seems to be an overreaction to news at first 
followed by price reversal . On average, one Saudi Riyal invested 20 days prior to the 
announcement day in the market portfolio is worth only 96% 6 days after the announcement and 
is worth 98.5% of its original value 20 days after the announcement day. However, it is necessary 
to split the portfolio in event studies into two samples, (positive) good news firms and negative 
(bad) news firms, to show the effect of the news on returns. The question arises whether the price 
drift magnitude will be similar for the two portfolios?  
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         Figure  2-5: Good and Bad News (CAAR) for Event Window (-19, +20). 
 
Notes: Figure (2-5) shows CAAR performance for Good and Bad news portfolios. We follow 
Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006), who use only the abnormal return at the time of the earnings 
announcement to control for earnings surprise. The good news portfolio (708 observations) is 
those companies who report positive abnormal returns on announcement days (0, +1). A Bad news 
portfolio (959 observations) consists of companies which report negative abnormal earnings 
returns on the announcement days (0, +1). On the graph, the Good news portfolio does not show 
strong anticipation to news in the pre-announcement period. However, the bad news portfolio 
exhibits some reaction to news in the pre-announcement period which can be observed in the 
period (-14,-5), an indication of some information leakage. Moreover, the Good news firms show 
similar PEAD pattern found in many other markets. Conversely, the bad news portfolio seems to 
overreact to news at first in the period (-5, +7), before a price reversal pattern forms. 
 
AL-Bogami et al. (1997) suggest that investors in the SSM do not react to quarterly 
statements; he finds that stock returns do not seem to respond to the announcement of the first 
three quarters but respond significantly to the fourth quarter announcement. To investigate 
whether investors would respond differently for quarterly announcements than for year-end 
announcements, we plot earnings announcements stock returns for quarters 1, 2 and 3 on the 
next graph and then in a separate graph we show stock returns around earnings announcements 
of end-of-year news. 
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Figure  2-6: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for First Three Quarters. 
 
Notes: The figure shows the performance of Good and Bad news portfolios for the first three 
quarters (Q1, Q2 and Q3). Good news portfolio (561 observations) = companies achieving positive 
returns on the announcement days (0, +1). Bad news portfolios (779 observations) = companies 
achieving negative returns on the announcement days (0, +1). Both portfolio performances show 
anticipation of the news before the announcement day; however, Bad news firms seem to raise the 
anticipation of news. The first three quarters were analysed here to examine whether the market 
could react in a different way for the fourth quarter, when year-end financial reporting is required. 
By law, the earnings in the first three quarters in the SSM are announced shortly after the quarter’s 
end, whereas the fourth quarter’s announcement can be extended to 40 days after the end of the 
financial year. 
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Figure  2-7: Year-End Earnings Announcements CAAR 
 
Notes : Figure 2-7  shows Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) performances over 40 
trading days around earning announcements (-19, +20) for the Year-end announcements. The 
figure shows CAAR for Good news portfolios (144 observations) and Bad news portfolios (208 
observations). Good news exhibits upward price drift that starts in the pre-announcement period 
and continues for the 4 weeks following announcements. Bad news shows upward trend in its 
returns before announcements that is corrected once announcements have been made public and 
then forms volatile patterns. It seems bad news is harder to interpret by investors because usually 
it contains higher accruals and “earnings management” figures. 
 
 
Our results for the fourth quarter announcements (Year End) show higher price reaction in the 
good news firms and lower price reaction in the bad news firms than quarterly results. Al-
bogami et al. (1997) suggest that investors in the SSM respond more strongly to the year-end 
results than to those in the first three quarters. Our findings support  theirresults for the good 
news category and contradict  them for the bad news category. The year-end good news firms 
show higher and more persistent upward price drift while the bad news exhibit more volatile 
returns than returns of quarterly bad news.  
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The year-end result is more authentic than quarterly results, because it is mandatory for the year-
end result to be audited by an accounting firm; this makes it more credible for the investors and 
creates a strong incentive for investors to be actively searching and anticipating news. In 
contrast, quarterly earnings announcements are reviewed but not audited by accounting firms, 
which make these announcements less effective. Moreover, good year-end results are usually 
followed by other good news announcements (i.e., stock splits and dividends) which explain the 
stronger price reaction for good news year-end results. Conversely, companies usually release 
quarterly bad news without “earnings management” whereas, year-end bad news is subject to a 
lot of earnings management practices which could reduce losses and hence the price reaction to 
these losses. The good news signal current and future firm‟s performance to  investors in the 
markets. 
 
Testing Abnormal Returns for Significance (test-statistics) 
 
Based on the efficient market hypothesis, all tests of statistical significance are tests of the null 
hypothesis that abnormal returns are zero over any event window. However, rejecting this null 
hypothesis indicates the possibility of achieving predictable abnormal returns and outperforming 
the market.  
 
To test whether there is any significant change in firms‟ value around the announcement 
day, we use aggregated returns, over firms and cumulative over time, since individual stock 
returns typically have higher variance, which could affect the power of the test. Usually, in 
event studies, a sample of firms which have made the same type of announcement are selected; 
each firm‟s announcement would naturally have been made on a different calendar day. The 
benefit of this approach is that it increases the likelihood that no other effect (information) 
beside the event under study is being picked up, as any unexpected information that is 
announced on a different day by a different firm  will cancel out other information. 
In event studies, the standard assumption is that returns are independent and normally 
distributed. Brown and Warner (1985) prove that departing from normality will be less 
pronounced for cross-sectional mean excess returns than for individual security excess returns. 
By the Central Limit Theorem and assuming that the announcement period returns for the 
sample firms are independently and identically distributed, consequently, average abnormal 
return is normally distributed with a zero mean. 
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Brown and Warner (1985), Corrado and Zivney (1992), Beneish and Gardner (1995) and 
many others have used the following test statistics, assuming abnormal returns are independent 
across securities.  In this test statistic, the mean excess return is divided by its estimated standard 
deviation, which is estimated from the time-series of mean excess returns. The test statistic for 
any event day “t” is as follows: 
 
𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭 − 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬 =
𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕
𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕
𝟐
 
 
(7)  
Where 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕    is the average abnormal return at time t for N events and  𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕   is the estimated 
standard deviation the time-series of mean excess returns for a pre- or post-event estimation 
window. An estimate of the variance of this series (an equally-weighted portfolio 
variance),𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕  is estimated   over 21 trading days (-40, -20). The variance estimate is: 
 𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 =  
𝟏
𝑵 − 𝟏
(𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 − 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕         ) 𝟐      →  𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕  
(8)  
Where 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕    is the average abnormal return at time t for N events and   𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕         is the 
sample mean average abnormal return for an interval of K days from 𝑡1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡2  .  For an 
estimation period of 21 days, the standard deviation 𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕   is calculated as:     
  𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 =  
𝟏
𝟐𝟎
(𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 − 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕         ) 𝟐 
(9)  
    The expected values of 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕     and 𝐂𝐀𝐀𝐑(𝐭𝟏,𝐭𝟐)  are zero in the absence of an 
abnormal return. For the cross sectional averaged abnormal returns, we can form our hypothesis 
as follows: 
oH : Expected average abnormal return is zero or 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 = 𝟎  .                
1H : Expected average abnormal return is different from zero or 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕 ≠ 𝟎  . 
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Table  2-1: shows Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) with their t-tests and Average 
Performance Indices (APIs). 
 A: Positive Return Portfolio B: Negative Return Portfolio 
Days Relative 
 to 
Announcements 
AAR (%) t-test API AAR (%) t-test API 
-19 0.09% -0.642 1.001 -0.07% 0.620 0.999 
-10 -0.08% -1.255 0.999 0.33% 3.311*** 1.000 
-5 0.07% 1.116 1.001 0.11% 1.320 1.001 
-4 -0.07% -0.124 1.000 -0.26% -2.609*** 0.998 
-3 -0.04% -1.855* 1.000 -0.34% -2.093** 0.995 
-2 -0.01% -0.882 1.000 -0.24% -1.522 0.993 
-1 -0.18% -2.043** 0.998 -0.05% -0.247 0.992 
0 1.83% 14.145*** 1.016 -2.12% -18.273*** 0.971 
1 -0.30% -7.494*** 1.013 -0.49% -15.105*** 0.966 
2 -0.01% -1.014 1.013 -0.33% -3.870*** 0.963 
3 -0.18% -0.005 1.011 -0.18% -3.292*** 0.961 
4 -0.07% -0.579 1.010 -0.22% -2.285** 0.959 
5 0.5% 0.947 1.011 -0.02% -0.490 0.959 
10 0.01% 0.350 1.014 0.27% 0.461 0.974 
20 0.12% 0.204 1.036 0.18% 0.387 0.984 
Notes: The table reports the average stock price response to the earnings announcements 
around the event day (0, +1). The T-test was conducted in the traditional way  t =
AAR t
(var  AAR t ) 
1
2 
. 
The table provides a standard test for whether the average abnormal return AARt is 
significantly different from zero. The positive return portfolios are reported in Panel A (708 
firms) and negative return portfolios (959 firms) are reported in Panel B. Portfolios were 
formed on the basis of the earnings announcement returns during an extended period of two 
days (0, +1). We extend the announcement period to two days to capture any market reaction 
for announcements made after or toward the end of the trading day. Positive (negative) returns 
were formed into Good (Bad) portfolios. The average performance index (API) uses a buy-and-
hold strategy to calculate returns.   API =   1 + ARit    
T
t=0 Was calculated to show wealth 
formation changes around earnings announcements. * Significant at the 10% level.  ** 
Significant at the 5% level.  *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
It can be observed from panel A that AARs for the Good news portfolio are statistically 
significant around the announcement day and most of the AARs in the pre-announcement period 
are negative numbers. Our finding is that there is strong evidence to support rejection of the null 
hypothesis that there is no daily abnormal return for  the -3, -1, 0 and 1 days in the event 
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window (-19, +20). The higher significance levels are found at Day 0 and Day 1 where a 1% 
significance level is shown. This is expected, as these are considered the initial market reaction 
to the positive news. AARs for the four days following the event day are of the wrong or 
opposite sign. This may point to some underreactions to the event which is later being corrected 
by the fact that the AARs from day +5 until day +20 start to pick up again with positive returns. 
For the negative news portfolio, AARs are significant for the following days: -10,-4,-3, 
0,1,2,3 and 4. Most of these AARs are significant at the 1% level with negative t-tests. This 
suggests that the market overreacts to bad news, starting even before the announcement day. 
Negative AARs starts from day T-5 up to day T+5; after this, the market reverses its direction 
and corrects its movement to a level where it would regain almost all its losses. The average 
performance index API, which reflects the actual investors‟ wealth change, shows us clearly that 
an investor who invested initially in the specified portfolio on day t-20 could lose, on average, 
up to 5% if he was to liquidate his bad news investment 5 days after the announcement day. 
However the same investor would regain his losses and reach near break-even point 20 days 
after the announcement. In general, It appears that prices underreact (overreact) to positive 
(negative) news for the first week after the announcement, then prices reverse for both portfolios 
achieving higher positive returns which drift upward for the next two and a half  weeks; that is, 
T+5 to t+20. Interestingly, the magnitude of the news impact on prices is phenomenal, 
suggesting that someone could constantly outperform the market by utilising the under-/over-
reaction and price reversal patterns in the SSM. 
Aggregating the mean abnormal returns over time produces cumulative average 
abnormal returns ( CAAR ) which allow us to test the persistence of the effect of the event 
during an event window (𝑇2 − 𝑇1 ) where  𝑇1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇2 . CAAR can also be tested by standard 
test statistics where the CAAR is divided by an estimate standard deviation of the time series of 
average abnormal returns aggregated over event window 𝐾. As K periods increase for the 
CAAR estimation window, the variance also increases. 
 
𝐭 − 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬 =
𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑹(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐)
 (𝑲 + 𝟏)𝒔𝑨𝑨𝑹𝒕
𝟐
 
 
(10) 
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We need only to adjust the variance for the accumulation of time where  K is the total 
number of event time (days) observations used to calculate CAAR.  The focus of this model is 
to test whether or not the average return on the sample during the event window is statistically 
different from the average return during a non-event period, which is expected to be zero. It is 
crucial to make sure that events are not clustered or overlapping; if they are, they will hinder any 
inference from the test statistics. 
 
We hypothesise that CAAR = 0. In other words, investors‟ wealth will not experience 
abnormal returns merely because of investment decision made conditionally on the event. We 
can state our hypothesis in the following format: 
oH : If the expected cumulative average abnormal return is zero, CAAR=0. 
1H : If the expected cumulative average abnormal return is other than zero, CAAR≠0. 
 
 The assumption that the abnormal returns of each individual stock are uncorrelated in 
the cross section allows us to infer something about the cumulative average abnormal returns 
without regard for the covariance between the individual CARs. All CAARs are tested for being 
significantly different from zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
Table  2-2  : Positive and Negative news portfolios’ performances using CAAR. 
Event Window 
(week number) 
  CAAR 
      (in days) 
     Good news      Bad news 
A:Pre-Announcement period 
Weeks (-4,-1) CAAR (-20,-2) -0.65%** 0.39% 
Weeks ( -2,-1) CAAR(-11,-2) -0.21% 0.40%* 
Week ( -1,-1) CAAR(-5,-1) -0.66%*** -0.51%** 
Day   (-1,-1) CAAR(-1,-1) -0.23% -0.03% 
B: Announcement day(s) CAAR (-1,+1) 2.30%*** -2.96%*** 
C: Post-announcement period 
Week (+1,+1) CAAR (+2+5) 0.14% -0.96%*** 
Week (+1,+2) CAAR (+2+11) 0.41%** -0.40%** 
Week (+1,+4) CAAR (+2,+20) 2.11%*** 1.24%*** 
D: Whole period (40 days) CAAR (-19,+20) 3.77%*** -1.33%*** 
No. of Firms 
 
708 959 
Note: this shows CAARs and their test statistics for Positive and Negative news. The table reports 
the positive and negative news performances over different time intervals to show how events are 
anticipated in the pre-event period and to examine the market reaction to news over different 
event windows. Event periods were divided into four panels. Panel A reports the pre-
announcement cumulative returns, Panel B shows the announcement day(s) returns, Panel C the 
post-announcement period and Panel D the whole period (40 days). Good news firms increase on 
average by 3.77% over CAAR (-19, +20), while Bad news firms decrease on average by -1.33% over 
CAAR (-19, +20). The statistical significance of the average stock price response to the earnings 
announcements around different event windows is shown below: 
  t − statistics =
CAAR (t1,t2)
 (K+1)sAAR t
2
 .  
* Estimate significant at the 10% level,** Estimate significant at the 5% level,*** Estimate 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
For the cumulative average abnormal return CAARs, we construct different CAAR 
windows to capture any unusual activities around earnings announcements. Event windows 
were divided into four periods; pre-announcement, announcement day, post-announcement and 
the whole period; their results are presented in Panels A, B, C and D, respectively.  Panel A 
shows an event window which starts 20 days before the announcement and continues until the 
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announcement day. The pre-announcement period shows any anticipation or leakage of news. 
We can observe statically significant cumulative abnormal returns in the period (-5, -1) for 
portfolios of both Good and Bad news, indicating the importance of examining this period 
carefully and testing whether this period could explain returns in subsequent periods. For the 
good news portfolio, CAAR (-5,-1) interestingly shows a negative return (-0.66%) which is 
significant at the 1% level. For the Bad news portfolio, the pre-announcement CAAR (-11,-2) 
and CAAR (-5,-1) show statistical significance at both the 5% and 1% levels, which could 
indicate a leakage of information to the market because it shows the reaction starting from Day t 
= -10 with a negative sign of CAAR. A loss-averse investor is more highly motivated to 
anticipate bad news to avoid losses incurred by these announcements. 
In panel B, which captures market reaction around the announcement day, the CAAR for 
the three days (-1 to +1) shows the good news reports price impact with a 2.3% increase which 
is significant at the 1% level. Conversely, the CAAR (-1, +1) for the Bad news portfolio reports 
the highest price impact, with an almost 3% decline which is significant at the 1% level. The 
strongest part of the price reaction takes place in the event window (-1, +1), which suggests that 
the SSM is somehow efficient to an extent in impounding the new information into the prices. 
The post-announcement period in Panel C exhibits interesting patterns of returns, while the 
Good news portfolio clearly indicates predictability in its returns, which are characterised by 
initial underraction. The Bad news portfolio does not reverse its return sign until a week after 
the announcement is made.  
   In the Good news portfolio, CAAR (+2, +5) shows no statistical significance, which 
confirms our previous analysis of the AARs that the market underreacts to Good news for the 
first five days after the announcement is made and then the market starts to form a post-earnings 
announcement drift for certain days (+2, +11). This is also confirmed by the CAAR (+2, +20) 
which is significant at the 1% level.  Around 74% of the cumulative returns in the post-
announcement period originated in weeks 3 and 4, while weeks 1 and 2 contribute only 26% of 
the CAAR in this period.  One explanation of this underreaction at first followed by a price drift 
pattern is that most investors in the SSM are individuals who lack the ability to interpret news 
properly. Moreover, there are no analysts following the market who could issue 
recommendations and forecasts; thus it takes investors more time to react to positive news later 
on, when interpretation and analysis can be found in newspapers, TV interviews and Internet 
forums. In the behavioural finance literature, this kind of behaviour is called “Investors‟ 
Attention”. The Bad news portfolio shows continuous reaction in the first week after the 
announcement day and then a price reversal which almost compensates for all the losses 
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incurred because of the announcement. Positive CAAR in the period (+2,+20), as compared to 
negative CAARs in (+2+5)  and (+2+11) indicate a strong price correction of the initial negative 
returns in the first week after the earnings announcement. CAARs for the post- announcement 
periods  (+2+11) and (+2,+20) report statistical significance at both the 5% and 1% levels, with 
negative returns for first period mainly because week 1 is negative, then followed by positive 
returns for the second period. This confirms our previous analysis of overreaction in the first 
week followed by price reversal in the weeks 2, 3 and 4 after the announcements being released.  
Overall, CAAR (-19, +20) reports 3.77% abnormal returns for the positive news firms and 
(-1.33%) abnormal returns for the negative news firms that are all significant at the 1% level. 
The price impact of earning news is persistent in the good news firms while much of the price 
reaction in the bad news is reversed shortly after the earnings being released. 
Does PEAD differ by industry? 
We test for price reaction differences between various industries to examine whether industries 
have different PEAD properties. This industry-level analysis is addressed because we believe 
that there are certain characteristics associated with certain industries. For example, the banking 
and industrial sectors tend to have larger than average company size, higher government 
ownership and higher institutional ownership. In contrast, the service and agriculture sectors can 
be described as having low market capitalisation, higher volatility in stock prices and earnings, a 
lower level of disclosure and many loss firms. We use the stock exchange classification of 
industries where companies are grouped into eight sectors: banking, industrial, cement, service, 
electricity, agriculture, telecommunication and insurance. Some sectors have a higher number of 
earnings announcements due to the high number of firms (e.g., the banking and industry sectors 
which report 235 and 622 earnings announcements, respectively). We believe that reporting 
average and cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements by industry may 
reveal some explanation for the PEAD based on firm characteristics.  
We expect companies of small size with fewer institutional investors to have a stronger 
price reaction, either in the form of a delayed price reaction or an initial overreaction followed 
by a price reversal. It is very well established in the literature that small companies which  are 
less often followed by analysts tend to show a higher PEAD pattern in their returns around 
earnings announcements; hence, we expect the drift to vary by size as well. Our selection of 
industries can also serve as a proxy of size because large firms tend to be in the banking and 
industrial sectors. Tables (2-3) and (2-4) report the average abnormal returns (AAR) and 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around earnings announcements by sector type. 
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Table  2-3: Average Abnormal returns (AARs) across Firms, Relative to the Announcement Day. 
 
This table reports the average abnormal returns AARt across industries for different days around earnings announcements.  A T-test was conducted in the 
traditional way. 
  𝐭 =
𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐭
(𝐯𝐚𝐫 𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐭) 
𝟏
𝟐 
.  AARt were broken down by sector (Industrial, Cement, Service, Electricity, Agriculture, Telecommunication and Insurance). Positive 
(negative) Returns were formed into Good (Bad) portfolios for each industry .t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
 
 
Industry Banking Industrial Cement Service Electricity Agriculture Telecommunication Insurance 
Days Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
-5 0.001 
(0.79) 
0.000 
(-0.41) 
0.000 
(-0.26) 
0.002 
(1.25) 
0.000 
(-0.15) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(-0.97) 
0.000 
(-0.23) 
-0.015 
(-1.60) 
-0.002 
(-0.48) 
0.000 
(-0.07) 
0.005 
(1.35) 
0.004 
(0.60) 
0.005 
(1.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.53) 
0.006 
(1.93) 
-4 0.001 
(0.89) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.47) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.83) 
-0.006 
(-1.97) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(-0.09) 
-0.012 
(-1.91) 
-0.007 
(-1.76) 
0.003 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
0.003 
(0.48) 
0.004 
(0.83) 
-3 -0.004 
(-2.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.003 
(-1.38) 
-0.002 
(-1.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.87) 
0.000 
(-0.29) 
-0.006 
(-1.99) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.021 
(-1.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
-0.003 
(-0.59) 
0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.004 
(-0.84) 
0.009 
(2.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.42) 
0.012 
(0.63) 
-2 0.001 
(0.52) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.003 
(-1.350 
-0.002 
(-1.19) 
-0.002 
(-1.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.82) 
-0.009 
(-2.62) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.25) 
0.005 
(0.62) 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
0.007 
(0.75) 
0.007 
(2.07) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
0.031 
(2.39) 
-1 -0.002 
(-1.16) 
0.002 
(-0.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.30) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(-0.13) 
-0.003 
(-1.23) 
-0.003 
(-1.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.004 
(0.57) 
-0.007 
(-1.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.006 
(1.52) 
-0.007 
(-0.86) 
0.010 
(1.36) 
  
              
 
0 0.011 
(6.62) 
-0.011 
(-9.71) 
0.019 
(9.04) 
-0.018 
(-12.7) 
0.012 
(6.76) 
-0.009 
(-6.76) 
0.027 
(8.56) 
-0.018 
(-9.99) 
0.015 
(2.64) 
-0.011 
(-1.50) 
0.027 
(4.94) 
-0.023 
(-8.18) 
0.021 
(3.51) 
-0.010 
(-2.62) 
0.015 
(7.72) 
-0.02 
(-1.86) 
  
              
 
1 0.008 
(4.71) 
-0.009 
(-8.32) 
0.013 
(6.32) 
-0.017 
(-12.3) 
0.006 
(3.49) 
-0.008 
(-6.77) 
0.019 
(5.46) 
-0.018 
(-10.1) 
0.011 
(1.24) 
-0.010 
(-1.41) 
0.020 
(3.81) 
-0.024 
(-7.93) 
0.003 
(0.49) 
-0.012 
(-3.10) 
0.008 
(0.91) 
-0.005 
(-0.66) 
2 -0.001 
(-0.58) 
-0.002 
(-1.29) 
0.001 
(0.56) 
-0.004 
(-2.64) 
-0.001 
(-0.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
0.005 
(1.45) 
-0.006 
(-2.75) 
-0.004 
(-0.58) 
-0.008 
(-1.07) 
0.011 
(1.58) 
-0.007 
(-1.64) 
-0.012 
(-2.42) 
0.010 
(1.69) 
0.003 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
3 0.003 
(1.61) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.004 
(1.74) 
-0.005 
(-3.12) 
-0.002 
(-1.07) 
-0.004 
(-2.45) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.98) 
-0.010 
(-1.23) 
-0.006 
(-1.42) 
-0.007 
(-1.17) 
-0.007 
(-2.03) 
-0.003 
(-1.30) 
0.004 
(0.70) 
0.005 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(-1.28) 
4 -0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.76) 
-0.002 
(-1.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
-0.003 
(-2.00) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
0.007 
(1.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.78) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.008 
(-1.96) 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.97) 
5 0.000 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.70) 
0.000 
(-0.18) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.002 
(1.10) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.009 
(1.81) 
-0.004 
(-1.53) 
0.003 
(2.89) 
0.007 
(0.66) 
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Table  2-4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) by Sector. 
 
 Table 2-4 shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) and buy-and-hold-abnormal returns (BHAR) broken down by sectors. Positive (negative) 
returns are reported for each industry in two portfolios Good and Bad. The letter G represents the Good news portfolios while B represents the Bad news 
portfolios. The table reports the positive and negative news performances over different time intervals to show how events are anticipated in the pre-
event period and to examine the market reaction to news from different industries. *Significant at the 10% level, **   Significant at the 5% level and *** 
Significant at the 1% level.
Event 
window 
Banking 
(n=235) 
Industrial 
(n=622) 
Cement 
(n=216) 
            Service 
          (n=397) 
Electricity 
(n=31) 
         Agriculture 
  (  n=164) 
        Telecom 
           (n=38) 
Insurance 
(n=21) 
Panel A: 
CAAR 
G B G B  G B G B G B G B G B G B 
(-20,-1) 0.000 
 
0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
0.008 
** 
-0.018 
*** 
-0.010 
*** 
0.019 
*** 
0.024 
*** 
-0.036 
*** 
0.015 
*** 
0.005 
 
0.042 
*** 
0.008 
 
0.013 
*** 
-0.011 
 
0.052 
*** 
(-10,-1) 0.002 
*** 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
0.010 
*** 
-0.006 
*** 
-0.004 
*** 
0.014 
*** 
0.006 
** 
-0.029 
*** 
-0.002 
 
-0.015 
*** 
0.032 
*** 
-0.020 
*** 
0.015 
*** 
-0.019 
*** 
0.057 
*** 
(-5,-1) -0.002 
* 
0.001 
 
-0.007 
*** 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
** 
-0.003 
* 
0.007 
** 
-0.007 
*** 
-0.037 
*** 
0.004 
* 
-0.025 
*** 
-0.003 
 
0.009 
** 
0.025 
*** 
-0.011 
** 
0.064 
*** 
(0,+1) 0.001 
*** 
-0.020 
*** 
0.032 
*** 
-0.036 
*** 
0.018 
*** 
-0.016 
*** 
0.046 
*** 
-0.036 
*** 
0.026 
*** 
-0.021 
*** 
0.047 
*** 
-0.047 
*** 
0.025 
*** 
-0.022 
*** 
0.024 
*** 
-0.025 
*** 
(+2+5) 0.001 
 
-0.003 
** 
0.002 
 
-0.011 
*** 
-0.003 
* 
-0.006 
*** 
-0.021 
*** 
0.005 
* 
-0.005 
 
-0.016 
*** 
0.002 
 
-0.022 
*** 
-0.008 
** 
0.010 
*** 
0.013 
*** 
-0.007 
* 
(+2+10) -0.002 
*** 
0.000 
 
0.008 
*** 
-0.008 
*** 
-0.009 
 
-0.005 
*** 
-0.027 
*** 
-0.001 
 
-0.008 
* 
-0.022 
*** 
0.003 
 
0.000 
 
-0.035 
*** 
0.000 
 
0.057 
*** 
-0.003 
 
(+2,+20) -0.005 
*** 
-0.006 
*** 
0.030 
*** 
0.012 
*** 
0.002 
** 
-0.003 
* 
-0.026 
*** 
-0.003 
 
0.061 
*** 
-0.054 
*** 
0.036 
*** 
0.033 
*** 
-0.030 
*** 
-0.001 
 
0.071 
*** 
0.017 
** 
Panel B: 
BHAR 
(-20,+20) 
1.037 0.976 1.059 0.984 1.001 0.971 1.038 0.986 1.05 0.941 1.09 1.02 1.002 0.989 1.086 1.042 
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The service and agriculture sectors report the highest earnings announcement returns (EAR) on 
days (0,+1), confirming our expectation that small companies will show a strong  price reaction  
due to the higher volatility and risk associated with this type of company. Table (2-3) shows all 
AARs to be significant at the 1% level for all industries except electricity, which contains only 
one company and has fewer earnings announcements. Moreover, blue chip sectors (i.e., 
banking, industry, cement) show lower AAR in the days preceding the announcement day, 
indicating that the level of information leakage or price anticipation in general is lower in these 
sectors than in sectors where the companies are small and less often followed by investors and 
the media. 
Table (2-4) lists all industries‟ CAARs in Panel A, while Panel B shows how returns 
around the earnings announcement impact investors‟ wealth formation, when using the BHAR 
method. In Panel A, CAARs for different industries vary and the upward price drifts seem to 
be more persistent for industrial, agricultural and insurance firms in the Good news portfolios. 
In the Bad news portfolios, the banking, industrial, cement and electricity sectors show 
persistent downward price drift which is consistent with the literature, whereas the service, 
agriculture, telecommunication and insurance sectors show contradicting results of negative 
initial reaction to bad news followed by positive reaction in the weeks following earnings 
announcements.  
Panel B reports returns on both Good and Bad news portfolios of 1 S.R. invested 
equally in all industries using buy-and-hold-abnormal returns method for the period between –
20 and +20. Agriculture and insurance sectors report the highest returns on their Good news 
portfolios at 9% and 8%. Electricity and banking report the highest losses for the same period 
of investment (-20 to +20). Interestingly, the insurance and agriculture sectors report positive 
returns for the bad news portfolios at 4.2% and 2%, respectively. It should be mentioned that, 
due to their relatively small size, these sectors are always the target of very speculative waves 
which make their prices deviate very widely from their fundamental values.  
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Robustness test 
It is natural to assume that the magnitude of the drift is closely related to unexpected earnings 
or the earning surprise (i.e., the difference between the actual earnings and the market‟s 
expectations of earnings). We have discussed previously the many possible proxies to have 
been used for the earnings surprise, which can generally be categorised into time-series 
models, analyst forecast models and earnings announcement returns (EARs). 
 
In this study, we assume that that market is directionally efficient, meaning that if a 
company announces earnings which are higher (lower)  than expected, the stock should react 
positively (negatively) on the announcement day. We use EAR as our measure of surprise and 
group all companies which produce positive (negative) EARs into two portfolios, namely, 
Good (Bad) news portfolios. Many papers in the literature use consensus forecasts or the 
average of analysts‟ forecasts as a measure of the earnings surprise. The SSM lacks publicly 
available analysts‟ forecast; hence, for a robustness check, we use the time-series property of 
quarterly earnings as another measure of earnings surprise and to compare with our EAR 
surprise measure. To model for unexpected earnings, we apply a naive time-series model 
which  predicts that this quarter‟s earnings will be the same as they were in the same quarter of 
last year‟s earnings, i.e. earnings follow a random walk with a drift. This model is called the 
seasonal random walk model:    
 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒒,𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒒,𝒊−𝟒 + 𝜹𝒊 (11) 
 
         
where 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞  is the earnings per share in the current quarter and 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞−4 is the earnings per 
share of the same quarter in the previous year and 𝜹𝒊 is the drift. If actual earnings are higher 
than predicted by the model, then we consider that their earnings quarter in the Good news 
portfolio and Bad news portfolio is allocated for firms whose  earnings are below the level of 
predicted earnings.   
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Table  2-5 : Average Abnormal returns (AARs) and Average Performance Index APIs.  
 
 Good news Portfolios Bad news Portfolios 
Days Relative 
 to Announcements 
AAR (%) t-test API AAR (%) t-test API 
-19 0.016% 0.178 1.0002 -.11% -1.42 1.0048 
-10 0.13% 1.41 1.0007 0.05% 0.63 1.0007 
-5 0.09% 1.013 1.005 0.02% 0.20 1.0070 
-4 -0.15% 1.645* 1.003 0.10% 1.10 1.005 
-3 -0.04% 0.456 1.003 -0.158% -1.71* 1.001 
-2 -0.03% 0.331 1.002 -0.002% -0.02 0.999 
-1 -0.16% 1.625* 1.0023 0.143% 1.31 0.996 
0 -0.27% 2.602*** 1.0031 0.072% -5.43*** 0.99 
1 -0.53% -5.233*** 1.00045 -0.51% -4.77*** 0.984 
2 -0.16% -1.640* 0.9993 -0.19% -1.69** 0.982 
3 -0.19% -1.96** 0.9968 -0.02% -0.23 0.981 
4 -0.13% -1.475 0.9945 -0.10% -1.17 0.980 
5 -0.08% -0.916 0.9942 -0.03% -0.31 0.981 
10 0.07% 0.855 0.999 0.18% 1.06 0.985 
20 0.12% 1.327 1.009 0.35% 3.1*** 1.005 
Notes: The table reports the average stock price response to the earnings announcements 
around the event day (0, +1).  T-test was conducted in the traditional way  t =
AAR t
(var  AAR t ) 
1
2 
. 
The table provides a standard test for whether the average abnormal return AARt is 
significantly different from zero. The Good news portfolio is reported in Panel A  (985 
observations) and the negative returns portfolio (330 observations) is reported in Panel B. 
Portfolios were formed on the basis of expected earnings according to the following rule: If 
ESP>E(EPS)= Good news portfolio; and If EPS<E(EPS)= Bad news portfolio. The average 
performance index (API)   uses buy-and-hold strategy to calculate returns. APIt =   1 +
40
t=1
ARit    was calculated to show wealth formation changes around earnings announcements. 
*Significant at the 10% level,** Significant at the 5% level and*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
When using the times-series forecast model (Seasonal Random Walk Model with Drift) to 
measure the earning surprise, we get similar results to the EAR measure. Underreaction to 
higher actual earnings than expected is observed in the Good news firms, resulting in an 
upward price drift for the following weeks. The Bad news firms show overreaction to earnings 
news in the first week, followed by a price reversal which also continues to drift upward  in the 
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following weeks (+2,+4), a  pattern similar to the one found using the EAR surprise measure. 
However, the magnitude of the drift is lower for the earnings which are  forecasted using the 
random walk model. The model seemed to underestimate the expected earnings, in particular 
when average EPS for the whole market rose more than four-fold during the time of the study. 
The two portfolios react differently but eventually they produce similar returns for the event 
window (-19 to +20).  
 
Figure  2-8: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) for the Earnings Surprise using a 
Time-Series Earnings Forecast. 
 
Figure (2-8) shows BHAR performances over 40 trading days around earnings announcements (-
19, +20). The Good news portfolio (985 observations) = companies achieving higher earnings 
than expected by the time-series forecast model. The Bad news portfolio (330 observation) = 
companies achieving lower earnings than expected by the time-series forecast model.  Portfolio 
performance is calculated using :BHARt =
1
N
 (  1 + Ri,t   
T
t=0 −   1 + MRt  ) 
T
t=0
n
i=1 . One Riyal 
invested in either portfolio 20 days before the earnings announcement will eventually produce 
similar results at the end of the period (20 days after the announcement). While Good news firms 
exhibit clear underreaction to the news, Bad news firms show overreaction to the news, followed 
by an upward price drift which starts in the second week after the announcement and continues 
through weeks 3 and 4. 
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2.7 Summary 
 
In this paper, we show the existence of PEAD in the SSM, using announcement returns as 
proxy for the earnings surprise. Disregarding transaction costs, it is possible in the SSM to 
outperform the market constantly by adapting the market reaction patterns and through the use 
of PEAD. The results pose a challenge to the efficiency of the SSM. The SSM seems to 
underreact to positive news for the first five days and then a positive reaction tends to be 
stronger for the following weeks, indicating the existence of a post-earnings announcement 
drift. In contrast, the SSM overreacts to negative news in the first five days and then reverses 
its direction and reports an upward post-earnings announcement drift.  Our results suggest that 
the market is slow in adjusting to new information when there is good news and reacts 
irrationally to bad news. The results are robust using different earnings surprises EAR and 
time-series earning expectation models. The absence of analysts‟ forecasts and an individually 
dominated market are the main explanation of this underreaction to positive news and 
overreaction to negative news. It is confirmed by higher PEAD in sectors containing smaller 
firms and where there is lower government and institutional ownership. 
Transaction costs have been highlighted by many researchers as a limitation of the 
arbitrage strategy of riding the PEAD wave (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990; Bhushan 
1994). However, our results are in line with the more recent study by Ng et al (2008), who 
explain the existence PEAD by means of the transaction cost. They find that transaction costs 
constrain informed trades which are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price.  
They suggest that there is a weaker returns response at the time of the announcement and a 
higher subsequent return drift for firms with higher transacting costs. We confirm that this 
constraint on behaviour owing to transaction cost exists in the SSM, in particular for Good 
news small firms. 
Our results confirm the uncertain information hypothesis suggested by Brown et al 
(1988), who postulate that rational, risk-averse investors may underreact to positive news and 
overreact to negative news. We document a return reversal pattern for the Bad news firms 
starting one week after the initial announcement is made. We find an upward post-earnings 
announcement drift for both positive and negative news firms, which are confirmed through 
statistically significant CARs around earnings announcements and in the four weeks following 
the event.  
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Interpretation of the different reactions for Good and Bad news firms, where a Good news 
portfolio shows an initial underreaction to positive news and a Bad news portfolio shows 
strong overreaction, can easily be linked to the literature. This kind of behaviour has been well 
documented and explained in many ways. Lim and Kong (2004) have explained this 
behavioural pattern in different ways. First they trace it to the Prospect Theory of Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) and to the Conservatism Theory (see Edwards, 1968), which  have frequently 
been referred to in the field of behavioural finance. Both these theories suggest that investors 
are risk and loss averse. This attitude makes investors value gains and losses differently, 
leading to quick and strong reactions to any potential losses; whereas they are more careful in 
taking decisions related to optional gains due to the risk involved. Second, the conservatism 
theory provides another element which is in harmony with the former theory: this postulates 
that investors are slow to update their beliefs in the face of new information.  The 
underreaction to good news is more consistent with the conservatism theory. Within this 
context, investors would sell any Bad news stock early and buy any Good news stock late, 
creating the underreaction to good news and overreaction to bad news, a behaviour which is 
observed in the SSM and supported by prospect and conservatism theories.  This explanation is 
modelled in Barberis et al. (1998) in the underreaction and overreaction hypothesis, under 
which conservative investors underreact to good news. Their model of investors‟ sentiments is 
motivated by varied psychological evidence and displays the heuristic of representativeness. 
When investors face an adverse event (here, bad news), they will overreact by selling the asset 
rapidly and even at a very low price, which suggests that investors overreact to bad news 
announcements and underreact to positive news announcements. 
In conclusion, the SSM shows predictable returns around earnings announcements. It is 
possible in the SSM to outperform the market constantly by adapting the market reaction 
patterns using PEAD investment strategy. Disregarding transaction cost, for a holding period 
of (-19, +20) an investor would achieve 3.77% abnormal market-adjusted returns for positive 
news firms, which is 15% annually, and (-1.33%) abnormal market-adjusted returns for the 
negative news firms, which  is (-5.32% ) annually. 
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chapter 3 : Information Asymmetry, Trading Activity and 
Investor Behaviour around Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines stock returns and trading activities around earnings announcements for 
listed companies in the Saudi stock market (SSM). Specifically, we examine the levels of stock 
liquidity, trading activity, volatility, bid-ask spread, asymmetric information and investor 
trading behaviour around earnings announcements for all firms in the market for the period 
2002-2009. We also examine trading behaviour among small and large investors in the market 
through constructing order imbalance measures. The magnitude of the cumulative abnormal 
returns and liquidity around earnings announcement are investigated using regression analysis.  
Our study is motivated by many factors: first, we investigate the Saudi stock market to 
provide out-of-sample evidence regarding the on-going debate about Post-Earnings 
Announcements Drift (PEAD) and the way in which it can be explained, because the nature of 
this anomaly is not well understood. Second, the SSM is dominated by individual investors, 
90% of its total trading, which provides an ideal setting for studying how investors react to 
informational events. Third, the SSM has unique institutional characteristics which make it 
suitable to test for these characteristics on stock returns and trading activities. For instance, it 
allows neither short selling nor derivatives trading. Moreover few analysts follow the market 
and reports are scarce and not regularly published, which makes it hard to anticipate earnings 
and news in the market. Finally, the SSM is an order-driven market; thus, analysing traders‟ 
placement strategies around earnings announcements  provides an insight which is applicable 
to other order-driven markets. 
All these factors motivate us to study how information content affects trading 
behaviour around earnings announcements. It is of great value to both academics and 
practitioners to study the effect of these unique aspects of the SSM on stock trading and return 
behaviour. 
Following previous studies (see, among others, Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002;  Chiang and 
Wang, 2007 and Lakhal, 2008), we measure the information content of quarterly earnings 
announcements, using abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, abnormal volatility and 
abnormal trading activity around the dates of  quarterly earnings announcements. We also 
estimate and observe the change in bid-ask spread and investors‟ trading behaviour around the 
quarterly releases of earnings. 
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3.2 Literature review 
 
For over 40 years, researchers have consistently documented the phenomena in stock markets 
where stock prices tend to drift in the direction of the earnings surprise following earnings 
announcements; this phenomenon is called Post-Earnings Announcements Drift (PEAD). 
PEAD has been found in the SSM (see Chapter 2, above). In this chapter, we explore the 
trading activities around earnings announcements with the aim of examining how investors and 
the market in aggregate level behave around earnings announcements. This behaviour is 
reflected in trading volume, volatility, bid/ask spread, abnormal returns, order imbalance and 
other factors. A vast body of research has documented the tendency of stock price returns to 
show a continuous drift after the release of earnings announcement (see, for example, Ball and 
Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990; Fama, 1998; and Garfinkel and Sokobin, 
2006). The systematic increase in price returns around earnings announcements can be 
observed in periods either before or after earnings announcements (see, for example, Beaver, 
1968; Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006; Cohen et al., 2007; and Frazzini and Lamont, 2007).   
Early event studies even document that the information content of earnings announcement  not 
only affects returns, but other stock characteristics of trading, such as higher abnormal trading 
volume surrounding announcements (Beaver, 1968; Kiger, 1972; and Morse, 1981).  
 
Many researchers have confirmed the robustness of PEAD using different techniques 
and different data (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1998, 1990; Ball, 1992; Ball and Bartov, 1996; 
and Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005). Findings of research on the capital markets suggest that 
earnings announcements contain information which is believed to alter investors‟ opinion 
about the values of stocks, through the process of impounding information into prices.  
 
 
PEAD is typically explained by the magnitude of the earnings surprises , the 
unexpected component of the earnings. The higher the surprise (the difference between 
anticipated earnings and actual earnings), the higher the drift found. Early studies measure the 
earnings surprise using the seasonal random walk model, while later studies focus on analyst-
based earnings surprise, since it is deemed a better substitute proxy for market expectation. 
More puzzling is that recent studies find that the drift which is associated with analyst-based 
surprise is even larger than that associated with the seasonal random walk surprise (Livnat and 
Mendenhall, 2006; and Doyle et al., 2006). 
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In attempting to explain the drift, many studies have distinguished between individual 
trading and institutional trading and suggest that institutional trading is more sophisticated than 
individual trading. On this basis, individual trading may be more closely related than 
institutional trading is to market inefficiencies in general and PEAD in particular (see, for 
instance, De Franco et al,  2007).  Frazzini and Lamont (2007) indicate that the earnings 
announcement premium is driven by buying from uninformed investors and relate the price 
pattern to a temporary increase in trading volume around the announcement release date. 
Berkman et al. (2009) and Trueman et al. (2003) find that the prices of certain stocks 
tend to increase only temporarily before the announcement, but do the opposite after the 
announcement. They also suggest that retail investors are a likely source of the temporary 
surge in buying and stock prices. 
However, recent research provides some evidence that even relatively more 
sophisticated investors have difficulty in processing financial information which could delay 
the price reaction to news (e.g., Bushee 2001; Ke and Petroni 2004). While we do not intend to 
review all the literature on PEAD drift, we intend to show that this phenomenon is poorly 
understood; as Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) argue, “if researchers do not understand how the 
magnitude of the drift depends on the specification of earnings surprise, they stand little chance 
of understanding the nature of the anomaly.” 
 
Research on the capital market has established that when earnings announcements are 
released, a substantial increase is observed, not only in return volatility and trading volumes  as 
found in earlier studies, but even in the concentration of trading activity. Analysing trading 
activities around earnings announcements should provide us with a clearer picture of the way 
in which different aspects of the market respond in general, not only the stock returns. The 
persistent increase of stock returns can be induced by factors other than the earnings surprise. 
Liquidity, level of information asymmetry, trading volume and order imbalance can all have 
major effects on price drift.  
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Trading volume and volatility 
In general, stock returns and trading volume tend to be positively correlated. Stocks tend to rise 
on high volume and decline on low volume.
21
 Most of the theories explaining the volume-
return relationship emphasise the dispersion of beliefs among investors.  In Miller‟s theory 
(1977), in an environment of short selling constraint and dispersion of opinion, prices will be 
biased upward because only the optimistic traders will buy the stock and the pessimistic ones 
are kept out of the market. Earnings announcements provide an ideal environment to test the 
volume effect on returns, because they are frequent, exogenous, generate substantial volume 
and have almost fixed intervals (Frazzini and Lamont, 2007). 
 
  Past empirical work shows that stock returns around earnings announcements are 
usually associated with an increase in trading volume and volatility. Trading volume usually 
increases in response to earnings announcements, due to the reduction of information 
uncertainty among investors.  In addition, as some researchers suggest, investors have different 
levels of ability to process information and may interpret earnings news differently, hence 
respond differently (Karpoff, 1986; Demski and Feltham, 1994; and Kim and Verrecchia, 
1994, 1997). 
 
Other researchers have explained the relationship between volume and returns in the 
context of noise traders. Higher trading volume indicates the presence of irrational or noise 
traders, who push up prices (Baker and Stein, 2004). Other similar explanations have focused 
on the “attention-grabbing hypothesis”, under which individual traders have limited attention 
and rarely use short selling. If a stock attracts their attention, they are likely to buy it, 
regardless of the nature of the news good or bad. This hypothesis predicts that stocks in the 
news have both high volume and high net buying by individuals (Lee, 1992; Gervais et al. , 
2001; and Barber and Odean, 2008). 
 
Kandel and Pearson (1995) demonstrate that volume rises on earnings announcements 
for all types of news, whether good, bad or without significance. Frazzini and Lamont (2007) 
find that, around earnings announcements, stocks with high volume have subsequently both 
high premiums and high imputed buying by individual investors. They invoke the “attention-
grabbing” hypothesis, causing stocks in the news to be usually associated with higher trading 
volume and net buying by individuals. They also show that the anomaly cannot be arbitraged 
                                                        
21 See, among others, Karpoff‟s review of the subject (1987) 
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away due to the costly trading volume needed and the highly idiosyncratic volatility around 
earnings announcements, which deters traders from diversifying.  
 
 
If new information is believed to either increase or decrease uncertainty in the market, 
then we can safely assume that volatility will also change around earnings announcements. 
Many research papers have documented the increase in return volatility and trading volume 
around earnings announcements compared with non-announcement periods (Beaver, 1968; 
Bamber, 1986). However, the relationship property between volatility in the post-
announcement period and the content or precision of the earnings announcement cannot be 
exactly defined. Kim and Verrecchia (1991), for example, suggest that the private information-
gathering characteristics in an economy play an important role into determining the volatility 
around earnings announcements.  
 
Acker (2002) links volatility with the content of the earnings announcement and 
documents a time asymmetry in volatility according to the information processing reaction. If 
an announcement is easy to interpret or contains good news, an increase in volatility is usually 
observed on the day of the announcement, while bad news or difficult-to-interpret news has a 
delayed price and volatility reaction until the following day.  
 
Liquidity and information asymmetry 
 
If various  groups of investors differ in their ability to interpret information or if they do not 
have the same access to information, then one would assume that earnings announcements may 
be of different degrees of usefulness to them and that the information content of 
announcements differs from one investor to another. This notion has been established for some 
time; for example, Hakansson (1977) shows that if investors differ in their information 
acquisition abilities or resources, different patterns of information acquisition and processing 
emerge. In making investment decisions, investors with low information processing skills or 
resources (small investors) tend to rely on public information, whereas more sophisticated 
investors with better information processing skills or resources rely on pre-disclosure 
information. Many researchers suggest that since some investors are asymmetrically informed 
before the anticipated announcement, they may respond to it differently (Kim and Verrecchia, 
1991; Demski and Feltham, 1994).  The Behavioural school argue that irrationality, in the form 
of one or more cognitive processing biases, can be the major source for these financial 
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anomalies. It is also argued that individual investors behave less rationally than institutional 
investors (Daniel et al., 1998). 
 
The information content of public disclosures can be observed through stock returns 
and changes in trading volume around the date of announcement, among many other variables. 
Announcements which cause more change in abnormal returns and trading volume are believed 
to contain more information than announcements whose effects are milder (Bamber and 
Cheon, 1995).  While abnormal returns are closely linked to the information content of the 
announcement, trading volume is normally associated with the level of information asymmetry 
in the market such that it captures the willingness of investors to hold or sell the stock, 
according to beliefs. 
  
Akerlof (1970) provides a framework in which corporate disclosures aim to reduce the 
informational gap between investors and the effect of information asymmetry by which 
informed investors gain when trading with uninformed ones. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
introduce the notion that a higher presence of informed traders on the market will widen the 
bid-ask spread to compensate the market maker for additional adverse selection cost. Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that these adverse selection costs may reduce liquidity and 
affect the cost of capital to firms. It is often argued that the level of information asymmetry in 
the market is reduced after the announcement (Lee et al., 1993). Handa et al. (2003) argue that 
spread serves also as a proxy of information asymmetry in an order-driven market, because it is 
a function of adverse selection and also of difference in valuation.  
 
Furthermore, the literature on market microstructure has shown the positive impact of 
earnings announcements on stock market liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Coller and 
Yohn, 1997; and Bushee et al., 2003). Demsetz (1968) proposes the bid-ask spread as a 
measure of liquidity where the spread reflects the adverse selection costs entailed by 
asymmetric information among investors. Higher information asymmetry would increase the 
adverse selection cost and this is reflected in a wider bid-ask spread. The market microstructure 
literature usually decomposes the spread into three components, namely, order processing, 
inventory and adverse selection components. More recent papers have shown that adverse 
selection or information asymmetry component represents a significant portion of the spread 
and that increased adverse selection cost is the dominant factor affecting bid-ask spread around 
earnings announcements. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that, due to the different levels of 
ability of market participants to process information, information asymmetry should not only 
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increase on the day before the announcement, but should also stay at a high level in the post-
announcement period, since some investors are better able to interpret news than other. Some 
participants, for example, process the public information (earnings announcements) into private 
information about a firm‟s performance and make better informed judgements. 
 
Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) find that, on the day of the announcement, the adverse 
selection component of the spread increases. They also find this component increases even 
before the announcement day and suggest that spread is used as a proxy for both information 
asymmetry and market liquidity. Heflin et al. (2005) show that high quality disclosures 
enhance market liquidity by increasing the quoted depth and reducing effective spreads. Healy 
et al. (1999) conclude that companies which show sustained growth at the level of information 
disclosure exhibit higher liquidity through a lower relative bid-ask spread. Both Heflin et al. 
(2005) and Healy et al. (1999) use relative spread as a proxy for market liquidity. Demsetz 
(1986), Tinic (1972) find a negative relationship between trading activity and the bid-ask 
spread. Yet Glosten and Harris, (1988) among many others, suggest that spreads are negatively 
associated with trading volume and share price but positively associated with return volatility.  
 
The inconclusive evidence of information asymmetry and liquidity behaviour around earnings 
announcements has been explained by Krinsky and Lee (1996), who investigate the spread 
components around earnings announcements and find an offsetting effect.  While other 
components decrease because of higher trading volume,   adverse selection costs increase 
because some traders have a superior capacity to estimate firm performance.  
 
Because the SSM is an order-driven market, we also study the traders‟ order placement 
strategies around the release of this accounting information by classifying traders into two 
categories, large and small. The different analyses allow us to infer the effect of earnings 
announcements on the level of information asymmetry and market liquidity among different 
types of investor. 
 
  Since earnings announcements convey new information to the market as observed 
through a reduction in information asymmetry, some investors will actively seek information in 
the pre-disclosure period which will be reflected in the concentration of trading activities 
before the earnings announcement. Trading activities can be examined by various groups of 
variables (i.e., trading volume, bid/ask spread and number of buy and sell orders in the market). 
On the basis of the earlier arguments, we expect quarterly earnings announcements in the SSM 
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to exhibit significant abnormal returns, higher abnormal trading volume, a wider bid-ask 
spread and more net buying by small traders.  We also assume that the stock market reaction 
occurs even before the day of the earnings announcement, for some investors will be actively 
seeking information in this period and this will increase the information asymmetry before the 
expected release date.  
 
Like Lakhal (2008), we conjecture that, in an order-driven market such as the SSM, 
earnings announcements are likely to narrow the subsequent bid-ask spread and to increase 
trading volume around the day of the announcement, thus improving market liquidity and 
reducing information asymmetry. We also anticipate that the spread increases before the 
announcement is made, because liquidity traders widen the spread in order to compensate for 
their potential losses from trading with informed traders.  
 
3.3 Data 
 
We use three sets of data: 
1) Earnings announcements data which are recorded manually from the official stock exchange 
bulletin (Tadawul) with their time and date stamped.  We document 2,437 quarterly earnings 
announcements covering the period between Q1 in 2002 and Q2 in 2009. After removing 
announcements whose time or date cannot be verified or announcements coinciding with those 
of other corporate events, we are left with 2170 earnings announcements. For each observation, 
we document the date, earnings and nature of the news as good or bad, compared either with 
the reaction of prices to the news on the announcement day or to a seasonal ranking walk 
surprise measure.  Ninety-five listed firms are included in the sample, which each have at least 
six observations (earnings announcements). 
22
 
2) Data regarding stock daily prices for all stocks and market index were provided by the 
official stock exchange bulletin, Tadawul. It includes the following fields: Close, High, Low, 
Volume, Value and Trades for the eight-year period of 2002-2009. 
3) Intraday data for all trades stamped to the nearest minute for the same period with the same 
field for the daily stock data. These data are extracted with a programming capability which 
stores and processes all historical data. Current high frequency data providers in the SSM 
provide data only for the last 25 days. These data were used for estimating the bid- ask spread, 
                                                        
22 The sample firms represent around 96% of the total market value , only newly-found firms which haven‟t made 
operating earnings were excluded. 
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calculating order imbalance, classifying traders into small and large, computing the number of 
buyer and seller initiated trades and finally for computing intraday volatility.  
All the listed companies in the SSM are required to publish their earnings in the 
fortnight starting from the last day of the quarter, but the exact timing of announcements is not 
known until they have been made public. At the end of each financial year, announcements 
must be made in the first forty days from the end of each company‟s financial year.  
Our unique datasets allow us to precisely investigate trading activities around earnings 
announcements in more detail, since intraday data has never been used in this market  . 
 
3.4 Methodology (Event Study) 
 
We first use standard event study to capture the informativeness of earnings announcements 
through estimating daily abnormal returns, trading activity measures, volatility and spread over 
time.
23
  To compute abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR), we use an 
expected return generating process as follows:     𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑬(𝑹𝒊𝒕),  
Where 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 is the abnormal return for firm i over time interval t, 
 𝑹𝒊𝒕  is the actual return for firm i over time interval t, 
𝑬(𝑹𝒊𝒕) is the expected / predicted return for firm i over time interval t. 
We consider the following two return generating models (i.e., models for „normal 
returns‟): 
A) Market-adjusted return model               
 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕  (1)  
 
where the abnormal return is the difference between the raw return 𝑅𝑖𝑡  and the market return 
(TASI index) 𝑅𝑚𝑡  at time t, 
B) Market model where returns are estimated using the following equation: 
 𝐄(𝐑𝐢𝐭) = 𝛂𝐢 + 𝛃𝐢 (𝐑𝐦𝐭) (2)  
 
                                                        
23 For reviews of the subject and event study econometrics, see MacKinlay (1997) , Binder(1998), and Kothari and 
Warner (2007). 
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Then estimated returns are subtracted from the raw returns   𝑹𝒊𝒕 to formulate the abnormal 
returns  𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 . 
 If an earnings announcement occurs within trading hours, then the announcement day 
is labelled day 0. If an announcement is made after the close of the day, then day 0 is the next 
trading day.   The abnormal return for a given day is computed as the difference between the 
realised returns predicted from the market model and the raw returns 𝑅𝑖𝑡 .  Abnormal returns are 
then aggregated across two dimensions, across events or firms (cross-section) and across a time 
interval [t1, t2]. Within the event window sample, the cross-sectional averages of all stock 
returns and other measures are constructed for each day and then a time series of cross-section 
averages is computed for the whole event window. To construct a control sample, the time 
series for each stock [-100,-11] relative to the day of the earnings announcement (day 0) is 
formed, to estimate the parameters. The time-series averages of these cross-sectional measures 
are then calculated to arrive at a single number which represents the control for comparison 
purposes for the measures of trading activity. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are then computed for various windows around 
the event day.  We define our event period to be various event windows [-10, +10], [-5, +5] 
and [-1, +1], so as to fully capture the earnings announcements effects. We focus on stock 
returns and trading activity during the 21-, 11- and 3-day event windows around earnings 
announcements. 
 
 
 Measures of trading activities and information asymmetry 
 
For trading activates, like Berkman et al. (2009), we assign our “normal period” for trading 
activities to be days [-30,-11]. We then construct our measure of abnormal trading activity for 
each day in the event window relative to our “normal” control period. Following Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989) and Bajo (2009), we compare the behaviour pattern of each variable around the 
earnings announcement to its “normal behaviour” estimated from the non- announcement 
control period (benchmark period). For each variable chosen, the abnormal measure is 
normalised and defined as:  
 
𝑽𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝑽 𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌
 𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝑽 𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌)
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where Vevent   is the event period interval,  𝑉 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐 ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘   is the mean value over the benchmark 
period intervals [-30,-11] and   𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑉 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐 ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 )  is the standard deviation over the control 
period [-30,-11]. Because we are interested in observing the change in trading activity around 
corporate events, we do not focus on the level of trading activity, but rather in recognising 
unusual activity. The deviation from normal trading activity is measured through normalising 
these trading activities.  
 
 
We use various measures of trading activates which have been used in the literature to 
capture the market behaviour before, during and after the earnings announcement day. We 
consider three different measures of trading activity; trading volume (TV) in SAR, share 
turnover (Turnover) which is computed as a percentage of the daily volume traded relative to 
outstanding shares and the number of trades (NT), since these measures have been used 
frequently to proxy for the level of trading activity.  For the remaining variables, we define 
each variable and document how it is computed below. 
For the volatility measure we use the intraday high-low price range. For the liquidity 
and information asymmetry, we use three measures: the bid-ask spread, order imbalance and 
overnight indicator. We define each variable and document according to the way in which it is 
computed. 
 
Volatility (VOL) is measured as daily High and Low prices scaled by Low prices. The 
market volatility is expected to increase around the date of the earnings announcement due to 
the release of price-sensitive information.  We compute our volatility measure similar to those 
of Bushee et al. (2003); and Lakhal (2008) which can be written as follows:   
       
 
𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑯 − 𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳  
  
(3)  
    
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡   denotes respectively the highest (H) and the lowest (L) prices for firm i and day t. 
Bid-ask spreads are used as a proxy for both information asymmetry and liquidity.  Spreads are 
commonly considered a proxy for information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). The 
wider spreads reflect the higher adverse selection cost, as suggested by many researchers (see, 
for example, Coller and Yohn, 1997; Affleck-Graves et al., 2002; and Heflin et al., 2005).   The 
order processing and inventory components reflect the liquidity while the adverse selection 
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component reflects the information asymmetry.  We follow Affleck-Graves et al. (2002), who 
suggest using the bid-ask spread as proxy for both the liquidity and information asymmetry.  
 
Since quote data are not directly available in the SSM, we estimate the spread using 
high frequency data (with one-minute intervals). We make use of the covariance model of 
George et al. (1991) which shows how the first-order auto-correlation in stock returns and  
quotes can be used to estimate the bid-ask spread.  
They estimate the informational asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread, ∅i,m =
1 − πi,m  which is that part of the spread which is derived from the information asymmetry of 
firm i and time 𝑚 . George et al (1991) used daily prices, but we use intraday prices at one-
minute intervals; hence, we give the time period the subscription 𝑚. Furthermore, πi,m   rep- 
represents that part of the spread which is not due to information asymmetry.  The spread 
estimation equation can be written as follows: 
 
 
 𝝅𝒊,𝒎 =
𝟐 −𝒄𝒐𝒗  𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ,𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
𝑺𝒊,𝒅
 
 
(4)  
 
where 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑡    is the difference between the intraday returns of the transaction 
prices 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡   and bid prices 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑡   (intraday Low prices) ,𝑅𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡−1     is the  one- minute lag of  
𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡   , 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡    is the  1-minute intraday return of firm i using the transaction prices of the time 
interval between t-1 and t,  𝑅𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑡     is the  1-minute intraday return of firm i using bid prices 
computed between time t-1 and time t,  𝑆𝑖 ,𝑑   is the average of intraday bid-ask spreads of all 
transactions recorded for firm i on day d and finally 𝑐𝑜𝑣  𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  , 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1  is the serial 
covariance of 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 .
24
 
 
 
The overnight indicator (ONI) of Gallo and Pacini (2000) is used to measure the 
disagreement and dispersion of opinion among investors regarding the fundamental value of a 
stock. ONI represents the surprise between the closing of one day and the opening of the next 
day; we find this a good proxy for information asymmetry and arrival in the SSM.
25
 It is 
calculated as follows: 
                                                        
24 Van Ness et al. (2001) have examined several spread decomposition models and concluded that no single model 
appears to perform better than the others. 
25 Gregoriou et al. (2005) and many others have used the variance of analysts‟ forecasts as a proxy for the 
diversity of opinion amongst investors. However, in the SSM, it is not possible to obtain such data. 
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𝑶𝑵𝑰𝒕 =   𝒍𝒐𝒈
𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏
𝒕
𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒕−𝟏
  
 
(5)  
 
In principle, there should be no increase of information arrival in the immediate pre-
announcement period beyond that of the non-announcement period.  The SSM has few reports 
which publicly forecast and publish future anticipated sales and earnings; therefore, the 
overnight indicator should provide us with a precise measure of information asymmetry and 
informational arrival.   
 
In our study, we also use Order Imbalance (OI) as another proxy for information 
asymmetry and examine the way in which it influences volume and returns. Order imbalance 
has frequently been used in the market microstructure literature as a proxy for informed trading 
and for liquidity asymmetry (see, e.g., Chan and Fong, 2000; Chordia et al, 2002; and Su et al, 
2009). OI is the excess of net buying or selling orders at one time which reflect the forces 
behind the orders. The OI is then classified by types of investor, whether small or large. We 
adopt Chan and Fong‟s definition of order imbalance (2000): the net of the numbers of buyer-
vs.-seller initiated trades. Any large positive order imbalance in the stock indicates excess 
buying, while a large negative order imbalance indicates excess selling. For this purpose we 
use Lee and Ready‟s “Tick Rule Test” (1991),  which infers trade direction using trade to trade 
prices. The Tick Rule Test compares trade price changes relative to previous trade price. If the 
price change between trades is positive, then the transaction is coded as a buy-initiated trade. A 
negative price change yields a sell-initiated trade.  Like  Shanthikumar (2004), we define order 
imbalance as follows: 
 
 
𝑶𝑰𝒊.𝒙.𝒕 =
𝑩𝒖𝒚𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕 − 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕
𝑩𝒖𝒚𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕 + 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒙,𝒕
 
 
(6)  
 
 
where we add all buyer and seller initiated trades for firm 𝑖  and investor type 𝑥   at time t. A 
positive OI indicates net-buying while negative outcome indicates net-selling. We classify 
investors into small and large, according the value of the transaction. We use two primary cut-
offs to classify investors of type x with a buffer between small and large trades to reduce noise, 
a method which has been used by Shanthikumar (2004), and Chiang and Wang (2007). The 
lower cut-off is all trades with a value of SAR 75,000 or lower (USD 20,000) and the higher 
cut-off is all trades with a value of SAR 250, 000 or higher (USD 66,666). 
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Statistical Tests 
 
To examine whether trading activity measures, bid-ask spreads, overnight indicators and 
volatility are significantly different in the period surrounding earnings announcements from  
“normal” times, a difference of means test is used. To gauge the prevalence of increases in 
returns, volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads and information asymmetry across the sample of 
earnings announcements, the frequency of increases in each metric is recorded for each day in 
the event window ( -5, +10). Then a Student t-statistic is calculated for each variable on each 
day in the event window to test whether the event window variable is greater than the normal 
value. The significance of t-statistics is assessed using two-tailed critical values. 
 
 
3.5 Event study results 
 
 
We first show results which examine the informativeness of earnings announcements measured 
by stock price reaction in the event window, more precisely by cumulative abnormal returns, 
CARs, around earnings announcements. We calculate abnormal returns using two models, the 
market model and the market adjusted model. Once we have computed the abnormal returns, 
we construct two event windows [-5,+5] to measure CAR  in the eleven days around the 
announcement day (0) and a smaller event window[-1,+1] to measure immediate reaction to 
public announcements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78 
 
 
  Table  3-1 : Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Earnings Announcements. 
Panel A: 
Market model 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−(𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜷𝒊 𝑹𝒎𝒕) 
All  
(N= 2133) 
Good 
( N=790) 
Bad 
( N=1003) 
Neutral 
(N=338) 
CAR(-5,+5) 
-.01633   *** 
(.0018)  -8.91 
0.0111*** 
(.0030) 3.66 
-.0397*** 
(.0027)-14.63 
-.0112*** 
(.0028)-3.98 
Car(-1,+1) 
-.0110*** 
(.0013)-7.29 
.01354  *** 
(.0023)   5.83 
-.0314  *** 
(.0019)   -16.31 
-.01002 *** 
(.0020)-4.82 
Panel B: 
Market adjusted returns 
𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕= 𝑹𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒎𝒕   
All  
(N=2179) 
Good 
( N=961) 
Bad  
(N=1218) 
Neutral 
(N=247) 
CAR(-5,+5) 
-.00079*** 
(.0002) -3.69 
0.01194*** 
(0.0003) 
-.01180 *** 
(.0003) -30.61 
-.0003*** 
(.00007) -4.55 
Car(-1,+1) 
-.00462*** 
(0.0012) 3.67 
.04006 *** 
( .0014)26.89 
-.0398 *** 
(.0011) -33.70 
0.0002 
( .0001) 0.13 
Notes: reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) along with the test statistic for Good, Bad 
and Neutral portfolios and across different event windows (-5,+5) and (-1,+1). The statistical 
significance of the average stock price response to earnings announcements around different 
event windows is shown as follows:  t − statistics =
CAAR (t1,t2)
 (K+1)sAAR t
2
 Estimated standard errors are 
reported in parentheses after each CAR, along with t-statistics values. Significance levels are 
reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Portfolios were constructed on the basis of the earnings announcement return (EAR) on 
days (0, +1). A positive EAR belongs to the good news portfolio, whereas a negative EAR is in 
the bad news portfolio and the neutral  portfolio is one which contains all the stocks that have 
the lowest 10%  absolute EAR during the announcement day (0, +1). In general, it was found 
that market reaction was negative in the days around earnings announcements, but this could 
be a reflection of the higher incidence of bad news at the time of the study.  The CARs in panel 
A were computed using the market model, which produces different behaviour of CARs than 
the ones computed using the market adjusted model in Panel B. The latter assumes the 
expected return is changing ,however, is constant among firms and discounts the  matching 
market return with the firm raw return, while the former measures the linear relationship 
between a stock and a market return and discounts only that relationship from the raw returns. 
However, all CARs are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the market in 
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general reacts positively (negatively) to good (bad) news and that public earnings 
announcements change the perceived value of a stock. Panel A reports asymmetry in the price 
reaction between good and bad news portfolios for both event windows (-5, +5) and (-1, +1). 
The bad portfolio shows a higher CAR at (-3.9%) and (-3.2%) for both event windows while a 
good portfolio exhibits an averages of 1.1% for one window and 1.3% for the other windows. 
The different price reactions to bad news and good news have been found in many studies (see 
Hayn, 1995, for example). The underreaction to good news has been established and explained 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis.   When using market adjusted returns, the asymmetry of CAR 
disappears altogether; we see a similar reaction to good and bad news at 1.1% (-1.1) and 4% (-
3.9%) for good (bad) portfolios in the event windows (-5, +5) and (-1, +1), respectively.  
 
3.5.1 Abnormal Trading activity 
 
In Table (3-2), we present average abnormal returns (AARs) along with three measures of 
abnormal trading (AT). We have discussed abnormal returns around the earnings 
announcement in the previous table; nonetheless, we list abnormal returns to link them to 
abnormal trading (AT). We focus on AT, by taking each daily measure of trading activity 
during the event window (-5, +10), subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation 
over the control period, (- 30, -11).  
Under the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns or trading activities of the event 
window have the same distribution as non-event (control period) returns or trading activity, we 
test for differences between each daily trading activity in the event window against the average 
of the control period of the event window [-30,-11].  Abnormal dollar (riyal) trading volumes 
are highly significant; however, there is mostly negative reaction in the five days before the 
event day (0). A higher than average significant positive reaction is experienced one day before 
the announcement and stays mainly positive until day 7. This pattern of a negative trading 
activity reaction in the pre-announcement period followed by a positive one is also observed in 
the turnover and number of trades. Turnover is negative and significant in days (-3) and (-2). 
The number of trades is also negative and significant in all of the week before the 
announcement day, but both the turnover and the number of trades shows positive and 
significant reaction during and after the announcement day. However, the posit ive reaction is 
more persistent in the dollar trading volume and turnover than in the number of trades. 
 
In general, this result indicates that daily trading activity during the event period 
significantly exceeds the mean daily activity over the control period [-30,-11]. These findings 
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suggest that there is systematic evidence of informed trading before the release of earnings 
announcements. The substantial increase in trading activity subsequent to the announcement on 
the event day (0) in particular is consistent with the finding in cumulative abnormal returns 
where the market reaction to new information indicates the informativeness of these 
announcements. 
 
Table  3-2 Abnormal Returns and Trading Activity around Earnings Announcements. 
Days 
Abnormal Returns 
% 
Abnormal Dollar   
Volume 
Turnover Number of trades 
-5 0.04 
(0.61) 
- 0.45 
(-1.22) 
-0.41 
(-0.97) 
-0.014** 
(-2.53) 
-4 - 0.11* 
(-1.80) 
-0.49 *** 
(-2.65) 
-0.40 
(-1.28) 
-0.004 
(-1.34) 
-3 - 0.09 
(-1.33) 
- 0.45 *** 
(-3.03) 
-0.39* 
(-2.20) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.70) 
-2 - 0.07 
(-1.04) 
-0.45 ** 
(-2.23) 
-0.38*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.74) 
-1 - 0.10* 
(-1.70) 
1.42 * 
(-1.85) 
0.39 ** 
(1.98) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.20) 
0 - 0.17** 
(-2.34) 
1.10 *** 
(6.15) 
0.45 * 
(1.61) 
0.041*** 
(4.65) 
1 - 0.26*** 
(-3.65) 
0.85 
(1.29) 
0.39 
(0.03) 
0.045*** 
(5.01) 
2 - 0.09 
(-1.67) 
0.52 
(-1.38) 
0.37*** 
(2.10) 
0.022*** 
(2.20) 
3 - 0.06 
(-0.90) 
0.43*** 
(-2.84) 
0.37 *** 
(3.69) 
0.010 
(0.66) 
4 - 0.08 
(-1.34) 
0.32 *** 
(-2.64) 
0.38 *** 
(2.96) 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
5 0.05 
(0.94) 
0.18 *** 
(-3.52) 
0.38 *** 
(2.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.10) 
6 - 0.01 
(-0.24) 
0.10 
(-1.13) 
0.37 *** 
(-3.51) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
7 0.20 *** 
(3.25) 
0.03 *** 
(-3.48) 
0.39 ** 
(-2.18) 
-0.007** 
(-1.69) 
8 0.03 
(0.34) 
- 0.03** 
(2.22) 
0.39 * 
(-2.00) 
-0.003 
(-0.26) 
9 0.29*** 
(4.87) 
-0.01** 
(2.44) 
0.42 
(-0.14) 
0.007 
(0.29) 
10 0.25*** 
(4.09) 
-0.04** 
(2.22) 
0.41 
(-0.47) 
-0.003 
(-1.14) 
Notes:  Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) represent the daily average cross-section market 
adjusted returns. The three measures of trading activity (TA) are dollar trading volume, turnover 
and number of trades. TA measures  are normalised by the average and standard deviation of 
the estimation period[-30,-11], as follows     
Vevent −V benchmark
 Var (V benchmark )
.For both Abnormal returns and TA 
measures, all hypotheses were accepted or rejected according to the t-statistic, formulated as 
follows: t =
AAR t
(var  AAR t  )
1
2 
,  
TA t
(var  TA t  )
1
2 
 , respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 
are based upon the null hypothesis that AAR (TA) is equal to 0(AT    ) and the alternative 
hypothesis which states that AAR (AT) is not equal to zero (AT    ). 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,1% levels, respectively. 
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3.5.2 Liquidity and information asymmetry  
 
 
Table (3-3) reports the volatility, overnight indicator and bid-ask spreads around earnings 
announcements as measures of investors‟ disagreement and information asymmetry in the 
market. The variable spread is closely related to the liquidity level in the markets, whereas the 
overnight indicator should measure the arrival of information and disagreement between 
investors regarding the value of a security.  We measure price volatility by the difference 
between the highest and lowest prices scaled by lowest prices for every day in the event 
window (-5, +10). The overnight indicator (ONI) developed by Gallo and Pacini (2000) 
measures the dispersion of opinion among investors regarding the fundamental value of a 
stock. The ONI represents the surprise between the closing of one day and the opening of the 
next day; we find it a plausible proxy for information asymmetry and the arrival of 
information, as most corporate events and announcements happen toward the end of the trading 
day. The bid-ask spread is estimated from transaction prices using the model of George et al. 
(1991); hence, it may not reflect the actual quoted bid-ask spread. All variables were computed 
for every day in the event window (-5, +10) and compared with the averages for the non-event 
window [-30,-11]. 
 
Under the null hypothesis that information symmetry and the liquidity of the event 
window has the same distribution as those of the non-event (control period), we test for 
differences between each daily measure of liquidity and information asymmetry in the event 
window against the average of the control period of the event window [-30,-11].   
 
Volatility and the overnight indicator are higher at the time of the announcement and 
the days immediately following it. They steadily increase in magnitude over the five days 
before the announcement and peak on the day of the announcement and the day after (days 0 
and +1).  In the subsequent days, volatility declines but remains above the pre-announcement 
levels. The highest volatility in prices is found on the announcement day at 5%, which 
indicates different opinions and interpretation of news on the part of different types of investor. 
If investors in the market were homogeneous, then we should anticipate a lower level of 
volatility, at least in the announcement day. The t-statistics indicate that volatility is 
significantly higher than it is in the control period [-30,-11]. 
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The ONI measures the rate of arrival of information in the market. It shows the highly 
significant arrival of information for every day in the pre-announcement period, indicating 
informed trading and engagement in private information seeking. The highest level of 
information arrival is found on day (1) and not on day (0), which can be explained by the fact 
that most of the news is made after the closing hour of day (0). The ONI declines substantially 
only 2 days after the announcement is made, to a lower level than before the announcement. 
Overall, bid-ask spreads increase around earnings announcements; however, they substantially 
decrease on the two days around the earnings announcement before they  bounce back to the 
same level as in the pre-announcement period. Spread is significant on days (0) and (1) only, 
but shows no significant level in the week before or after the announcement period; however it 
remains high after the announcement period. Our spread results are opposite to those recorded 
by Coller and Yohn (1997), who found an increased spread only on the day of the management 
forecast release and the day after it, but not in the period before management forecast. They 
explain the failure of the spread to increase in the pre-release period by the fact that these 
management forecasts are unanticipated by investors. Even though earnings announcements in 
the SSM are not scheduled, evidence from trading activity and information asymmetry 
suggests that announcements can be anticipated by some market participants. Many studies 
found no significant changes in spread surrounding earnings announcements, despite evidence 
that the adverse selection component of the spreads widens significantly (see Morse and 
Ushman, 1983; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Lee et al, 1993; Krinsky and Lee, 1996; and 
Affleck-Graves, 2002). 
 
Since spread has three components and each component is induced by different factors, 
many previous researchers have suggested that these factors may have opposite directional 
effect and that this could explain the lack of evidence of changing spread around earnings 
announcements which some studies find (Krinsky and Lee, 1996). For example,  trading 
volume reduces the spread, due to lower order processing cost, while private information 
induces the adverse selection component of the spread, hence increasing the spread. Obviously, 
a high number of trades surrounding earnings announcements in the SSM will reduce inventory 
and order processing costs, which eventually narrows the spread.  
 
The pre-release information asymmetry level indicates disagreement between market 
participants about the content and implication of forthcoming earnings announcements, 
whereas the persistence in volatility after the announcement compared to the volatility of a 
non-event period suggests that different market participants have different levels of ability to 
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process the content of the earnings announcements and supports the assumption that some 
investors convert public information into private.  Since the dates of announcements are not 
predictable in the SSM, most imminent days before earnings announcements show significant 
levels of information asymmetry, indicating a higher incidence of private acquisition of 
information. 
 
These results support the hypothesis suggested by Kim and Verrecchia (1994), who 
explain the persistence of adverse selection problems after the announcement day by the 
varying abilities of investors to process corporate disclosure. An informed judgement based on 
earnings release increases the information asymmetry between different traders in the market. 
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Table  3-3: information asymmetry and liquidity around earnings announcements 
Days Volatility Overnight(ONI) Spread 
-5 4.0 
(0.51) 
0.11 ** 
(2.18) 
3.17 
(0.25) 
-4 4.1** 
(2.15) 
0.14 *** 
(5.07) 
3.16 
(0.81) 
-3 4.0 
(1.56) 
0.18 *** 
(4.80) 
3.08 
(0.31) 
-2 4.2*** 
(4.08) 
0.18 *** 
(5.47) 
3.14 
(0.28) 
-1 4.5*** 
(6.49) 
0.20 *** 
(5.37) 
3.19 
(1.62) 
0 5.0*** 
(12.97) 
0.21 *** 
(5.27) 
3.07** 
(2.00) 
1 4.8*** 
(9.93) 
0.25*** 
(6.20) 
3.13* 
(1.65) 
2 4.7*** 
(8.54) 
0.14 *** 
(2.44) 
3.18 
(0.68) 
3 4.4*** 
(6.26) 
0.12* 
(1.70) 
3.19 
(0.21) 
4 4.4*** 
(5.66) 
0.09 
(0.45) 
3.22 
(0.15) 
5 4.2*** 
(3.76) 
0.14* 
(1.69) 
2.19 
(0.34) 
6 4.1*** 
(2.72) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
3.21 
(0.38) 
7 4.2*** 
(3.05) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
3.18 
(0.75) 
8 4.1* 
(1.90) 
0.01 
(1.25) 
3.22 
(0.77) 
9 4.0 
(1.36) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
3.14 
(0.70) 
10 4.0 
(0.92) 
0.04 * 
(1.70) 
3.20 
(0.83) 
Notes: this table reports the volatility, overnight indicator and estimated bid-ask spread along 
with their t-statistics. All variables are averaged cross-sectionally for all days in the event 
window (-5, +10). Volatility is measured by difference between highest and lowest prices per 
day, scaled by lowest prices, the overnight indicator is the absolute log of opening prices to 
the‎previous‎day’s‎closing‎prices‎and‎spread‎is‎estimated‎using‎the‎seria l covariance model 
of George et al. (1999). 
All hypotheses were accepted or rejected according to the t-statistic, formulated as follows: 
  t =
Volatilityt
(var VolatilityT )
1
2 
,  
ONIt
(var ONIT )
1
2 
 , 
Spread
(var SpreadT )
1
2 
. 
The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based upon the null hypothesis that the daily 
cross-section average is equal to its time-series average in the estimation window [-30,-11]. 
The alternative hypothesis states that the daily average is not equal to the normal period 
average. 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
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3.5.3 Investors’ behaviour around earnings announcements 
 
In this section, we analyse different types of investor and the ways in which  they react to 
news. The aim is to examine any pattern in buying or selling and whether this pattern differs 
according to the type of investor. In other words, we investigate who is buying around earnings 
announcement dates. Many studies suggest that small investors are less rational and become 
net buyers around earnings announcements. Panel A in Table (3-4) reports order imbalance 
according to the type of investor. Assuming that different investors have different levels of 
ability and resources of information regarding the true value of a security, we use the value of 
trades to separate small and large investors. If this assumption is valid, we should observe 
different behaviour between the two groups. It is worth mentioning that because event window 
(-5,+10) is relatively short, we do not aim to examine trading strategy followed by investors  , 
but instead examine immediate reaction to news.  
 
The small investors order imbalance in Panel A indicates that they tend to buy more 
than sell around earnings announcements, whereas large investors tend to sell immediately 
after the announcements; they buy every day and sell  on days (-3,-2, 1, 2 and 5). Panel B 
shows the order imbalance split further by type of news. Good news is reported in subgroup (1) 
and bad news in subgroup (2). The good news portfolio shows interesting results: while large 
investors are mainly net-buyers in the pre-announcement period and net-sellers in most days 
after the announcement, small investors are net-buyers in the days immediately following the 
release of the news. The bad news portfolio in subgroup (2) indicates concentrated selling for 
small investors in days (1), (2) and 3),  while large investors show no strong pattern of selling 
around earnings announcements. The evidence suggests that small investors are less 
sophisticated in acquiring pre-announcement information and in interpreting news. Good news 
shows strong buying from small investors, while bad news shows strong selling by small 
investors. Conversely, large investors show that they buy shares in good news firms even 
before the announcement day and sell them afterwards. Moreover, large investors show a 
buying pattern on the day of bad news announcements and the next day. The evidence suggests 
informed trading and a higher ability to interpret news among large investors in the SSM. Our 
results are in some ways similar to those reported by Barber and Odean (2008), who surmise 
that individuals tend to be net-buyers whether the news is good or bad. Their buying behaviour 
is motivated by the attention-grabbing  hypothesis, under which any stock in the news 
experiences higher abnormal buying. This finding is supported by Lee (1992) and Hirshleifer 
et al. (2008).  Our order imbalance results are also similar to those found in Shanthikumar 
(2004) and Chiang and Wang (2007), who use similar methodology and find that small 
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investors in general react more strongly to earnings surprises than do large investors. 
Moreover, our results suggest that informed trading is associated with the size of the trades, 
evidenced by the buying of good news stocks by large investors in the pre-announcement 
period. 
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Table  3-4: Order Imbalance by Type of Investor and by Type of News. 
Days Order Imbalance  
(small investors) 
Order Imbalance 
(Large investors) 
 Panel A: Order imbalance by type of investor 
 
-5 -0.031 
-0.034 
0.026 
0.025 
0.015 
0.023 
0.016 
0.026 
0.025 
0.030 
-0.035 
-0.027 
0.028 
0.028 
0.035 
0.032 
0.023 
0.020 
-0.019 
-0.009 
0.020 
0.028 
-0.009 
-0.012 
-0.017 
0.021 
-0.015 
0.020 
0.032 
0.023 
0.024 
0.020 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
 Panel B: order imbalance for Good and Bad news 
 (1) Good News (2) Bad news 
 Small investors Large investors Small investors Large investors 
-5 -0.76 4.08 1.04 1.29 
-4 -0.52 3.45 -0.15 2.22 
-3 -0.63 4.27 0.96 1.61 
-2 0.90 3.25 0.65 -2.03 
-1 -0.15 3.35 0.54 0.84 
0 0.79 4.26 0.47 1.88 
1 0.00 3.19 -1.67 0.92 
2 1.40 -1.10 -0.08 -2.98 
3 0.58 -2.21 -0.80 1.18 
4 0.90 -1.98 0.71 -2.80 
5 -0.70 3.73 0.33 1.95 
6 -0.35 -2.83 1.70 -1.37 
7 -0.64 -2.00 1.00 0.31 
8 1.62 2.71 -0.45 0.46 
9 1.22 3.98 0.01 1.14 
10 -0.66 -2.49 -0.39 -1.91 
Notes: This table presents the results of raw order imbalance, measured as follows: 
OIi.x.t =
Buys
i,x,t
− Sellsi,x,t
Buys
i,x,t
+ Sellsi,x,t
 
Where all orders are classified into buy or sell initiated orders, then counted for firm i, investor 
type x (small or large) and date t.  Panel A reports the order imbalance for each group of 
investors. Panel B report an order imbalance for each group of investors and for type of news, 
either good or bad. Order imbalance is computed for all days in the event period (-5, +10) to 
show how different types of investors react to good and bad news. 
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3.6 Regression 
 
I attempt to explain the magnitude of cumulative abnormal return, CAR (-1, +1) by estimating 
Equation (7).  OLS linear regression was used to test the hypothesis that the pre-announcement 
stock behaviour and level of trading activity have an effect on the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns on the announcement day. I use Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) in the window (-
1, +1) to capture the market reaction of the announcement. Then, I   regress CAR on a set of 
variables which are expected to affect the magnitude of the stock return. For the pre-
announcement explanatory variables, I include the price trend in the stock returns 
(momentum), cumulative overnight indicator, average abnormal volume. All the previous 
variables are computed using a time frame of the three weeks before the announcement day, 
that is, 15 trading days. I also include two firm characteristics; size measured in market value 
and the earnings surprise of the current quarter compared to same quarter of the previous year. 
Good (Bad) news portfolios contain all the companies which have positive (negative) CAR (-1, 
+1). 
 
 The aim is to test whether the level of pre-announcement trading activity or firm 
characteristic would have predictive power to explain the magnitude of the earnings 
announcement returns.  
 
We expect a positive relationship, positive (negative) coefficient estimates for the good 
(bad) subsamples for pre-announcement trading activity and the earnings surprise with regard 
to abnormal return. At the same time, we expect a negative relationship between firm size and 
the magnitude of price reaction CAR that is a negative (positive) coefficient sign for the good 
(bad) subsamples.  
 
A cross-sectional model, similar to that adopted by Jackson and Madura (2003), is used 
to investigate the association between the absolute CARs and a set of pre-announcement 
variables covering trading activity and firm characteristics (Size and SUE) specific to the event 
observation. The model is constructed as follows: 
 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑴𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒖𝒎𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑶𝑵𝑰𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑨𝒃𝒗𝒐𝒍
         
𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
 
(7)  
where:   
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1-Momentum is defined as the compounded stock returns for the past three trading 
weeks before the earnings announcement, where:   𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡
15
𝑡=1    and 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  is the 
daily stock return for firm i and day t in the window [-16,-2]. 
 
2-ONI is the summation of overnight indicators over the period [-16,-2] calculated as: 
 𝑂𝑁𝐼𝑖 =    𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛
𝑡
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑡−1
 
15
𝑡=1
 
(8)  
 
3- 𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙         is the average normalised abnormal volume which was first used by Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989). It is computed as the residual of daily volume less mean daily volume 
scaled by trading volume standard deviation during the three weeks before an announcement [-
16,-2] as follows:  
 𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖 ,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑉    𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑖 ,𝑡
  , where   𝑇𝑉    𝑖 ,𝑡 =
1
20 
 𝑇𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡
20
𝑡=1 ,   is the average trading volume for 20 
days over the window of [-36,-17] and  𝜎𝑖,𝑡 =  
1
20
  𝑇𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡       
220
𝑡=1   , is the standard deviation 
of trading volume during the estimation period [-36,-17].  The daily estimated Abvol is then 
averaged as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙         𝑖 =
1
15 
 𝐴𝑏𝑣𝑜𝑙
15
𝑡=1
 
 
(9)  
 
4- Standard unexpected earnings (SUE) are measured by scaling the unexpected 
earnings (seasonal random walk with a drift) to its standard deviation. The SUE for each firm i 
at quarter t is given by:  
 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
 
(10)  
 
 where ei,t  represents actual earnings and E(ei,t) is the expected earnings computed using a 
random walk model with drift E ei,t = et−4
i + δi , where δi  is the seasonal drift in a firm‟s 
earnings and σi,t  is estimated using the figures for the previous 8 quarters‟ earnings. 
5- Finally, Size variable is the market value of each firm at the time of the 
announcement. We multiply the number of outstanding shares by the closing price immediately 
before the earnings announcement day.  
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Table  3-5 :  Cross-sectional Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Pre-
announcement trading activity and Firm Characteristics. 
 (1)                  (2) 
VARIABLES Good News Bad News 
   
Momentum 0.0140*** -0.00840** 
 (0.00538) (0.00416) 
ONI 0.000215** -0.000218*** 
 (0.000101) (4.67e-05) 
𝑨𝒃𝒗𝒐𝒍           0.000328** -0.000272** 
 (0.000128) (0.000109) 
SUE -0.000153* 0.000134*** 
 (5.95e-05) (4.26e-05) 
size -0.00130*** 0.00126*** 
 (0.000403) (0.000327) 
Constant 0.0402*** -0.0394*** 
 (0.00907) (0.00733) 
Observations 860 1131 
R-squared 0.058 0.065 
Note: This table presents regression coefficients of the earnings 
announcement returns CAR (-1, +1) on trading activity and firm 
characteristics for two types of disclosure (Good and Bad news 
portfolios) for 95 firms during the period 2002-2009 with 1991 as 
the total number of observations. Good (bad) news firms are defined 
according to the price reaction during the event window (-1, +1), 
while positive (negative) CARs are placed in the good (bad) news 
portfolios. *** p<0.01,*p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
As expected, all trading activity variables have a positive relationship with CAR for 
both types of news, good and bad. The price trend (momentum) has a positive relationship, 
positive (negative) coefficients with good (bad news) firms. The momentum was selected to 
show any pre-announcement trend in informed trading. A company which exhibited a price 
trend before the release of its earnings shows higher cumulative abnormal returns. However, 
the coefficient is higher for the good news firms at 1.4%, suggesting that traders in the good 
news firms engage actively in private information seeking. The ONI, which is a measure of 
investors‟ disagreement and information asymmetry in the market, also has a positive 
relationship with abnormal returns. In the two portfolios, the abnormal volume increases CAR 
and is significant at 5%. SUE shows a bizarre negative relationship which is not expected, for 
the good news firm with significant coefficients at 10% .However, the bad news firms show a 
predicted positive coefficient for SUE that is significant at 1%. SUE was measured using the 
seasonal random walk model, since analysts‟ forecasts are not available in the SSM. The time-
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series model has proven to be inaccurate, more precisely in the case of the Saudi market, where 
during the period of our study, the price of oil and earnings per share (EPS) for the whole 
market rose to more than 400% between 2002 and 2009. Consequently, SUE might not be 
good predictor for earning surprise in a boom economy. Finally size, as expected, is negatively 
related to the cumulative abnormal returns, with positive (negative) coefficients for the bad 
(good) news which are significant at 1%. Larger companies in the SSM have substantial 
government and institution ownership and have better disclosure practices, which reduces 
information asymmetry and the reaction to news for such stocks. In general, pre-announcement 
trading activity and information asymmetry (momentum, overnight indicator and volume) have 
a positive relationship with cumulative abnormal returns. However, firm characteristics (SUE 
and Size) have a negative relationship with CAR. 
 
3.6.1 Liquidity, Information asymmetry around earnings announcement 
We first examine the change in liquidity (models 1 & 2 in table 3-6) around earnings 
announcements using an approach similar to that of Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) and Chan 
and Li (2005), who examine the change in adverse selection cost around earnings 
announcements. We use the estimated bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity. Model (1) uses 
the effective estimated spread from the model of George et al. (1991) and model (2) uses a 
relative estimated spread which deflates the spreads relative to prices.  We use the estimated 
information asymmetry component of the spread in model (3), where we distinguish adverse 
selection cost behaviour with regard to good news and bad news firms.  
 
 For each earnings announcement, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
𝑩𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝟏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝟐𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑩𝟔𝑫𝟑𝒊𝒕 +   𝜺𝒊𝒕 
(11)  
where:  
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 =   Estimated Bid-Ask  spread of firm i on day t; 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  = High to low price range divided by low prices for firm i on day t; 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡= closing stock prices of firm i on day t; 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  =Ln (number of shares traded of firm i on day t multiplied by 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  ); 
D1it =1 for days -20 to - 2; zero otherwise (pre-announcement period); 
D2it =1 for days - 1 to +1; zero otherwise (announcement period); 
D3it =1 for days +2 to +20; zero otherwise (post-announcement period). 
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Following the research design of Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) and Chan and Li 
(2005), volatility, price and volume are used in the model to measure the inventory and order 
processing cost, as suggested by the literature. Dummy variables measure the change in 
information asymmetry in the period before, during and after earnings announcements.  An 
increase in the volatility of a stock will increase its market risk, which would be reflected in 
market makers/participants increasing the spread. Therefore, in line with the literature, we 
expect volatility to widen the spread because the SSM is an order driven market which has no 
designated market makers. Price is assumed to have a negative relationship with regard to 
spread because order-processing costs are disproportionately higher for lower priced stocks 
(Demsetz, 1968). We also expect a negative relationship between the “Saudi Riyal” trading 
volume and the spread, because inventory and liquidation cost will decline with higher trading. 
The dummy variables are constructed to test how the information asymmetry component 
would affect the spread around earnings announcements. After controlling for other 
components of the spread, namely, the inventory and order processing costs, the higher level of 
information asymmetry should be reflected in positive coefficients between the bid-ask spread 
and the dummy variables. 
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Table  3-6: Liquidity and Information Asymmetry around Quarterly Earnings 
Announcements. 
     
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Spread Relative 
Spread 
Information Asymmetry  
   Good Bad 
Volatility -2.062*** -0.0407***   
 (0.0206) (0.000756)   
Price -0.00478*** -0.000175***   
 (1.48e-05) (5.43e-07)   
Volume -0.0177*** -0.000121***   
 (0.000457) (1.68e-05)   
D1 -0.000505 -7.88e-05 0.0291*** -0.00746 
 (0.00158) (5.79e-05) (0.00884) (0.00869) 
D2 0.00991*** 0.000312*** 0.0303** 0.0148 
 (0.00247) (9.09e-05) (0.0128) (0.0127) 
D3 0.00961*** 0.000271*** 0.0175* -0.0171** 
 (0.00157) (5.79e-05) (0.00889) (0.00864) 
Constant 1.216*** 0.0266*** 0.370*** 0.754*** 
 (0.00755) (0.000278) (0.0444) (0.0459) 
Observations 105827 105827 58965 58110 
R-squared 0.573 0.531 0.651 0.689 
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients of the liquidity and 
information asymmetry components of volatility, stock price, volume and 
time dummies, representing the pre-announcement (D1), announcement 
(D2) and post-announcement periods (D3). Model (1) is run for the 
estimated spread, Model (2) uses relative spread (spread/price) and 
Model (3) uses the estimated adverse selection component  of the spread 
as a dependent variable, which was run separately for the good and bad 
news portfolios.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
As expected, spread is negatively associated with stock price and “Saudi Riyal” trading 
volume. However, volatility deviates from expectation and shows a negative coefficient too 
which could be a reflection of noise trading. A lot of noise trading is expected during this time.  
 
 Controlling for the previous variables should mainly control for the inventory and 
order processing components of the spread.   The dummy variables show an increasing 
information asymmetry around and after earnings announcements (D2 and D3) with positive 
coefficients of around 0.01 which are significant at the 1% level. The information asymmetry 
in the pre-announcement period (D1) shows negative coefficient, but this is not significant. In 
general, information asymmetry remains at a high level after the announcement. These results 
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are consistent with previous literature, maintaining that the different levels of ability among 
traders to interpret news aggravate the information asymmetry between them. 
 Model (3) was used to confirm our original model of the spread around earnings 
announcements; this model uses dummies to control for the adverse selection component. In 
the information asymmetry model, we use an adverse selection component which was 
estimated using the model of George et al (1991) and run the same model again on time 
dummies.  We show whether this component would differ from or confirm the behaviour of the 
spread and time dummies in models 1 and 2. The behaviour of the information asymmetry 
component of the spread is reported for three periods, the pre-announcement period (D1), 
announcement period (D2) and post-announcement (D3). Regression was run separately for 
good news and bad news. Good and bad news firms were defined according to the earnings 
announcement return (EAR). Positive (negative) EAR is allocated in good (bad) groups. 
Because we are interested only in the information asymmetry component around earnings 
announcements, we report the dummies‟ coefficients and ignore the other coefficients of 
volatility, price  and volume.  
The behaviour of information asymmetry differs slightly in model (3) from that in the 
previous models, where information increased around and after the date of the earnings 
announcement. When we run the information asymmetry component and take into 
consideration the nature of the news, new and interesting results emerge. The good news firms 
show an increasing positive relationship of information asymmetry relative to the time of the 
announcement: information asymmetry gradually increases in the 20 days event window before 
the news and then peaks at the announcement period. Information asymmetry is then reduced 
after the announcement to the lowest level in the 20 days event window. The time dummy 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels for D1, D2 and D3, 
respectively. Information asymmetry is reduced substantially in the post-announcement period, 
suggesting that earnings announcements reduce uncertainty in the market. The bad news firms 
show different behaviour patterns for information asymmetry. Information asymmetries are at 
their highest level during the announcement period D2; the other two periods exhibit lower 
levels of information asymmetry. However, only period D3 shows a negative coefficient of (-
.017) which is significant at the 1% level. 
 
 The difference between good and bad news information asymmetry supports our 
conclusion in the price reaction regression, where we find that traders engage more actively in 
information seeking activities in the good news firms.  The evidence suggests that while other 
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components of the spread, inventory and order processing are reduced around the time of 
earnings announcements, information asymmetry increases around this time. 
Our results are consistent with those of Chan and Li (2005), who also find evidence of 
an increase in adverse selection cost around earnings announcements, using similar time 
dummies to show an information asymmetry reaction to earnings news. 
 
 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
This study analyses abnormal returns, trading activity (dollar volume, turnover and number of 
trades), and liquidity and information asymmetry for the Saudi stock market around its 
quarterly earnings announcements. We use a sample of 2,437 quarterly earnings 
announcements which covers all listed and operating firms in the period from 2002-2009. We 
examine the market reaction to news through computing market adjusted abnormal returns over 
various event windows. We also examine the changes in different measurements of trading 
activity, liquidity, volatility, asymmetric information and in the traders‟ order placement 
strategies.  In general, we find a significant increase in abnormal returns, increases in trading 
volume, a significant shift in systematic risk, widening bid-ask spread and above average stock 
price variability.  
The highly significant abnormal returns around earnings announcements indicate the 
importance and informativeness of the information content of these announcements.  We 
observe a rise in trading activities and volatility around earnings announcement with a higher 
information asymmetry which gradually reduces in the 20 days following the announcement 
date. The persistence of volatility and information asymmetry in the post announcement period 
can be explained by the heterogeneity in investors‟ ability to process the information in the 
public announcement, which indicates that investors may respond differently to news. These 
results are consistent with such different levels of ability, a notion suggested by Karpoff, 1986; 
Demski and Feltham, 1994; and Kim and Verrecchia, 1994, 1997, among others. 
  
When examining trading behaviour among small and large investors in the market 
through order imbalance measures, we find that large investors are more sophisticated and 
show higher informed trading before earnings announcements, whereas smaller investors show 
a stronger reaction to news. Moreover, small investors show a buying pattern which is 
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consistent with the earnings surprise. Our investors trading placement behaviour around 
earnings announcements is similar to that found by Chiang and Wang (2007), Barber and 
Odean (2008) and Hirshleifer et al. (2008).  However, we find that small investors are net-
buyers for the good news and net-sellers for the bad news in the 3 days following earnings 
releases.  
 
We investigate further the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
find it to be positively related to information asymmetry and trading activity in the pre-
announcement period (15 trading days before earnings announcements). CAR is reduced by the 
size of the company: larger companies which have higher institutional ownership and better 
disclosure practices show a lower CAR around earnings announcement. Surprisingly, CAR 
seems to converse effect of the time-series earnings surprise, SUE.  One explanation of this 
relationship is that time-series coefficients show downward bias in their estimating of the 
earnings forecasts, since the market shows an exceptionally high growth in EPS for the years 
2002-2009. Hence, SUE does not accurately measure the earnings surprise in the SSM.  
 
Finally, liquidity measured by the bid-ask spread is negatively associated with stock 
return volatility, stock price level and riyal trading volume. The time dummy variables which 
control for other spread components and test for information asymmetry indicate increasing 
spread around the date of earnings announcements which remains relatively high in the 
following 20 days.  An earnings release as suggested by Kim and Verrecchia (1994) motivates 
informed judgement, creating information asymmetry between traders in the market which can 
lasts for some time after the announcement. 
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chapter 4 : Bid-Ask Spread and Price Impact Asymmetry of Block 
Trades 
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4.1  Introduction  
This chapter examines the price impacts of buy and sell initiated block trades on the Saudi 
Stock Market (SSM) over the time period, 2005-2008. This is important for a number of 
reasons. First, to our knowledge this is one of the first studies to investigate the price impact of 
block trades in an emerging equity market. Emerging markets are of particular interest because 
a vast majority of mutual funds, investment banks and individuals are investing heavily in 
emerging markets to diversify risk. This is common given that institutional investment is not 
very well established in emerging equity markets. Second, the SSM is of particular interest 
because there have been a large number of structural changes affecting the  microstructure of 
the equity market, as well as the role the exchange plays as a resource allocation mechanism. 
The major structural change was when the government established the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) in 2004. The CMA is a centralised regulatory body that oversees the market 
regulation and activities of the SSM.  
Our empirical findings reaffirm the previous literature by documenting a greater price 
impact of block purchases than block sales. However, unlike the previous literature we 
discover that the asymmetry persists even when we account for the bid-ask bias in block trades. 
Overall, our findings suggest that in an emerging market where institutional trading is 
relatively scarce, market microstructure cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of 
large trades.  
The chapter is organized as following. Section 4.2 discusses the literature review. 
Section 4.3 illustrates the data and methodology used to implement the empirical analysis. 
Section 4.5 documents a price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales on the 
Saudi Stock Market. The price asymmetry is investigated using different trade size categories. 
We also empirically examines whether the bid-ask spread can explain the asymmetry between 
block purchases and sales.  Finally, Section 4.6 summarises and concludes.  
 
4.2 Literature Review  
In an efficient market ,prices are believed to  change  in response to  the arrival of new 
fundamental information  .On the other hand,  in market microstructure research,  market 
makers or traders  update their beliefs about the true value of security prices in response to 
transaction data as well, hence trade itself conveys information to traders which is a key 
element of asymmetric information models . Large trades   have the capacity to move prices 
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directly through the trading itself, as well as indirectly, by influencing the trading decisions of 
other market participants who may observe the action of large trade initiators. In a less deep 
market, higher price impact reflects a major challenge to stock exchanges and policy makers. 
Large trades in the stock market are known as block trades. 
It is commonly recognised that any trade volume higher than 10,000 shares is 
considered to be block trades. The proportion of equities traded in blocks has increased 
substantially in recent years. In 1994, block trades of 10,000 shares accounted for 55.5% of 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) share volume (Madhavan and Cheng, 1997); now it 
accounts for over 70%. In the LSE (London Stock Exchange) block trades (of 10,000 shares or 
more) accounted for mere 5% of total FTSE 100 trading volume in 1984 which reached over 
50% in 2005.
26
 Institutional trading, predominately made up of block trades, accounts for over 
60% of total trading volume in the LSE (Stapledon, 1996).  
 
Starting with  Kraus and Stoll (1972) who noted “blocks are sold not bought” , prior 
empirical research has documented a permanent price impact asymmetry between buyer and 
seller initiated trades in many equity markets including the NYSE (Holthausen et al.,1987) 
,DJIA, (Frino et al, 2003), LSE, (Gemmill, 1996 and Gregoriou, 2008) and the Australian stock 
exchange, (Aitken and Frino, 1996a) and for a study covering 37 international markets 
(Chiyachantana et al.,2004). The price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales 
has been a “Puzzle” over the last three decades. Empirical work (see among others, Holthause 
et al., 1987, 1990; Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Gemmill, 1996, Frino et al, 2003 and 
Gregoriou, 2008) has suggested that stock prices react differently to buy and sell orders.
27
 The 
price continuation following a block purchase and a price reversal following a block sale 
suggests that block sellers pay liquidity premium while block buyers do not (Aitken and Frino, 
1996).  
Scholes (1972) and Kraus and Stoll (1972) were the first to develop hypotheses on how 
stock prices react to block trades: the substitution hypothesis, short run liquidity costs, and the 
information hypothesis.  The substitution effect draws attention to the lack of close substitute 
for a security which leads to a demand curve of a stock not to be perfectly elastic .Under the 
imperfect substitute hypothesis price effect is expected to be permanent. In the case of no 
perfect substitutes, prices tend to change permanently as the buyer or seller has to offer a 
                                                        
26 The Financial Times, January 2006. 
27 Chan and Lakonishok (1993) call the price asymmetry of block trades a “key puzzle”. 
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higher discount to make the deal attractive for other traders to take the other side of the trade. 
Price pressure or short-run liquidity cost occurs because of the demand and supply friction at 
the time of the trade which may result in price effect that is most probably to be temporary and 
closely related to the depth of the market. The information effect depends on the identity of the 
traders and size of the transaction as a proxy for the information content of the trade. A 
permanent price change is expected to be associated with informed trading which subsequently 
lead to new equilibrium prices. 
 
One established explanation of the asymmetry of the price impact of block trades is that 
there is more informed trading in purchases than in sales. Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Keim 
and Madhavan (1996) and Saar (2001) among others suggest that the block purchases are based 
on the arrival of new firm-specific information, whereas block sales are motivated by liquidity 
and portfolio composition. The decision to sell a block reflects the limited option  a trader has 
among stocks in his/her portfolio, whereas the decision to buy a block indicates a fundamental 
interest in that particular stock among many stocks in the market. 
 
4.3 Data and Econometric Methodology  
 
We use high frequency data at one minute time intervals to evaluate the price impact of buyer 
and seller initiated block trades, in the SSM over the time period of January 2005 to September 
2008. The data is taken from Mubasher, a vendor of quotes and transaction data in the SSM. It 
is a unique dataset because to our knowledge it is the only database that includes all listed 
companies (124 companies) in the SSM and the market index, Tadawul All Share Index 
(TASI) at the intraday level. The dataset contains all transactions which are time-stamped to 
the nearest minute and in some cases it aggregates all transactions occurred within the minute. 
Any inference about the data is applicable to the whole market as the dataset is free from any 
sample bias.
28
  
It is a highly comprehensive dataset as it almost covers four-year intraday dataset, from 
Jan 2005 to September 2008, with over 16,076,414 records of all transactions and bid-ask 
quotes. Following the previous literature (see among others Madhavan and Cheng, 1997) we 
                                                        
28 Two companies were delisted due to pending satisfaction of certain financial criteria, namely “Bisha” and 
“Anaam”. They were excluded from the data because no transaction data was available due to the suspension of 
trading. 
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define block trades in our study as any trade with over 10.000 shares, which is   4,221, 870 
trades or 20.8% of all trades in our sample.  Clearly, the sample size, when compared with 
those used in previous studies, is very large. For example, Frino et al. (2003) and Gregoriou 
(2008) used approximately 2,800,000 block trades, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) examined 
1,215,387 transactions while Madhavan and Cheng (1997) and Gemmill (1996) analysed only 
16,343 and 6,000 trades respectively. 
Following the previous literature (see among others Madhavan and Cheng, 1997), block 
trade price effects are classified into three categories, the total price impact, temporary price 
impact and permanent price impact. We use a five trade “minutes” benchmark to compute the 
price effects.
29
 The total price impact is calculated as the percentage return from five trades 
prior to the block trade to the block trade itself. The temporary price impact is calculated as the 
percentage return from the block trade to the fifth trade after the block trade. The permanent 
price impact represents the percentage return from five trades prior to the block trade to five 
trades after the block trade.  All prices used in the computations are transaction prices. The 
following equations represent the three types of price effect used in this study: 
 
   (𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍  𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒕 =  
𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
  )                  (1) 
 
 (𝑻𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒕 =
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆+𝟓−𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆
  )          (2) 
 
             (𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒕 =
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆+𝟓−𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
 )       (3) 
 
 
We use the trade classification algorithm established by Lee and Ready (1991) to 
identify the block purchases and sales. The idea underlying the Lee and Ready method is to 
infer the trade direction of the transaction using the “tick rule”. The tick rule test compares 
trade price changes relative to previous trade prices. If the price change between trades is 
positive, then the transaction is coded as a buy-initiated trade. A negative price change yields a 
sell-initiated trade. We follow the Bonser-Neal et al. (1999) method to sign a trade when the 
change in the price is zero. We compare trade price P (t) with the trade price  P(t − 2)  and if 
                                                        
29 Given that we use intraday minute transactions data, we use the terms trades and minutes interchangeably. 
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the change in price is still zero, we repeat the process   until we find a difference in prices. If 
the price change is still zero at P(t − 5).   Then this trade is unclassified and omitted. Using the 
“tick rule”, we classify 2,366,099 trades into buy trades and 1, 855,236 into sell trades with 
total sample number of 4,221,870 transactions. Consistent with prior research, we associate a 
trade indicator for each trade to indicate the nature of the trade: 1 (buy), −1 (sell), or 0 
(undecided).   
 
Table 4-1 reports descriptive statistics for our dataset. The dataset contains intraday one 
minute transaction data of all companies in the SSM making up the TASI index.  Each one-
minute interval includes the following fields for each trade: Ticker, Date, Time, Price, Ask, 
Bid, and Volume.
30
 We analyse 4,221,870 transactions amounting to a value of S.R 8.7 trillion 
(equivalent to $ 2,32 trillions). The sample is very large comparing to previous studies and it 
covers all 124 listed companies.  The average number of shares per trade is larger for purchases 
amounting to 29,130 shares whereas the average number of trades for sales is 28,204 shares. 
Moreover, the average quoted spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price, is slightly 
higher for purchases (S.R 0.3607) then for sales (S.R 0.3564). On the other hand, the relative 
spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the midprice (the average of the 
bid and ask prices), indicates that the spread is larger in the sale trades than in the buy trades; 
however, the difference is negligible.  
The average quoted and relative spreads for all trades are almost half of those found in block 
trades. Size of the trade can be seen as a proxy of the information content of the order. Easley 
and O‟Hara (1987) indicate that informed traders prefer to trade a large amount at any given 
price, a finding that confirmed by many researchers. Consequently, informed trading is 
believed to have a higher effect on price impact and bid/ask spread. 
 
 
 
                                                        
30 We follow (Engle and Russell, 1998, and Spierdijk, 2004) and treat multiple transactions at the same time as 
one single transaction with aggregated trade volume and average prices. 
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Table  4-1 : Summary Statistics of Block Purchases and Sales for the Saudi Stock Market. 
 
 No of trades 
’05-‘08 
Avg No of 
shares 
Avg Value 
Per trade 
Avg Quoted   
Spread 
Avg Relative  
  Spread 
 
All trades 
 
 
16,076,414 
 
 
9,528 
 
 
58,000 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
0.0030 
 
Block trades            4,221,870 29,130 1,880,473 0.3586 0.0063 
 
Block Buys  
 
 
2,366,099 
 
30,046 
 
1,932,452 
 
0.3607 
 
0.0062 
 Block Sells  
 
1,855,236 28,204 1,827,466 0.3564 0.0064 
Notes: Number of trades, average number of shares traded, average value per trade, average 
quoted spread where quoted spread is defined as the ask minus the bid price, and the average 
relative spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the midprice (the average 
of the bid and ask prices). The exchange rate is approximately ($1=3.75 Saudi Riyal).    
 
 
 
4.4 Results  
 
In Table 4-2 we formally test whether the magnitude of the price impact of buyer and seller 
initiated block trades is significantly different. Our test entails a comparison of the means for 
the temporary, permanent, and total price impacts of block purchases and sales. The asymmetry 
between block purchases and sales reported in the previous literature is transparent when we 
observe the permanent and total price impact. Block buys have a permanent (total) price impact 
of 0.49% (0.51%), whereas block sales have a permanent (total) price impact of -0.38 %.(-
0.43%). Tests of equality for all three measured price impacts demonstrate that block purchases 
have a significantly greater price impact than block sales. The price impact asymmetry gives 
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strong support that the information content of block purchases is higher than block sales. This 
is because the. SSM has few institutional investors and a vast majority of the governmental 
mutual funds are not active in the market. The mutual funds primarily follow a buy-and-hold 
investment strategy, implying that the market has more purchases than block sales. The 
purchase of a large trade in the SSM is perceived as a fundamentally strategic decision, 
whereas the sale of a large trade is perceived as less strategic decision or liquidity- based 
decision.   
 
The temporary price impact which is mainly a product of short-run liquidity costs 
suggests that following a block sale, a reversal in prices is predicted and that the magnitude of 
price reversal is higher in block sales than block purchases. The higher reversal in the price 
impact for block sales at 0.04%, suggests that sellers in the SSM pay a liquidity premium that 
is at least three times the liquidity premium paid by buyers at -0.013%.  The best five quotes 
for the bid and ask prices are transparent in the SSM and trades seem to react to a large block 
sale before it is executed through discounting the price at -0.42%. Once the block sale has been 
executed, a price reversal of 0.04% on average is observed.  On the other hand, block 
purchases are executed at a 0.5% premium with a smaller price reversal of -0.01%. Given that 
the price impact continuation is higher in the block purchases, the results suggest that block 
buys are more informative than block sells. Our results are consistent with the prior literature. 
See among others, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and Keim and Madhavan (1995).  
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Table  4-2 : Transaction Price Effects of Block Trades in the Saudi Stock Market. 
 
 Permanent Total Temporary 
 effects effects effects 
    
Panel A Buys(n= 2,366,099 )    
Mean 
 
.004917     .0050667     -.000137     
SD 
  
 
.012490 
 
 
.0097506 .0091441   
Panel  B Sell(n=1,855,236)    
Mean 
 
-.003883     -.0042678     .0004012     
SD .01246 .0097611 .0095251      
Panel  C Test of Equality    
Mean difference 0.001034 0.000799 0.000264 
t-statistic(two-sample mean comparison 
test) 
585*** 794*** -47***     
Notes: Transaction returns surrounding block trades of 10,000 shares or more executed on all 
companies listed on the Saudi Stock Market over the time period 2005-2008, broken down by 
buyer (Panel A) and seller (Panel B) initiated trades. Three measures of price impact are reported 
:(1) Permanent, defined as the algorithmic return of transaction prices from five trade before the 
block to five trades after;(2) Total, defined as the algorithmic return of transaction prices from 
five trade before the block to the block trade; and (3) Temporary, defined as the algorithmic 
return of transaction prices from the block to five trades after the block trade. Panel A reports the 
buy-block traders while Panel B reports sell-block trades along with mean and standards 
deviations. Panel C shows the tests of equality between the two samples by performing a two-
sample mean comparison t test. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 
1% level.  
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4.4.1 Price Asymmetry and trade size 
 
Existing theoretical and empirical research suggests that informed traders submit larger orders 
than do liquidity traders. If that assumption holds true in the SSM, we expect to have an 
increasing function between price impact asymmetry and order size for both block purchases 
and sells. To examine how price effect might differ within different size groups   , we divide 
block trades of buys and sells into different groups.   Following Madhavan and Cheng (1997), 
we partition block trades into three categories of 10,000 to 20,000, 20,000 to 50,000 and 
greater than 50,000.   
 
Table  4-3 : Permanent Price impact Asymmetry between BUY and Sell within different 
sizes of block trades 
 G1 
Share volume 
10,000-20,000 
G2 
Share volume 
20,000-50,000 
G3 
Share volume 
 >50,000  
    
Panel A: Buys(n=2,366,099)  G1(n=971091) 
 
G2(n=852122) G3(n=542886) 
Mean 
 
.00331 .00467     .00781     
SD 
 
.01123 .01250     .01379     
Panel B: Sells  (n=1,855,236)  G1(n=560662) G2(n=683068)        G3(n=382971)     
Mean 
 
-.00339 -.00414     -.00440     
SD .01129 .01269    .01414    
Panel  C Test of Equality    
difference -.00008 0.00053 0.00341 
t-statistic(two-sample mean 
comparison test) 
  315***  349***  347*** 
Notes: Size of the trade is partitioned into three categories. Small blocks 10k-20k (G1), medium 
block size 20k-50k (G2) and finally large block trades of 50k and above (G3). Panel A  reports 
mean permanent price impact for buyer initiated trade for the three size categories and Panel B 
reports the mean permanent price impact for seller initiated trades for all three size categories. 
Panel C lists the mean difference along with the t statistics for the two sample mean test. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4-3 summarises the price impact of block purchases and sales broken by the trade size 
category. In smaller size category of (10k-20k), the price impact is higher in the seller initiated 
trades, however, the difference is negligible. On the other hand, price impact asymmetry 
(higher price effect for buy block trades) is observed in the other two categories (20k-50k) and 
(50k and above) with a different of 0.054 % and 0.34%, respectively. There appears to be a 
significant price asymmetry in the price impact between buyer and seller initiated blocks. 
However, the price asymmetry is an increasing function of size, asymmetry in the magnitude of 
the price effect reaches its highest in the large group category, 50k and above. Average 
permanent price impact per block sale does not vary substantially according to the block size 
category. Conversely, the average permanent price effect increases substantially in the buyer 
group, contributing to the price asymmetry. The permanent price impact for block purchases in 
the large block category is 0.78%, more than twice the average price effect for the small block 
purchases at 0.33%. Selling medium to small blocks has approximately similar effect on prices 
whereas buying large blocks conveys information to the market more than buying small to 
medium blocks. It could also mean that seller of block trades tend to split large orders into 
smaller to medium orders or they use more frequently “stealth trading” .However, the 
distribution of block sales into the three size categories is not substantially different from block 
purchases distribution suggesting that both buyers and sellers of block trades in the SSM 
follow similar trading strategies.  
 
4.4.2 Price Impacts and the Bid-Ask Spread  
 
There is an emerging literature (Frino et al, 2003 and Gregoriou, 2008) that attempts to explain 
the price impact asymmetry in block purchases and sales by the bid-ask bias in stock prices. 
This is because when using transaction prices to calculate the price impact of block trades a 
systematic error occurs. This is due to the fact transaction prices, implicitly, assume an equal 
probability of a trade to occur at the ask or at the bid price. If this is not true, block trade price 
effects will be systematically biased. 
 
  In order to mitigate this systematic error Frino et al. (2003) and Gregoriou (2008) have 
computed the price impact of block trades purged of bid-ask bias. This is done by using quote 
data to calculate price returns where bid prices are used to calculate price returns for the sell 
trades and ask prices for the buy trades. Frino et al (2003) and Gregoriou (2008) find that the 
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asymmetric price impact of block purchases and sales is diminished in the DJIA and the LSE 
respectively, when price impacts are purged of bid-ask bias. 
 
Therefore, following this line of literature, we empirically examine whether the price 
impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales in the Saudi Stock Market, can be 
explained by the bid-ask bias. Following Lease et al. (1991), Frino et al (2003) and Gregoriou 
(2008) we calculate the order flow ratio, to examine the propensity to trade at the quote. We 
document the frequency of trading for five classifications; 1) at the bid price indicating a block 
sell, 2) at ask price indicating a block buy, 3) at the midprice price indicating a matching order, 
4) between the midprice and bid prices indicating selling pressure, 5) between midprice price 
and ask prices indicating buying pressure. The order flow ratio is calculated for the entire 
sample using the following formula: 
 
   𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 =
(𝑨𝒔𝒌−𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆)
(𝑨𝒔𝒌−𝑩𝒊𝒅)
  (4) 
    
 
As the order flow ratio approaches 1, it is more likely the trade price is at the bid price, and 
when it reaches 0, the greater the likelihood that the trade is at the ask price .Table 4-4 
evaluates the percentage of block trades occurring at the ask and bid prices in the Saudi Stock 
Market over the time period, 2005-2008. 40% of the block trades take place at the ask prices 
whereas 37% of trades occur at the bid prices. Moreover, the trades that happen between the 
midpoint and either the ask or bid prices have similar percentages, 9% and 7% respectively. 
Given that the number of block purchases are higher, and the distribution of the percentages of 
trading at the ask and bid price are similar, indicates a propensity to trade at the ask or between 
the midpoint and ask more frequently than at the bid price. 
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Table ‎4-4 :  Block Prices Relative to the Ask and Bid Price in the Saudi Stock Market  
 
Order Flow 
Ratio 
Order Flow < 0.5 Order Flow = 
0 
Order Flow 0.5 < 1 Order Flow = 1 Order Flow = 1 
Trade 
 
Between 
Midpoint and 
the Ask 
At Ask Between Midpoint 
and the Bid  
At Bid At Midpoint 
Distribution     9%   40%           7%   37%        7% 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of block trade prices in the Saudi Stock Market over the 
time period 2005-2008. The distribution is determined by the order flow ratio broken into five 
categories: (1) At the Ask Price, (2) At the Bid Price, (3) At the midpoint (the average of the bid 
and ask price), (4) Between the midpoint and the ask price, (5) between the midpoint and the bid 
price. 
 
 
In order to eliminate the bid-ask bias in block purchases and sales, we employ quotes data to 
calculate block price impacts instead of transaction prices. Ask (bid) prices are used to 
compute the price impact for block buys (sells). Mean returns purged of bid-ask bias are 
displayed in Table 4- 5. We witness that the asymmetry in block purchases and sales seen in 
Table 4-2, remains even when we account for the bid-ask bias in block trade transactions. 
However, the asymmetry is reduced in magnitude for all three price impact measures.  
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Table  4-5 : Quote Price Effects of Block Trades in the Saudi Stock Market 
 Permanent Total Temporary 
 effects effects effects 
    
Panel A Buys(n=2,366,099)    
Mean 
 
.0090771     .0093398     .0051918     
SD 
 
.0131882     0.011248     .0096929 
Panel A Sell(n=1,855,236)    
Mean 
 
-.0091983     -.0096808     -.0051626     
SD .0138164    .0120155    .0101444 
Panel  C Test of Equality    
difference -0.0001212 -0.00034 .0000292 
t-statistic(two-sample mean comparison test) 1.4e+03*** 1.7e+03*** 1.3e+03*** 
    
Notes: Mean Returns purged of bid-ask bias surrounding block trades of 10,000 shares or more 
executed on all companies listed on the Saudi Stock Market over the time period 2005-2008, 
broken down by buyer (Panel A) and seller (Panel B) initiated trades. Three measures of price 
impact are reported :(1) Permanent, defined as the algorithmic return of transaction prices from 
five trade before the block to five trades after;(2) Total, defined as the algorithmic return of 
transaction prices from five trade before the block to the block trade; and (3) Temporary, defined 
as the algorithmic return of transaction prices from the block to five trades after the block trade. 
Panel A reports the buy-block traders while Panel B presents sell-block trades along with mean 
and standards deviations. Panel C shows the tests of equality between the two samples by 
performing a two-sample mean comparison t test. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
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4.5 Summary  
 
In this paper we empirically examine the price impact of block trades, in the Saudi Stock 
Market over the time period of 2005-2008. Using a unique dataset of intraday data consisting 
of 2.3 million block buys and 1.9 million block sales, we replicate the asymmetry between 
block purchases and sales documented in the previous literature. However, unlike prior 
research the price impact asymmetry persists even when we encapsulate the biases in block 
transactions through the existence of the bid-ask spread. Overall, our findings suggest that in 
an emerging market where institutional trading is relatively scarce, market microstructure 
cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of large trades.  
 
Our results suggest that bid-ask spreads do not fully incorporate the information 
asymmetry present within block transactions in emerging equity markets. This implies that the 
electronic limit order book system may not be the optimal trading mechanism for emerging 
markets. This is because as mentioned by Benveniste et al (1992) and Snell and Tonks (2003) 
market makers are superior in resolving information asymmetry than the order book system. 
Our analysis reveals that emerging markets may require a dealership system to improve the 
quality of their equity markets. Given the extensive trading in emerging equity markets as a 
result of international diversification, the empirical findings in this paper cannot be ignored.  
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chapter 5 : Liquidity and Price Impact of Block Trades 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of this study is to examine some market microstructure implications in the Saudi 
Stock Market (SSM). Market microstructure is the study of the process by which prices are 
formed in a market including the role of information and the interaction of different agents 
within different sets of rules. Market microstructure studies have been covering various 
aspects, e.g., liquidity, transaction cost, bid-ask spreads, trading mechanism, trade size, and 
block trades. While there have been several studies of the impact of large trades on more 
developed markets, there have been none for the SSM and the other similarly related markets. 
The SSM has been undergoing remarkable changes during the last five years and it is 
believed to continue gradually changing the infrastructure of the market.  Such rapidly 
changing market is an interesting story by itself; however this market lacks microstructure 
research coverage which can be explained by the inaccessibility of the required trade and tick 
data. Hence, this is the main motive to cover such a market.  
We analyze two dimensions of liquidity in the SSM: price impact and bid/ask spread. 
First, we attempt to examine   the determinants of the price impact of block trades  in the SSM 
to understand how this market, and perhaps similar markets, responds to large trades in a 
microstructure framework. Second, we study the relationship between liquidity and other 
trading activities such as volatility, volume and firm size. In both dimensions, we focus on 
intraday patterns of liquidity and cross-sectional variation effects of trading activities  . 
 
  The SSM is a pure order-driven market where most of the activities taken places are 
initiated by private investors not institutional investors. In fact more than ninety percent of 
trading is individually initiated trades. The presence of institutional investors is still new and 
hesitant. Moreover, foreign direct investment is restricted and does not entail full ownership of 
shares bought. 
Since establishment of the capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2004, the SSM has 
experienced important structural reforms. However, the need for strong market architect is 
crucial for SSM and other markets in the region.   The CMA is promoting stability and 
liquidity in the market through introducing sets of regulations that encourage institutional 
investment and reduce information asymmetry in the market. 
In this study we focus on the trading process, more precisely, the impact of block trades 
and the effect of asymmetric information on market liquidity and asset prices .We extend the 
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research of this area in market microstructure and provide out-of-sample evidence through 
examining new dataset that covers all listed companies in the SSM at the one minute intraday 
level. We aim to study micro-structural effects on price behaviour of securities listed in the 
market .we focus on the liquidity issue and resiliency of the market following a block trade. 
 
5.2 Literature review  
The National Bureau of Economic Research(NBER) has a market microstructure research 
group that, it  describe itself  as , "is devoted to theoretical, empirical, and experimental 
research on the economics of securities markets, including the role of information in the price 
discovery process, the definition, measurement, control, and determinants of liquidity and 
transactions costs, and their implications for the efficiency, welfare, and regulation of 
alternative trading mechanisms and market structures".
31
 
O‟Hara (1995) defines the term as “the study of the process and outcomes of 
exchanging assets under a specific set of rules. While much of economics abstracts from the 
mechanics of trading, microstructure theory focuses on how specific trading mechanisms affect 
the price formation process”. 
While much of the financial investment theories focus on the equilibrium prices or the 
mechanic of trading where supply and demand interact, market microstructure has focused on 
how these mechanics work to determine price formation. Or as Biais et al. (2005), put it “In 
perfect markets, Walrasian equilibrium prices reflect the competitive demand curves of all 
potential investors. While the determination of these fundamental equilibrium valuations is the 
focus of (most) asset pricing, market microstructure studies how, in the short term, transaction 
prices converge to (or deviate from) long-term equilibrium values.‟‟32 This deviation of 
transaction prices from their long term equilibrium prices is attributed to the existence of 
frictions in the markets such as   handling costs and the asymmetric information in the market. 
The price formation process is a central issue of market microstructure literature. More 
specifically, market microstructure analyses how the market structure and design affect the 
following characteristics of financial markets: (i) Liquidity, (ii) transaction and timing costs, 
(iii) price formation and price discovery, (iv) volatility, and (v) trading profits. 
                                                        
31
 http://www.nber.org/ 
32 Simultaneous auction type where in a perfect market, each participant submit their net demand at every price 
level possible, then price is set to match all demand submitted with total supply 
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Does Market microstructure matter?  
For decades, academics, practitioners, and regulators have been debating and contributing to 
this issue. They are all concerned with market microstructure as it could enhance the efficiency 
and pricing mechanism in a market. Most of the literatures of financial markets microstructure 
focus on stock returns behaviour, transaction cost, volatility and liquidity as the most popular 
studied variables. 
  Vast topics and practical issues are usually covered in the literature, e.g., If market 
microstructure matters, then what is the optimal structure for a stock market? Do prices reflect 
true values of assets traded and how that is related to the market design? How does information 
play important role into price formation?  Can we prevent price manipulation? What type of 
transaction costs exist in each market? How trading rules effect the price formation and 
discovery? Academic answers to such questions position, perhaps, the branch of market 
microstructure as the closest branch of financial research to practice. It is one of the most 
engaging finance topics by practitioners from banks and stock exchanges. 
Empirical research suggests that market structure has important effects on properties of 
asset prices. See for example, (Amihud and Mendelson ,1987; Amihud et al.,1990). Moreover, 
Madhavan(2000) and Biais et al.(2005) are some of the most recent extensive surveys of the 
literature. 
 It is agreed upon that no single market design will serve all exchanges well. 
Differences in organisations set up, nature of markets and participants necessitate the 
adaptation of different architectural approaches. In other words, different market structures 
handle different market situations. 
The field of market microstructure has been growing rapidly in the past two decades. 
Much of that rise is attributed to the developments and changes in structures and technologies 
of many stock markets around the world.  Emerging market growth has fuelled the subject of 
market microstructure too. Obviously, the availability of  transactions  and quotes data such as 
high frequency data and  real time data combined with increasing  computing power has  
spurred the literature  and  made it possible to  enhance the field with more research data that 
can be exploited for  new opportunities of  empirical works.   
Clearly, we don‟t attempt to answer all the previous microstructure questions. 
Nonetheless; the market microstructure research argues that the transaction process and the 
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organisation of markets have effects on the securities‟ prices. And in light of that assumption, 
we will discuss briefly different types of market design according to who provide the liquidity 
and whether trading is continuous or not to position our topic well within the context of market 
microstructure. 
 
Market architecture (trading process mechanism) 
The fundamental design characteristic of a market is called market architecture. There are 
many basic market architectures employed around the world. However, the two most popular  
trading systems are the quote-driven market and order-driven market. The most noticeable 
distinguishing feature between these two markets designs are the presence or the absence of 
intermediaries.  In a quote-driven market or a dealer market, designated intermediary agents 
who can be called a specialist, broker or dealer undertake the responsibility to sell when 
somebody wants to buy and to buy when somebody wants to sell. In this type of market, 
investors trade against the prices quoted by the market maker. Based on information in their 
book, the designated market makers will post the bid and ask offers that they are willing to 
trade for at that time. Individual orders are not seen by other traders and the market maker will 
have to fill in the order from his inventory or match it with another order. Market makers work 
to smooth trading through balancing demand and supply of liquidity. One drawback of this 
type of market is the lower level of transparency as the order book only known to the market 
maker.  
Since 1990, many stock  exchanges have introduced electronic limit order trading, 
either to replace, or to run in parallel with batch auctions or a quote system .Major US 
exchanges, i.e. NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and London Stock Exchange (LSE) are all using 
quote-driven trading mechanism to an extent with some of them have hybrid systems now. For 
example, NYSE is a hybrid system (quote-driven and order-driven) where the specialist is in 
charge of monitoring the order book. 
  
Unlike quote-driven markets, pure order-driven markets operate without the 
intermediation of dedicated market makers.
33
  Instead, investors submit their buy and sell 
orders specifying their price and quantity, thus creating the limit-order book which should be 
                                                        
33
 In many order-driven markets, market makers still exist but they are not the only main quote setters.  Traders 
can equally set the quotes in the market by interaction with other traders through the limit order book. 
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seen, at least partially, by all traders. Buyers and sellers provide liquidity to the market by 
posting limit orders (orders to buy or sell at a given price) and demand liquidity by placing 
market orders (orders to buy or sell at the current price in the order book). The price discovery 
happens based on the chosen price determination mechanism (discussed below) but in general 
order execution is usually prioritised based on price and then time. The majority of the stock 
exchanges outside the US employ order-driven systems which use computerised order 
matching. To name just a few; Paris Bourse, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Singapore 
Stock Exchange. 
Price determination mechanism 
Like any other product, share prices are determined by interaction of demand and supply, 
however this interaction or trading can take place continuously or at specific points/periods in 
time. Market participants submit their bid/ask orders which are stored in a record called the 
book order until they are executed, amended or cancelled.  In the case of   continuous trading 
which is referred to as continuous auction, orders are matched as they arrive and are executed 
at the price available on the counter side of the order book. The order book contains all 
submitted bid and ask orders which can be matched and executed instantly and on a continuous 
basis.  A trade takes place whenever a new bid (ask) arrives with a limit price equal to or 
higher (lower) than the limit price of the best ask (bid)in the limit order book meaning a higher 
price have priority in the bid (buy) side and a lower price takes priority at the ask (sell)side. If 
two orders have the same limit price on one side, then the order entered first into the book has 
the priority of trading.  
 
In theory, the limit order book should be seen to all participants in the market. However 
for practical issue, normally several best prices on each sides are shown with each price level 
accumulating multi-orders volume. 
A trade also can takes place in continues auction through market order. The market 
order is non-priced  order to buy(sell) with specific volume that is met at the best order on the 
other side, if volume is not satisfied completely then the market order is executed against next 
best order at the other  side climbing up the book until it is completely executed. 
The other type of trading mechanism is called call auction which allows trades to take 
place at specific points of time. In a call auction, limit orders are stored and accumulated in the 
book, and then matching takes place at a specific time at a single price. This single market 
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clearing price is determined in a way that should maximise trading volume and results in the 
execution of bids (asks) with the same or higher (lower) limit prices. Call auction is usually 
employed at the opening of the trading day, at the close of the trading day, and after trading 
halts. On the other hand, most stock exchanges uses continuous auction throughout the trading 
day. 
Market microstructure models  
Two major groups of models dominate the market microstructure theory literature. The first is 
inventory-based models, which studies how the intermediary (dealer, specialist, or market 
maker) uses prices to balance supply and demand across time and taking in consideration the 
uncertainty about the order flow and its relationship to the market maker‟s inventory position.34 
The second group of models is information-based models, which views the trading process as a 
product of different participants possessing different information regarding the prices of 
securities. In other words, information is distributed asymmetrically among participants in the 
market.  
Inventory based models have actually predated the information based models. As the 
name implies, Inventory based models focus on the problem of inventory management where 
the market maker uses the price to balance supply and demand across time but facing 
unbalanced risk related to   uncertainty about the order flow. The dealer controls the inventory 
through changing his quotes of bid and asks prices to induce the imbalance of buy and sell 
orders.
35
 The difference between the bid and ask that is set by the dealer represents the spread 
which is his profit on any trade.  The changing of the spreads by the dealer reflects his 
inventory position, the flow of orders and other factors like market condition. Early and 
pioneering models focus on dealers‟ optimisation and how agents set prices in order flow 
uncertainty environment (see for example,  Stoll ,1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; O'Hara 
and Oldfield, 1986).   Issues discussed on these models include the nature of the order flow in 
determining the asset trading prices, dealer‟s optimisation problem, and the bid-ask spread as a 
function of inventory level, dealer‟s risk aversion and transaction size and cost. One important 
implication of these models is that transaction costs along with inventory cost determine the 
bid-ask spread.  
                                                        
34 We use the terms dealer and market maker interchangeably throughout the thesis .It refers to those economics 
agents who set the quotes for the bid and ask in the market.  
35 Bid-Ask spread are the difference in prices traders welling to sell and buy at. In the following pages, Bid-Ask 
spread is discussed in more depth. 
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Contrary to the Theory of Efficient Market that assumes all participants in the market 
are equally informed about the true value of the asset traded, information-based models assume 
that information is not equally distributed among all participants in the market. A consequence 
of asymmetric information is that trading itself conveys information. 
Starting with Bagehot (1971), a new theory emerged to explain market prices and 
spreads that does not depend on transaction cost, but rather centred on the importance of 
information on price formation.  Examples of important work that follow are(Kyle 
,1985;Glosten and Milgrom ,1985; Easley and O'Hara ,1987; Stoll ,1989; Glosten and Harris 
,1988). A central idea in the information based models is that asymmetry information cost is an 
important component of the bid-ask spread which was ignored in the inventory based models.  
Empirical findings suggest that the bid-ask spread can be decomposed into two or three 
components. Glosten and Harris (1988), George et al. (1991), Kim and Ogden (1996) and 
Madhavan et al. (1997) use models that decompose spreads into a combined inventory and 
order processing cost components and an information asymmetry cost component. Stoll (1989) 
, and Huang and Stoll (1997), however, provide a three-way decomposition of the spread into 
three components  that is  order processing, inventory, and information asymmetry 
components.  
 
The inventory holding component is to compensate the dealer from undesirable 
inventory level situation while the order-processing component is to compensate the market 
maker for handling the transactions. Finally, the adverse selection component is to compensate 
the market maker when dealing with potentially informed traders which is the focus of the 
information-based models.  
 
The third component or cost arises because information-based models stipulate that 
some investors are better informed “informed traders‟‟ about a security true value than others 
“uninformed traders or liquidity traders” who trade for any other reason.36  Company directors, 
mutual fund managers,  large shareholders and other insiders having access to private 
information not available to the market at large all are considered to be “informed traders‟‟ 
who are also motivated by profit maximising goals.  In this type of trading environment, the 
dealer on average losses to the informed trader and therefore should normally profit when 
dealing with the uninformed trader. However, as the dealer is presumably unable to distinguish 
                                                        
36 Investors, who trade to adjust the size or the contents of their portfolio, are called liquidity traders or 
uninformed traders. Uninformed trading should be reflected in non-price change in the long-run. 
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the informed traders from the uninformed ones, he offsets losses by making gains from 
uninformed traders.  This gain is a portion of the spreads that is to compensate the dealer for 
risk taking when trading with potentially informed trader(for details on how market maker set 
the bid-ask spread in response to adverse selection problem , see for example, Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994; Gregoriou et al.,2005 ). The information based model first evolved in a 
sequential trade framework addressing issues related to adjustment of prices to information 
based on updating belief and expectation that is implied by the trading process. See for 
example ;(Glosten and Milgrom ,1985; Easley and O'Hara ,1987). The sequential trade models 
allow the learning process of the market maker or uninformed trader to be examined .In other 
words, the market maker learns from his previous trades. O'Hara (1995) explains that these 
models explicitly detail how asymmetric information affects market behaviour by 
demonstrating how market parameters such as size of the market or the ratio of large trades 
affects the bid ask spread and prices. Hasbrouck (1991a) measures the information effects as 
the permanent price impact of a trade while inventory, order processing, and other frictions 
should have temporary impact on prices. A liquidity-motivated trading has a temporary price 
impact on the stock because the order-flow does not carry value-relevant information. 
In contrast, informed-motivated trading has a permanent future effect on prices of 
stocks.  Most of the recent research focus on the adverse-selection component (the variable 
cost) as it represents an important function that is related to trade size. On the other hand, order 
processing cost is largely fixed and does not vary significantly with the trade size.  
Other extensions of information-based models, consider the strategic behaviour of 
segments, informed traders and uninformed traders, these extension models are called strategic 
trade models.  Kyle (1985), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), are some of the most 
prominent papers that have been analysing the former segment of traders. In the informed 
strategic trade models, participants can choose their timing or size of the trade therefore 
making equilibrium prices differ from those in sequential trade models. The focus of strategic 
informed trade models is how informed traders exploit their information and maximise their 
profit in dealing with the market maker. The other sets of strategic trade models, the 
uninformed trader case,   relax the restriction that   uninformed traders are not permitted to act 
strategically (see for example, Foster and Viswanathan, 1990; Seppi, 1990). These models add 
the strategic element and behaviour of the uninformed trader to the interaction between the 
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market maker and the informed trader creating new dimension which is the price effect and 
behaviour of those uninformed traders or “noise traders”.37   
 
Liquidity  
Liquidity is one of the main issues in microstructure literature. The word liquidity is often used 
in loose and imprecise way because it can cover many aspects. However, a market is 
considered perfectly liquid if a participant can trade at the observed prices irrespective to the 
quantity, time  and order type (buy or sell) desired. It is   defined as the ability to buy or sell 
significant quantities of a security quickly, anonymously, and with little price impact.  
Since the start of market microstructures studies, liquidity has been the focus of some 
researchers trying to understand the price formation process. Starting with Demsetz (1968) 
who concludes that trading volume and number of trades, volatility, firm size and prices are the 
main determinants of liquidity. Tinic (1972) finds a positive relation between trading activity 
and liquidity and a negative relation between trading activity and volatility. Subsequent papers 
usually use bid-ask spread and price impact as main proxies for transaction costs and liquidity. 
These papers study the topic in two different ways. First, in cross sectional analysis where they 
investigate whether higher bid-ask spreads and higher price impact would lead to higher 
returns in assets. In general, these papers find positive relationship between expected stock 
returns and alternative proxies for individual illiquidity levels such as bid-ask spreads, price 
impacts and probability of informed trading (e,g., Amihud and Mendelson,1986, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyan ,1996) . 
 
Second group of papers study the time-series properties of aggregate liquidity measures 
and find existence of liquidity patterns and predictability in how liquidity might affect asset 
prices. Example of these papers include ( Chordia et al.,2001; Hasbrouck and Seppi ,2001; 
Amihud , 2002). 
 
It is generally accepted that asset prices are closely affected by liquidity risk and 
liquidity patterns. Many research papers have focused on the liquidity effect on assets prices, 
the main finding is that liquidity is negatively related to stock returns. For example, Amihud 
                                                        
37
 O‟Hara in her book “Market Microstructure Theory” had reviewed the most prominent models of both 
inventory-based and information-based. 
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and Mendelson(1986) suggest that average liquidity is priced in the market while Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) find that security return sensitivity to market liquidity is a risk factor that 
is priced in the market. Amihud (2002), Bekaert et al., (2007) provide evidence that liquidity 
commoved with returns and can predict future returns. 
 
  In any stock exchange, liquidity can impact the price at which securities are traded, 
therefore, it is crucial to measure and model liquidity for the assets and the market in general.  
Various measures have been used for liquidity, e.g. Grossman and Miller (1988) indicate that 
market liquidity can be measured by investigating the  ability of executing trades under the 
current quotes price and time wise. More commonly cited is Kyle‟s (1985) practical definition 
of liquidity. Kyle identifies three components of market liquidity; the bid-ask spread 
“tightness”, the depth of the market for a particular stock, and resiliency.  Tightness is defined 
as the cost of turning around a position over a short period of time. Generally, the narrower or 
the smaller the spread the more liquid is the market. Depth of the stock or the market in general 
is the volume needed to move the prices by a given amount. The larger volume needed to move 
the prices the higher liquid is the market.   Resiliency is the speed with which prices return to 
equilibrium or current level following a large trade. The price effect of a trade in a resilient 
market is small and short-lived. Depth and breadth of the market are concepts that are closely 
related to each other.  A deep market is a one that you find incremental quantity ready to for 
trade above and below current price level. 
 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that liquidity can be measured by the cost of 
immediate execution in a view that bid and ask price is the sum of the buying premium and the 
selling concession.  Recent work has introduced different metrics of liquidity, such as the 
illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) where he shows that expected market illiquidity 
increases expected return because essentially illiquidity ratio serves as a proxy for the price 
impact of trade. He has proposed a liquidity cost in the markets using daily dollar volume and 
stock returns where illiquidity is measured as the average ratio of the daily absolute return to 
the dollar trading volume on that day as follow: 
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 month. The basic intuition of this ratio is that the higher ILLIQ indicate the 
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less liquidity a stock is. Thus, a higher ILLIQ  means that the price of a stock changes more in 
response to smaller volume. 
 
 
Persaud (2003) identifies a different but rather insightful fourth measure for liquidity 
which he calls diversity .He argues that lack of diversity can lead to liquidity black holes. 
Diversity refers to the differences in beliefs among traders in their market view. Persaud states 
“a liquidity black hole is where price falls do not bring out buyers, but generate even more 
sellers.” Contrary to the normal belief that when prices go down an increasing number of 
buyers will exist, this is a condition where liquidity dries up and falling   prices incline more 
seller. One important factor of this condition is the homogeneity of investors and how it could 
create the liquidity black holes. A stock market crash where panic selling motivates more 
selling is a clear example of liquidity black holes.  
Market liquidity is considered an important factor that is closely related to market 
efficiency and stability. Liquidity is an important determinant of market behaviour.  A liquid 
market has more capacity to accommodate order flow, hence promoting efficiency of the 
market. Chordia et al. (2005) consider the market‟s capacity to accommodate order imbalances 
as an indicator of market efficiency.
38
  
 
Market systems differ in their role of who provides liquidity. In a quote-driven system, 
the dealer is responsible for creating liquidity in the market. He stands by ready to buy and sell 
shares at anytime. Quantity of shares (volume) demanded or supplied is determined by the 
traders not the dealer creating inventory balance risk for him. Hence the dealer is given 
exclusive rights as compensation by an exchange over a share; therefore the dealer can post 
different prices for purchases and sales. The dealer buys at the bid price Pb  and sells for higher 
ask price  Pa  and the spread is the difference between the bid and ask prices  Pb − Pa , known as 
the bid-ask spread. The spread is the main source of profit for the dealer in return for providing 
the market liquidity. The dealer sets prices first then investors submit quantities. 
 
In contrast, in the order-driven system, investors voluntarily provide the liquidity for 
the market through the limit orders and subsequently creating the spread in the order book.  
Prices and quantities are set by investors as the order-driven system operates without 
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 Conditions where buy (sell) orders outnumber sell (buy) orders for a security in the market, which might halt 
trading for that security. 
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intermediary.
39
 All orders are entered into the order book and wait for execution which could 
follow call auction or continuous auction mechanism. Trade transactions and best price levels 
on both sides are visible to all traders in the market, and orders submitted but not executed yet 
can be amended or cancelled by a trader. 
Trading rules and mechanisms varies in the way liquidity provision is handled. For 
example, some markets allow for “upstairs market” to facilitate the large trade transactions. 
Upstairs market is a network of dealers and brokers that facilitate negotiation of block trades 
between the buyers and sellers or dealers who syndicate among themselves to take the other 
side of the trade.  This alternative trading mechanism is used for different reasons, one of 
which is the information problem naturally embedded in the large trades as they may signal 
information to other investors thus creating adverse selection problem. The block trader might 
be at price disadvantage when a large trade moves the price unfavourably if the order is 
submitted to the downstairs market.  
Asset Pricing and Liquidity   
Conventionally financial theory argues that risk is the principal determinant of differences in 
expected asset returns and that trading volume and transaction costs can be neglected  in asset 
pricing models. This view is well documented in the classical asset pricing papers such as, 
Sharpe (1964) and  Lintner (1965) as well as the subsequent enrichments of that framework 
provided by  Merton (1973). The traditional view is also at the heart of the general equilibrium 
analyses of many subsequent papers.  
 
 However, within asset pricing framework, liquidity and transaction costs have been 
integrated recently in some theoretical studies, which established that transaction costs are an 
important determinant of excess returns. Jacoby et al. (2000) develop a liquidity adjusted 
CAPM, where systematic and liquidity risks are inseparable. They show that the true measure 
of systematic risk when considering liquidity costs is based on net (after bid-ask spread) 
returns. Lo et al. (2004) propose a dynamic equilibrium model of asset prices and trading 
volume when agents face fixed transaction costs. In their study, they show that even small 
transaction cost can provoke “no-trade” regions for each agent optimal trading policy. Liu 
(2004) confirms these findings in an environment where multiple risky assets are traded. 
 
                                                        
39
 A broker exists to facilitate the matching of buyers and sellers in an electronic order driven market. 
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In an empirical framework, Fisher (1994), Marquering and Verbeek (1999) and 
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2007) combine transaction costs with asset pricing models. In Fisher 
study(1994) it was shown that transaction costs parameters are relatively and  significantly 
different from zero in US equity market which imply that transaction costs can explain a 
component of the equity premium as investors want to be  compensated for relatively high 
transactions costs. This was reaffirmed in Marquering and Verbeek (1999) and in an extended 
model  Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2007) in UK equity market. 
 
   
  More recently, there has been an emerging literature on the impact of liquidity risk 
“liquidity premium” on asset pricing, such as the work of (Amihud , 2002; Pastor and 
Stambaugh ,2003; and Sadka ,2006). These papers look at the systematic component of 
liquidity as a source of priced risk. However this work is mainly emerging and is of empirical 
nature. 
 
Bid-Ask spread 
The spread represents the difference between the best demand prices (Bid prices) and the best 
supply prices (Ask Prices). The ask price should always exceeds the bid price, otherwise one 
could benefit by buying at the Ask and immediately selling at the Bid which could create clear 
arbitrage opportunity. In other words, the spread should be positive or the market is in locked 
situation.
40
   The spread can be thought of as the cost or the price of immediacy in both buying 
and selling securities (Demsetz, 1968). The bid-ask spread is determined differently in the 
“quote driven” market and “order driven” market.  In “quote driven” market, investors trade 
against the market maker who sets the spread. The specialist should stand ready at any time to 
buy from sellers and sell to buyers. The market maker sets the quotes on the stock to 
compensate him/her for the costs and risks associated with holding and trading the stocks. In 
“order driven” market, there are no market makers, hence liquidity is provided to the market by 
investors and the spread is determined subsequently by those investors (individuals or 
institutions).  They submit their orders to an order book (Limit Order Book) which enter into 
computerised systems that match buy and sell orders and information regarding transactions is 
available to all investors.  Bid-Ask spreads are determined according to liquidity preferences of 
investors. 
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 Temporary situation when spreads between Bid/Ask prices are identical which made trading to stop until prices 
are corrected by subsequent orders. 
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There are two main theories of the bid-ask spread, „asymmetric information‟ and 
„inventory control‟. In „asymmetric information‟ model, dealers trade with informed traders 
and liquidity traders. Informed traders have private information and seek to utilise it. 
Therefore, bid and ask prices are set in order to compensate dealer for the adverse selection 
problem. In „inventory control‟ model  the trade-off between price changes while holding the 
stock and being unable to trade the stock is considered by the market maker. The bid-ask 
spread should  compensate market makers for order  processing costs, inventory costs and the 
risk of trading against the better-informed traders. Each component of the spread has been 
modelled and empirically examined, however, information asymmetry perhaps is the most 
related component to the bid-ask spread .  
 
Numerous researchers have tried to decompose the bid-ask spread into its three 
components using different statistical modelling approaches. Huang and Stoll (1997) group the 
various statistical models into two categories. In the first group of models, the covariance-
based models , inferences about the  components of  the bid-ask spread are made  by  the use of  
serial covariance properties of observed transaction prices to infer about the components of the 
bid-ask spread (Roll, 1984; Stoll, 1989 ; George et al., 1991). 
 
The second group of models is the trade indicator regression models, was initially 
proposed by Glosten and Harris (1988). This class of models uses the direction of trade flows 
to estimate the bid-ask spread components (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1994; Lin et al., 1995; 
Hasbrouck, 1991a; Madhavan et al., 1997). 
 
Many studies suggest applying the information asymmetry component in explaining the 
bid-asking spread, e.g. (Glosten andMilgrom, 1985; Glosten and Harris, 1988). They suggest 
that information asymmetry alone is sufficient to induce the spread solely, since the market 
maker widens the spread in anticipation of any potentially informed trades. Information 
asymmetry is based on the adverse selection theory and suggests that changed in bid- ask 
spread merely reflects the changes in the level information asymmetry. In general, spread 
decomposition models successfully isolate the adverse selection or information related 
component of the spread, and analyses employing an estimated informed trading component 
should be more powerful than those employing total spreads (Heflin and Shaw, 2000).  
In limit order markets, because investors are  not obligated to trade or keep inventory,  
the spread decomposition models that consider only adverse selection and order processing 
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costs produce more reliable results (Majois and De Winne , 2003) .The order processing 
component is largely fixed which represent a fee set by a market maker to stand ready to buy 
and sell. Furthermore, in electronic limit order market where computing have reduced   
substantially the cost of data and order processing, the asymmetric information component is 
the focus of the spread decomposition models.  
Macrostructure studies have reported various intraday liquidity patterns of the bid-ask 
spread; the U-shaped, L-shaped, J-shaped along with other patterns (e.g., Wood et al., 1985; 
Brock and Kleidon,1992; Chan et al., 1995; Madhavan et al., 1997  ;McInish and Van Ness, 
2002). Moreover, Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000a) find the U-shaped behaviour of the 
bid-ask spread in the SSM even though it shows different structure and characteristics. 
Most of these patterns indicate high spread at the beginning of the trading session then 
declining during the day, a behaviour that can be related to uncertainty. The similarity in 
liquidity patterns in different market system, suggests that market makers alone, in a quote-
driven market, cannot be accounted totally to the widening of the spread at the open and close 
of the trading session. 
Madhavan et al. (1997) in a study of sample of some NYSE listed companies, show that 
security prices change because of new arrival of public information, and because of the 
information revealed in the trading process itself. They report the U-shaped bid-ask spread with 
information asymmetry declines during the day, while transaction costs increase. Huang and 
Stoll (1997) finding supports the presence of a large order processing components and smaller 
adverse selection and inventory components. They also show that spread is affected by the 
trade size. 
Existing market microstructure theories and models on the components of the bid-ask 
spreads are mainly developed within the framework of quote-driven dealer markets, 
specifically, using the NYSE data. However, many studies have shown that bid-ask spreads are 
not unique to quote-driven dealer markets.  
 
Cohen et al. (1981) demonstrate that order-driven auction markets produce positive bid-
ask spreads, and that the free entry and exit of informal market makers will sustain a viable 
securities market. Glosten (1994) also shows that information asymmetry costs generate 
positive bid-ask spreads in an order-driven trading system. Handa et al. (1998) study how the 
spread is determined in an order market environment and suggest that spread are a “natural 
property” of the order driven market. Spread exists because of the value participants place on 
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trading with certainty. However, they emphasised that regulators should take in consideration 
that order driven market requires a reasonable balance between various types of participants.  
Other examples of order-driven market studies include ; Brockman and Chung (1999) who 
study  the bid-ask spread components of  (Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and  Huang (2004) 
who focus on the bid-ask spread and its determinants in (Taiwan stock Market). 
 
Spread as a measure of liquidity cost is defined in many different ways. Three types of 
bid-ask spreads are usually studied, quoted spread, effective spread and relative spread.  
1- Quoted Spread is the difference between the ask price and bid price  : 
 𝐐𝐮𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐬𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐭 = 𝐚𝐬𝐤 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭 − 𝐛𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭  
 
(1)  
The main intuition of this measure, is that when a trader buys at the ask price then sells at the 
bid price she will incur a transaction cost which is the difference between the two prices. This 
measure of the spread does not consider trades that take place inside the best bid-best ask quote 
and therefore is considered unreliable measure of liquidity cost. Many large trades take place 
outside   the bid ask spread whereas the many small trades happen within the spread (see, e.g., 
Lee, 1993; Madhavan et al., 1997). 
 
 
2- relative spread is calculated as :  
 
𝐑𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝒕 =
(𝒂𝒔𝒌 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕 − 𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕)
𝒎𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕
 
 
(2)  
Relative spread method deflates the quoted spread by the share price which is the midpoint 
between bid and ask prices. It is very useful and gives meaning to the size of absolute spreads 
relative to the share price.  In cases where the minimum price change unit is fixed (e.g., Saudi 
stock market), quoted spread at its lowest unit of change will be equal among many stocks and 
therefore will not show any statistical power in the analysis. In relative spread method, price 
variation will be reflected in relative spread variable which  is more powerful in an analysis. 
 
3- Effective spread is defined as the following:  
 𝐄𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞  𝐬𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝒕 = 𝟐 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝒕 −  𝐦𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝒕   
 
(3)  
 Here the midpoint price is just the average of bid and ask prices, where: 
 
𝒎𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕 =  
(𝒂𝒔𝒌 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕 + 𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕)
𝟐
 
(4)  
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The effective spread avoids some drawback associated with using the quoted spread.  
The idea of the effective spread is that it measures how costly an investor is trading relative to 
the midpoint. It shows how trade price varies from true price approximated by the bid/ask mid 
price.  This estimate is often used to proxy for the total price impact of trades and has been 
suggested by many (e.g., Lee, 1993; Huang and Stoll, 1996). If all trades take place at the 
prevailing bid and ask quotes, the effective spread is equal to the quoted spread. If some trades 
take place within the spread, the effective spread is smaller than the quoted spread (Bollen et 
al., 2004). This measure assumes that any trade above mid price is considered a buyer-initiated 
and any trade below mid price is seller-initiated. It measures how far a trade is relative to the 
midpoint to show price improvement   and to reflect to true round trip of buy and sell trade the 
effective spread is multiplied by two. 
 
Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
Easley et al. (1996) develop an empirical technique called Probability of Informed Trading 
(PIN) to measure the degree of information asymmetry in the market. Subsequently, PIN has 
been firmly established in the literature as a measure of the extent of informed trading (see, 
e.g., Brown et al., 1999). The technique which is built on the sequential trade model, estimates 
the PIN directly from the trade process data. Originally this technique was used to investigate 
whether the change in spread is explained by the difference in information based trade in both 
less-frequent and more-frequent traded stocks. The PIN has been since employed in wide range 
of applications in market microstructure and other fields of empirical finance, e.g., the 
importance of trade size, the order flow in an electronic market and the order flow around 
corporate event announcements. The PIN microstructure model assumes that there are three 
types of agents in the market; informed trader, market maker and liquidity trader “noise trader” 
who trade for exogenous reasons. The market maker adjusts the spread according to  his belief 
about the order flow arrival and information event occurrence. The arrival of liquidity traders‟ 
orders of buy or sell is modelled as independent Poisson processes .Liquidity traders are 
equally to submit buy or sell order and the numbers of buy and sell trades are independent of 
one another. The informed trader arrival is conditioned on information event occurrence with 
some form of probability. If the information event is good news, the informed trader will buy 
and sell otherwise. It is crucial to classify trades to buys and sells and then to count the number 
of buyer- and seller-initiated trades per day and per stock to calculate the PIN.  Using 
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maximum likelihood ,four parameters are estimated in the model- the probability that an 
information event occurs on a given day , the probability that an information event is negative  
and the order arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders. The higher the probability of 
informed traded the higher the degree of information asymmetry is expected. 
 
Easley et al. (1996) show that PIN is closely related to the spread which reflects the 
adverse selection cost of trading. It is important to mention that an estimation bias of PIN can 
arise from inaccurate classification of the trade; however, PIN as discussed has been used in 
varieties of studies and proved to provide insightful empirical inference about the information 
asymmetry in the market. Easley et al. (2002) use PIN in capturing the information asymmetry 
aspect of illiquidity and they indicate that PIN has a direct impact on expected stock returns, 
regardless of the stocks‟ illiquidity and return characteristics. 
 
Price impact and Block Trades 
In market microstructure research,   market makers or traders update their beliefs about the true 
value of security prices in response to transaction data as well, hence trade itself convey 
information to traders which is a key element of asymmetric information models. Large trades  
have the capacity to move prices directly through the trading itself, as well as indirectly, by 
influencing the trading decisions of other market participants who may observe the action of 
large trade initiators. 
The security‟s price change that is attributed to trade information is the price or market 
impact of a trade. The effect of trade size on securities‟ prices measures the market depth 
indirectly through measuring the price impact of large trades. However this depth is only 
analysed when the block trade happens. In a less deep market higher price impacts reflect a 
major challenge to stock exchanges and policy makers. Large trades in the stock market are 
known as block trades. How trading volume affect prices is an evolving topic especially large 
trade that concerns institutional investors and other types of investors.  Information asymmetric 
models consider that trade size is correlated to the probability of holding private information 
by the trade initiator and suggest that the price impact of a trade is an increasing function of 
order size (Easley and O‟Hara, 1987). Within adverse selection context, block trades might 
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signal information to other traders in the market.
41
   If a trader wants to buy a small volume 
immediately then he can submit a limit order at the ask price or alternatively he can submit a 
market order. The transaction takes a place through matching between the buyer‟s price and 
quantity and the seller‟s price and quantity at the ask price which is the cost of immediacy. 
Normally, in block trades case, the volume at the other side is not sufficient to satisfy the 
quantity completely unless the trader is welling to jump up to the next higher ask price. 
Consequently,  to satisfy block trades  investors face unwanted upward price impact in case of 
buying and unfavourable downward price impact in case of selling.   
The price impact of block trades is of interest to various groups; researchers, regulators 
and practitioner. From researchers‟ point of view, understanding the interrelationship between 
trade, information and prices is the core business of market microstructure research and other 
related fields. Moreover, exchanges and regulators who are concerned with issues like 
liquidity, transparency, trading process and rules show great amount of interest in the price 
impact of block trade research.  Understanding the relationship between trade size and price 
impact can help investors and practitioners, who are profit maximisation seeker, to formulate 
the best action to transact in a way that would minimise the affect of block trades on   their 
investment performance, e.g., trading in the upstairs market or splitting large orders into 
smaller multi-orders that are traded anonymously   in the downstairs market. Seppi (1990) 
suggests that upstairs markets are preferred to electronic downstairs markets by those traders 
who can credibly convey that their trades are uninformed. Block trades are used by uninformed 
agents for liquidity reason whereas informed agents split their large orders into smaller ones 
when trading for information reasons. 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) relate the choice to trades at the upstairs or downstairs 
market to the ability of the trader to credibly signal their motive for trading. A liquidity trader 
who can convincingly signal the liquidity motive behind his trade can trade large block at the 
upstairs market with less price impact. On the other hand, a trader who cannot signal his trade 
motive will trade anonymously in the downstairs market and face the consequence of a higher 
price impact.  
The price effect of block trades has been extensively analysed in the literature with 
normally classifying the impact into permanent and temporary components. The permanent 
component is the price change that is due to the information content of the trade while the 
                                                        
41 market impact studies  that show  the effect of trading  activity on stock prices include but not limited to  (Chan 
and Lakonishok,1995, Keim and Madhavan ,1995 ,Chakravarty ,2001, Chiyachantana et al., 2004,Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam ,2004). 
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temporary price impact is the transitory change in prices due to the market friction such as 
liquidity effect and imbalance between demand and supply.   
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) summarise three potential explanations for price changes 
caused by large trades that were discussed in the literature: (I) short-run liquidity cost,(II) 
imperfect substitution, and (III) information effect(adverse selection problem).
42
 Short-run 
liquidity cost occurs because of the demand and supply friction at the time of the trade which 
may result in a price effect that is most probably temporary.  A large trader who wants to trade 
would pay a price concession for the immediacy. On the other hand, liquidity providers should 
be compensated for taking the other side of the deal with a price concession to their favour.  
Large trades move prices also if there are no perfect substitutes for a particular stock. In 
the case of no perfect substitutes, prices tend to change permanently as the buyer or seller has 
to offer a higher discount to make the deal attractive. Large trades are believed to convey 
information about the prospects of a stock. Participants in the market learn new information 
about underpricing or overpricing of stocks from the decision of large traders to initiate buy or 
sell trades. The information effects depend on the identity of the traders and size of the 
transaction as a proxy for the information content of the trade. A permanent price change is 
expected to be associated with informed trading which subsequently lead to new equilibrium 
prices.  
Different approaches are being used to measure the price impact of block trades. For 
example, event study methodology was used by (Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Holthausen et al.; 
1987; Keim and Madhavan, 1996). Other researchers have used time series methodology, 
vector autoregressive VAR-model specifically, to test the relationship between trading volume 
and price movement (See, e.g., Hasbrouck, 1991a,1991b; Dufour and Engle, 2000). The VAR-
model was used to test for the dynamic changes in the model and to test for time wait between 
trades. Chan  and Lakonishok (1997), Domowitzet al.  (2001), and Chiyachantana et al.(2004)  
study the stock price volatility and its relation to price impact , they find that when  volatility as 
a measure of  dispersion in beliefs increases it results in greater price concessions or price 
impact. Frino et al. (2007) measure the price impact of the block trade in the Australian stock 
exchange through cross-section regression method and added time of the day variable along 
with other variables to a theoretical model in an attempt to examine the price impact 
determinants. 
                                                        
42 Scholes (1972) and Kraus and Stoll (1972) were the first to develop hypotheses on how stock prices react to 
block trades: the substitution hypothesis, the price-pressure hypothesis or short run liquidity costs, and the 
information hypothesis. 
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Most of the previous models used were linear in nature, however several papers have 
used and suggested non-linear models to test the price impact of block trades (See, e.g., 
Hasbrouck, 1991a, 1991b; Kempf and Korn ,1999).   
The majority of the empirical studies concerning block trades have documented 
intriguing results supporting an asymmetric price impact, where absolute price responses for 
buys and sells are significantly different.
43
 The obvious result, so far, is that buyer-initiated 
trades have a stronger price impact than seller-initiated trades. It indicates that block trades 
sellers pay liquidity premium while buyers do not as price continuation is usually associated 
with block trade purchases and price reversal is associated to block trade sales. One established 
explanation to this phenomenon attributes it to a higher informed trading in purchases than in 
sells. Chan and Lakonishok (1993), Keim and Madhavan (1996), and Saar (2001) among 
others provide institutional explanation to this asymmetry that is the buy side is assumed to act 
on information whereas the sell side trades for liquidity motives. Based on the previous 
analysis, sell block trades can be motivated by many reasons one of which is liquidity motive 
whereas the buy block trades are likely to convey firm-specific information. The decision to 
sell a stock reflects the limited option  a trader has among stocks in his portfolio, whereas the 
decision to buy a stock indicates a fundamental interest in that particular stock among many 
stocks in the market.  The difference of price effect between block purchases and sales has 
been confirmed in many other markets outside the US where it was first depicted and in 
different trading systems ( see, e.g.,  Gimmil,1996 ; Gregeriou , 2008 , in the UK  market 
;Aitken and Frino, 1996a, in the Australian market; Chiyachantana et al.,2004 in  study 
covering 37 international market) . 
In attempting to include variables that affect the price impact, researchers usually choose 
size of the trade as a proxy of information asymmetry. Barclay and Warners (1993), and 
Dufour and Engle (2000) argue  that, trading frequency would be a suitable explanatory 
variable  that captures informed trading  as informed traders prefer to use medium size orders 
but more frequent trading ,therefore the number of orders might provide superior information 
than the order size.  Other variables beside the size of the trade itself  and the direction of the 
trade(buy or sell) that  have been considered in various studies as determinants of the  price 
impact  include;  stock price volatility, market condition, bid-ask spreads, turnover, firm size 
and momentum return effects . 
 
                                                        
43 Some studies that have found asymmetry of price impact include Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen et al. 
(1987, 1990),Gemmill(1996), and  Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995). 
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5.3 Saudi Stock Market (SSM). 
 
At the heart of microstructure research, lies the assumption that structure of the market and its 
trading process design has an effect on equilibrium prices. In other words, market 
microstructure could play important role in making prices to deviate from their fundamental 
values.  The rapid structural, technological and regulatory changes the SSM has been   facing 
recently have brought interests to focus on the microstructure aspects of this market.  The 
newly established Capital Market Authority, CMA has made dramatic reconstruction to the 
exchange in terms of regulations and structural changes to promote efficiency and liquidity.   
The number of companies that are traded in the market has nearly doubled in 5 years time and 
commercial banks are no longer the only entities authorised to   provide brokerage service. 
Now around 80 brokerage houses have been granted licenses to operate in the market.
 44
 The 
list of changes goes on from establishing insider trading rules and imposing fines on companies 
who pass deadline of earnings announcements to changes of trading time and tick size.  Clearly 
all these changes are microstructure related and motivate us to  study how price formation are 
affected .Therefore , an attempt to explain some of  SSM aspects  in a micro-structural  
framework should give insight to  all interested parties.   
Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowsky (2000a ,2000b) are the only studies that have 
attempted to examine the trading activities in a pure market microstructure context .
45
  Al-
Suhaibani and Kryzanowsky (2000a) find that although the SSM has distinct structure, its 
intraday liquidity patterns are similar to those found in other markets with different structures 
but the average relative inside spread is large compared to other markets which they related it 
to the tick size being relatively high. They also record that market width and depth is relatively 
low and finally the limit order has a short duration on average and has high probability of 
subsequent execution. 
In a study covering the market index, five industries and fifteen listed companies, 
Alsubaie and Najand(2009)  investigate volatility–volume relationship  in the SSM.   They 
show strong volatility persistence and indicate that the rate of information arrival can be 
significant source of the conditional heteroskedasticity at the firm level in SSM. They also 
suggest that price volatility is potentially forecastable with knowledge of trading volume. 
 
                                                        
44
 Thirty Five are already operating and provide intermediation by the beginning of 2009. 
45 Chapter one of this thesis covers characteristics and studies related to the SSM in details. 
 135 
 
SSM is relatively newly established market, officially organised in 1985, and by far the 
biggest stock exchange in the Middle East region. According to the Arab Monetary Fund‟s 
annual report for the year ended December 2008, which provides statistics for 15 stock 
markets, the capitalization of the SSM represents 41% of the total market capitalization of 
these markets, while the value traded of the SSM represents 67% of the total stock value traded 
in all member markets. The market value of the stocks at the end of 2008 amounts to 246.5 
billion dollars down from 518.984 billion dollars just one year back in 2007, which is more 
than 52 percent drop in value. The SSM is an interesting market to examine in the way that a 
few companies are publicly listed with government owning the majority of shares, yet it is very 
actively traded market   . The average company size is 4.7 billion dollars, the highest in the 
region where the average of company size for 15 stock markets is around one billion dollars
46
. 
Many firms exhibit a low dispersion of shareholdings and the concentration of shares is 
relatively high the SSM, compared to other developed market. By the end of 2008, the free 
floating stocks that are available for trade represent 37% of total stock outstanding in the 
market (excluding major passive shareholders and government shares). 
It is characterised as large active market with few number of companies. Trading in the 
market is only for common stock and no option market or short selling is allowed.  The 
distinctive characteristics  of a large market size and trading volume  relative to the number of 
companies  combined  with different characteristics such as absence of institutional investors  , 
undergoing  development  and  small breadth of the market  make it very unique environment 
to study the effect of these  specific structural aspect on securities‟ returns and how the order 
size affect prices.  
The SSM is a fully electronic pure Order – driven market where buyers and sellers 
provide liquidity through the limited order book. They provide liquidity by limit orders and 
demand liquidity through market orders.  The SSM lacks the existence of major institutional 
players, who usually form the backbone of such market. A few government-owned pension and 
investment funds are the major shareholders of “blue Chip” companies; nonetheless, they are 
passive buy-and-hold investors.  Foreign investors are forbidden from market participation 
directly but they can enter into equity swap agreement with local authorised  brokerage 
companies  where the foreign  investors  have right to economics benefits of the equity but  do 
not enjoy voting rights or any other rights, the dealer  retain the legal ownership of the shares. 
                                                        
46 All figures are taken or calculated from the Capital Market Authority ,CMA. 
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As for the domestic mutual funds, their total value represent only insignificant portion of total 
market value of the stock market at 1.8 percent by the end of 2008.
 47
 
The Number of shares traded and number of transactions have grown remarkably in the 
period 2001-2008 averaging 142% and 174% ,respectively. The SSM has witnessed high 
growth in trading volume and in number transactions. However the average number of shares 
per transaction has sharply decline from 8,873 shares per trade in 2003 to just 1,144 shares per 
trade in 2008. This decline is partially ascribed to the   remarkable increasing number of small 
investors who enter the market each year.  
Investors who want to trade large block trades normally do so in the downstairs market 
or go through the unofficial “upstairs market” where the two parties are introduced to the deal 
through personal networks of the dealers and then the trade is recorded in the normal way. At 
other times, large investors meet directly without any dealer efforts, and then they go through a 
dealer to register the trade.  The  upstairs market trades in Saudi  does not affect the index 
calculation , however, it implicitly has a price effect on the security traded as the quantity is 
recorded for the trading volume and the stock exchange announces it on its official website at 
the end of the day or the next day but not on regular basis. The criteria followed to announce or 
not is not fully understood, but we assume the more significant the block trade in terms of 
value and percentage of company ownership the more likely that this trade would be 
announced at some time. A report by the IMF (2006) regarded the SSM as buoyant market, 
with significant turnover and limited provision of investment information.
48
  Recently, the 
stock exchange starts listing major shareholders (5%or more) in any company, and the lists is 
updated on a daily basis. Some active investors can infer about large trades through watching 
the changes to the major shareholders‟ list. 
In this study block trades are examined to see how they could affect prices. In principal 
prices should only be moved by the arrival of new fundamentals information and block trades 
information should not have effect on the prices, therefore, in our study we will examine 
market frictions such as liquidity measures, volatility and bid ask spreads.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
47 The number is calculated from the Capital Market Authority, CMA. 
48 A market in which prices have a tendency to rise easily with a considerable show of strength. 
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Trading rules 
 
Since September, 2006, trading on the SSM consists of one trading session from11:00 AM to 
03:30 PM and five trading days  that is Saturday through Wednesday. The market has four 
states during the day, Market Open (Order Maintenance), Market Open (Trading), Market Pre-
Close and Market Close.
49
  The official stock exchange (Tadawul) in its website has a 
description of each state and how orders are maintained, entered and executed throughout the 
stages.  
Trading on the SSM takes two different forms of trading mechanism , call auction is 
used to open trading  in the market open state (maintenance and trading states ) and then  
continuous auction is used throughout the day(trading state). Call auction is used during the 
first five minutes of a day‟s trading to determine an opening price which is an average that 
maximises trading volume. Orders entered during the pre-open periods are queued in the 
system until an opening price is determined which is recalculated every time an order in the 
pre-trade period is submitted and finally a trading price is set once per trading day at the 
opening. The following criteria are used to determine the opening price; share volume, 
minimum order imbalance and share price from the previous close. Once the allocation of 
volume at the opening price is complete, the market is now open for continuous trading where 
limit orders are submitted by buyers/sellers and transactions take place immediately upon the 
availability of counterparty order or instantly in the case of market order. During the 
continuous period, limit orders that do not immediately match with any another orders on the 
other side are queued in the system .Orders that are queued in the system follow price and 
FIFO time priority.  Settlement time for transaction is t+0, that is the time of transfer of 
ownership is the time of transaction. 
During continuous trading period, orders must be prices within the 10% higher or lower 
than the previous day closing price, this cap is set by TADAWUL (daily cap on price 
movement up or down) to control for large swings in prices during a day for all stocks listed. 
The only exception is for new IPO‟s where the stock is normally allowed to move freely for the 
first a few days of initial trading.  
The trading mechanism followed   in the SSM is very much similar to the theoretical 
model of electronic limit order book by Glosten (1994).  The information of trades and status 
                                                        
49 In the old system, there were two sessions per day (10: AM-12AM and 4:30PM-6:00PM) and six trading days 
per week from Saturday through Thursday where Thursday has morning session only. The Official Government 
weekend in Saudi is Thursday and Friday. 
 138 
 
of the book are available immediately to the public through electronic screens either at the 
trading rooms at the dealers or through online access for subscribed users .Traders can also 
phone their brokers to inquire about prevailing quotes and prices, and to place orders. In 
particular, the limit order book is partially displayed to the public by most brokers where the 
five best ask/sell quotes and quantities are publically available with less than five minute time 
lag. However, the best quotes are displayed in aggregate format (a best quote shows only total 
quantity available at that quote).  The status of the best quotes along with quantities is updated 
each time an order arrives, is cancelled or is executed. The last trade is shown to all 
participants containing price, quantity and time after it takes place and the last 20 trades are 
shown in TADAWUL official website at the end of the trading day.   
 
Independent quotes and trades data providers who charge premium on their services can 
show more detailed real time quotes and   have facility to allow users to watch the Order Book 
for bids and offers – particularly the 5 best quotes by price level  and 10 by orders in real time. 
Independent data vendors also show trade by trade data at end of the trading day.  
Investors who want to transact large block trades can choose to transact anonymously 
in the downstairs market through automatic routing and execution but probably face a higher 
price impact due to the trade size implication and adverse selection problem. As an alternative, 
negotiation and search is taken place between buyers and sellers through personal networks of 
investors and dealers thus creating informal “upstairs market”.50 Once a buyer and a seller 
agreed on price and volume they ask for the trade to be handled through the system. Price of 
such deal may not reflect current market/firm condition; therefore the trades in the upstairs 
market are not integrated into the price discovery mechanism of the trading system except 
when it is reported by Tadawul during the trading hours or sometimes at the end of the trading 
day.  The price and volume are entered into the system as put-through to satisfy transparency 
and reporting requirements. However ,  upstairs  trades  prices are not considered in the 
computation of the market index nor the firm current prices because  they  affect the volume 
traded only  but not the price even though  there is an implicit price impact on the market due 
to the fact that  these large trades are assumed to contain information that is not revealed 
publically  . For the previous reasons, we only consider block trades that take place in the 
normal automated downstairs market.  Any identified “upstairs” block trade is excluded from 
                                                        
50
 Sometimes Tadawul officially send messages to dealer in search for counterparties. Presumably, only 
liquidity trader would seek help from the stock exchange to facilitate the trade. 
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the study, but not all these upstairs blocks are effectively identified. Sometimes Tadawul do 
not announce every off-market block trade.
51
 
 
Explicit direct transaction cost in the SSM is comparatively low at  0.12% of total value 
of the trades levied on each party of the trade(buyer and seller) or the minimum of  
(SR12=USD 3.2)   for trades less than SR10,000. The minimum price variation unit, or tick 
size, for all shares used to be at 25 Hallalas (1 Saudi Riyal=100 Hallalas), regardless of the 
trading price of the share traded. The unified tick size has sever effect on the cost  of trading  
and  market liquidity  because it limits the prices that traders can quote and thus restrict price 
competition especially for the low-priced shares. For example , if the share price is SR 10, the 
least change, up or down, in ask or bid price will be 25 Hallalas; that is, SR 10.25, or SR9.75, 
equivalent to 2.5% change in the share price while it is only 0.25% for a stock priced at S.R 
100. Clearly that would create return bias because stocks with relatively low prices would 
show higher price impact and volatility in their returns. The stock exchange realising the 
problem has introduced a new scheme where Tick Size is measured based on the share price, at 
three new bands as shown bellow in the table. 
 
 
Table 5-1:  Old and New Tick size  
BANDS Tick Sizes 
New system   
BAND 1 :Shares SR25.00 or Below 
 
SR 0.05 
BAND 2 :Shares SR25.10 to 50.00 
 
SR 0.10 
BAND 3 :Shares SR50.25 and above 
 
SR 0.25 
Old System Fixed  ( SR 0.25 ) for all stocks 
This table compares the new system for tick sizes that is adopted in Sep, 2008 with old unified tick system. 
Source: TADAWUL, USD1=S.R3.75 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
51 Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowsky (2000a) consider large value trades to be qualified for an upstairs market 
usually has minimum value of SR500.000 that is equal to $133.333 
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5.4 Data Processing and Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
We use high frequency data (one minute interval). The dataset is taken from Mubasher, a 
vendor of quotes and transaction data in the SSM .However historical prices had to be stored in 
a monthly basis because data vendors only provide at anytime one month historical data.  It is a 
unique dataset in the way that it includes all listed companies (124 companies) in the SSM and 
the market Index, Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) at the intraday level. The dataset contains 
all transactions which are time-stamped to the nearest minute and in some cases it aggregates 
all transactions occurred within the minute. Any inference about the data is applicable to the 
whole market as the dataset is free from any sample bias. It is highly comprehensive dataset as 
it is almost four-year intraday dataset, from Jan 2005 to October 2008, with over 16,076,414 
records of all transactions and bid-ask quotes. We define block trades as any trade with over 
10,000 shares that is 4,221, 870 trades or 20.8% of all trades in our sample.  Clearly, the 
sample size, when compared with those used in previous studies, is very large. Frino et al. 
(2003) used 2,796,561 block trades in their working papers. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) 
examine 1,215,387 transactions while Madhavan and Cheng(1997) analyse only 16,343 blocks. 
 
Trade classification is used to estimate our model of price impact, the probability of 
informed trading, and effective spreads. For this purpose we use Lee and Ready (1991). The 
idea underlying the Lee and Ready (1991) method  is to infer trade direction using the 
transaction price relative to the previous price “tick rule” or to the quote mid-point price 
“midpoint test”. The tick rule test compares trade price changes relative to previous trade price. 
If the price change between trades is positive, then the transaction is coded as a buy-initiated 
trade. A negative price change yields a sell-initiated trade. We follow Bonser-Neal et al. (1999) 
for how to sign a trade when the change in the price is zero. We compare trade price P (t) with 
the trade price  P(t − 2) and if the change in price is still zero, we repeat the process   until we 
find a difference in prices or we stop atP(t − 5).  If the price change is still zero at P(t − 5) 
then this trade is unclassified and omitted. 
 
We conduct the  midpoint test by comparing trade prices to quote midpoints prevailing 
at trade time calculating the midpoint between the bid and the ask quotes. In “LR” test, the 
prevailing midprice corresponding to a trade is used to decide whether a trade is a buy, a sell, 
or unclassified. If the transaction price is higher (lower) than the midprice, it is viewed as a buy 
(sell). Any trade price at the midpoint will be unclassified. Although there is a possibility of 
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misclassification, we follow this procedure as it is standard and widely accepted in the 
literature. 
Using “tick rule”, we classify 2,366,099 trades into buy trades and 1, 855,236 into sell 
trades with total sample number of 4,221,335 transactions. On the other hand, using “midpoint 
test” we classify 1,714,072 trades as buy trades and 1,646,728 trades as sell trades. The total 
number of the sample is 3,360,800 after data cleaning which is lower than the tick rule sample, 
because we exclude unclassified trades.   Consistent with prior research, we associate trade 
indicator for each trade to indicate the nature of the trade: 1 (buy), −1 (sell), or 0 (undecided).  
Table (5-2) reports some descriptive information about our dataset. The dataset contains 
intraday one minute transaction data of all companies in the SSM making up the TASI index.  
Each one-minute interval includes: Ticker, Date, Time, Open, (Ask), (Bid), Close, and 
Volume.  
 
 Minute intervals in this study are treated as trades; however it sometimes happens that 
multiple trades take place at the same minute. We follow (Engle and Russell, 1998, and 
Spierdijk, 2004) and treat multiple transactions at the same time as one single transaction with 
aggregated trade volume and average prices.  
 
 Since the data do not provide, directly, information on the prevailing direct quotes of 
bid and ask prices, we cannot use the Lee and Ready (1991) midpoint rule to assess the trade 
sign effectively. We believe the “tick rule” should provide more accurate trade classificat ion 
algorithm that fits the nature of the data .Lee and Ready (1991) state that “When only price 
data is available... the 'tick' test performs remarkably well”. However, for comparison 
purposes, we report both tests classifications and number of trades along with means of price 
impact in the following table.  
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Table 5-2 : Summary Statistics for Block Trades. 
 
No of 
trades 
 
Avg No 
of shares 
 
Price 
Impact% Variance 
Panel A: Trade sign classification using Tick Rule.   
All Trades 16,076,414 
 
9,528 
 
--- --- 
       
BlockTrade(26.2%) 4,221,870 
 
29,130 
 
0.067 0.01323 
       
Buy (14.7%) 2,366,099 
 
30,046 
 
0.491 0.01125 
       
Sell(11.5%) 1,855,236 
 
28,204 
 
-0.388 0.01247 
Panel B: Trade sign classification using Midpoint Rule 
Buy (10.6%) 1,714,072 27,613 
 
0.28777 0.01193 
       
Sell (10.2%) 1,646,728 23,472 
 
-0.1926 0.01176 
Notes: This table reports the number of observations in the dataset with some descriptive statistics 
regarding the average of number of shares per trade, average value, average price impact and its 
variance. Panel A uses tick rule and Panel B used Midpoint test which shows less number of 
observations as we exclude unclassified trades that happen at the midpoint. 
 
 
Table 5-2 provides some descriptive statistics about the number of trades for all 
transactions and for the buys and sells trades. Panel A lists main characteristics of block trades 
using the tick rule. Block trades amount to 26.2% of all trades which is not as high as the more 
developed markets where institutional investors play active role in the market. However, 
considering the lack of institutional investment in the SSM, block trades making up one quarter 
of all trade is very high percentage. Large “off-market” trades are sometimes included in the 
dataset   which is hard to filter out as the reporting of these trades are not accurate and does not 
follow timely strict manner. However, these off-market large trades do not happen frequently 
and as robustness, we exclude the largest 1% trades from our analysis. 
 
14.7% of all trades are considered buyer-initiated trades and 11.5% of all trades are 
classified into seller-initiated trades. The numbers of buy trades are higher than sell trades, and 
that seems to be the case for stocks with larger market capitalisation (Gemmill, 1996).  The 
mean of price impact has different magnitude between the two categories, where the averages 
of  price impacts are  0.5% and (-0.38%), respectively. The averages suggest an asymmetry of 
price impacts that have been found in many previous papers. 
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 Panel B lists the number of block purchases and sales according to the “midpoint rule” 
after excluding the “unclassified” category.  The mean price impact of block purchases is 
0.29% and (-0.19%) for block sales. The price impact asymmetry is robust even when using 
different trade classification algorithm.  Even though the price impact is higher for the buy 
trades, the number of purchases exceeds the number of the corresponding sales. One would 
assume since price impact is higher for purchases, hence trading cost is higher, we should 
expect higher numbers of sales than purchases.  In contrast, many previous studies report 
higher number of sales, on a downtick, compared with purchases, on an uptick. One 
explanation to the higher number of purchases is that it is easier to sell large amount of stocks 
than to buy the same amount with minimal price impact. We can imply that number of trades is 
closely related to the price impact asymmetry in purchases and sales. 
 
5.5 Methodology 
In order to estimate the price impact of block trades, we classify the price effect of large 
transactions into three types which is a common practice in the literature.
52
 Consistent with 
(Holthausen et al., 1990; and Gemmill, 1990; and Frino et al., 2007) we use five trades 
“minutes” benchmark to calculate price effects. The total price impact is calculated as the 
percentage return from five trades prior to the block trade to the block trade itself. The 
temporary price impact is calculated as the percentage return from the block trade to the fifth 
trade after the block trade. The permanent price impact represents the percentage return from 
five trades prior to the block trade to five trades after the block trade.  Because quotes data are 
not directly available in the SSM, all prices used in the computations are transaction prices. 
The following equations represent the three types of price effect: 
 (𝑻𝒐𝒕𝑰𝒎𝒑 =
𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
 ), (5)  
 (𝑻𝒆𝒎𝑰𝒎𝒑 =
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆+𝟓−𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆
 ), (6)  
 (𝑷𝒆𝒓𝑰𝒎𝒑 =
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆+𝟓−𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆−𝟓
) (7)  
 
                                                        
52 Within the asymmetric information models, the permanent price impact of large trades is due to new 
information conveyed by the trade, while the temporary price impact is associated with liquidity shortages. For in 
depth analysis, refer to Holthausen et al., 1987, Glosten and Harris, 1988, Chan K. and Lakonishok, 1995, among 
many others). 
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Because the price impact and the bid-ask spread are both considered liquidity  cost 
functions, the variables that drive the price impact of trading seem to be similar to the variables 
that determine the bid-ask spread. In order to employ comprehensive measures that capture 
trading activity and market liquidity, we use multi- measures for these activities in the right 
hand side of the equation as explanatory variables for the price impact.   
We mainly follow Frino et al. (2007) model where the price impact of block trades is a 
function of a list of variables that are expected to be the determinants of the price effect.  The 
Following regression is estimated: 
 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒄 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟑𝑰𝒏𝑻𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 + 𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏
+ 𝜷𝟓𝒎𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒖𝒎 + 𝜷𝟔𝑩𝑨𝑺 + 𝜺 
 
(8)  
 We list all variables used with a brief definition of each variable and how it is 
computed.  The right hand side in our analysis include the following variables: 
1- ln(size) is  the natural logarithm of the number of shares traded(Volume) reported  to the 
nearest minute. Size of the trade is used as a proxy of the information content of the order, an 
informed trader would only sell when he believes the stock is overpriced and buys when the 
stock is underpriced. We expect size to have a direct effect on price movement. See for 
example, Easley and O‟Hara (1987). 
2- Volatility is the standard deviation of trade to trade prices on the trading day prior to the 
block trade. We include the standard deviation of the transaction price as a measure of intraday 
volatility to capture variation in true prices of the stock. Volatility represents dispersion in 
beliefs among traders, hence it is an indirect measure of the adverse selection. An increase in 
volatility of a stock will increase its market risk, therefore,  traders will demand higher 
compensation in the form of price concessions . We thus   expect that more volatile stocks will 
have higher price impact (see Domowitz et al., 2001). 
 
3 - ln (turnover) is the natural logarithm of total “Saudi Riyal” value of stocks  traded divided 
by the value of shares outstanding  on the trading day prior to the block trade, using the 
following ratio , turnover =  value of shares traded/value of shares outstanding. Turnover is 
used as a measure of liquidity in the market. Many researchers use turnover as their sole 
measure for trading activity or market liquidity. For example, lakonishok and Lev (1987) and 
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Hu (1997) suggest that turnover is a good measure of liquidity. We anticipate that turnover will 
be negatively related to price impact of block trades. 
4- BAS represents the bid-ask spread which is another   measure of liquidity and either relative 
or effective spreads are used in the analysis. Relative spread is the proportional bid–ask spread 
immediately prior to the block order being released to the market, calculated in Equation (2). 
And the effective spread is the difference between transaction price and midpoint of the bid 
and asks prices multiplied by two to show the actual round-trip transaction cost for the buy and 
the sell. Relative spread is calculated for a round trip trade as shown in Equation (3). When 
liquidity is high, bid ask spread tend to be tight, thus we expect positive relationship to exist 
between bid-ask spread (BAS) and price impact. 
 
 
5- Market Return represents the daily return on the Tadawul All Shares Index (TASI) which 
covers all listed companies in the market. We follow Aitken and Frino(1996a) and Bonser et 
al.(1999) where they use the market return on the day of the block trade. A positive 
relationship is expected to exist between market return and price impact. 
6- Momentum is calculated as the lagged cumulative daily return to the stock on the five 
trading days prior to the block trade. Lagged returns measure if there is any momentum in the 
price performance of the stock. In other words, it indicates whether there is a buying or a 
selling trend for a particular stock. We follow Saar (2001) when he differentiates between the 
price impact for a stock when it is at the beginning of a price run-up or after long period of a 
price run-up. He suggests that past price performance, represented by cumulative lagged 
returns, affects the magnitude of price impact.  Since there is some evidence of herding in the 
market, we expect a positive relationship between momentum and price impact. 
 
7- Time dummy variables. These dummy variables were constructed to analyze if there are 
systematic intraday variations in the magnitude of the block trade price impact, a day is divided 
into three time intervals. Because the trading hours of SSM  are 11:00 –15:30 ,we classify time 
as follows: First trading hour (11:00-12:00), midday trading (12:00-14:30) and last trading 
hour (14:30-15:30).  
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5.6 Regression Results and Analysis 
 
Table 5-3 presents the estimated result of the parameters in regression for the entire 
sample, (4,221,870 block transactions).  Because of the large sample size and the high t-
statistics, almost all variables were found to be significant . Panel A reports the mean price 
effect of the independent variables using three types of price impact permanent, total and 
temporary. On average, the temporary effect is only (-0.11%) whereas the total effect is (-
0.96%) for all block trades.  The temporary impact as a measure for immediate demand effect 
shows that immediacy is not highly priced in the SSM which indicate a higher depth for the 
market .Hence, liquidity traders have very low level of price impacts on stocks, which is 
considered as non-informational price impact.  All constants are negatively signed which could 
be a model specification problem .e.g., data points are serially correlated, However, the  main 
variables that should measure trading activities are included in our model . 
 
 The permanent impact which represents the information content of the trade is roughly 
ten times higher than  the temporary effect at (-1.08%). The SSM seems to be very sensitive to 
potentially informed trades. Panel B presents the regression results of the estimated 
coefficients for the explanatory variables. All coefficients are significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. The size of the trade appears to have a direct positive effect on the price impact 
, the larger the volume the higher is the impact. Volatility, as expected, increases market risk 
for traders therefore higher volatility has greater price impact on stocks. Turnover has negative 
relationship to price impact, indicating that increased liquidity in the market reduces the price 
impact of the block trade. When liquidity is high, the spread tends to be narrow; however, we 
find that BAS has negative relationship with permanent price impact and positive relationship 
with temporary price impact. The wider spreads have   temporary effect on prices. The market 
return has a positive effect on price impact, a higher market return indicate greater price 
impact. Finally, the momentum  return which is the cumulative of the five days returns prior to 
the block trade shows significant negative relationship between the temporary  and permanent 
price impacts and the previous return.  
 
Our results thus provide some evidence that permanent price impact increases 
following larger trades, higher volatility and positive market returns. On the other hand, 
permanent price impact is decreased when the stock is actively traded, relative spreads is 
higher and when it has momentum trend in its returns.  
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Table  5-3: Determinants of Price Impact for Block Trades 
Notes: This table shows the regression results of the determinants of the price impact of block 
trades. The Price impact, dependent variable, is one of three types; permanent, total. We use the 
following model: 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 = 𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 + 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 +
𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 + 𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒 + 𝛆.  Size is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per trade, 
volatility is the standard deviation of trade to trade prices on the trading day before the block 
trade is taking place, turnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on the trading 
day prior to the block trade, BAS is the bid-ask spread (relative to the midpoint between bid and 
ask) at the time of the block trade. Market Return is TASI returns on the day of block trade. Finally 
Lagged Return is the five days cumulative returns of the stock preceding the block trade .Standard 
errors in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Using Effective Spread  
 
We run the same regression model replacing the relative spread with the effective spread to 
examine any differences as the effective spread reflects the actual round-trip cost for a trader 
relative to a midpoint price between the bid and ask prices. 
 
 Permanent Total Temporary 
VARIABLES effects effects effects 
Panel A: Price Effect 
 
  
Mean Return -0.0108*** -0.00965*** -0.00115*** 
Panel B: Regression Results 
 
  
Ln(size) 0.00106*** 0.000957*** 9.89e-05*** 
 (7.32e-06) (5.87e-06) (5.36e-06) 
Volatility 0.000368*** 0.000439*** -6.14e-05*** 
 (8.93e-06) (7.16e-06) (6.53e-06) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000147*** -0.000121*** -2.93e-05*** 
 (3.36e-06) (2.69e-06) (2.46e-06) 
Mktreturn 0.0663*** 0.0370*** 0.0293*** 
 (0.000288) (0.000231) (0.000211) 
Momentum -0.000264*** -0.000346*** 7.13e-05*** 
 (3.15e-05) (2.53e-05) (2.31e-05) 
BAS(relative) -0.0392*** -0.0604*** 0.0276*** 
 (0.00110) (0.000880) (0.000803) 
Observations(All) 4,221,870 4,221,870 4,221,870 
R-squared 0.018 0.013 0.005 
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Table  5-4: Determinant of the Price impact Using Effective Spread. 
 Permanent Total Temporary 
VARIABLES effects effects effects 
Ln(size) 0.000997*** 0.000871*** 0.000125*** 
 (7.14e-06) (5.73e-06) (5.22e-06) 
Volatility 0.000266*** 0.000421*** -0.000155*** 
 (9.64e-06) (7.73e-06) (7.05e-06) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000138*** -0.000116*** -2.54e-05*** 
 (3.37e-06) (2.70e-06) (2.46e-06) 
Mktreturn 0.0673*** 0.0382*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.000287) (0.000230) (0.000210) 
Momentum -0.000211*** -0.000264*** 3.28e-05 
 (3.15e-05) (2.52e-05) (2.30e-05) 
BAS(effective) 0.000238*** -0.000280*** 0.000597*** 
 (1.80e-05) (1.45e-05) (1.32e-05) 
Constant -0.0104*** -0.00902*** -0.00134*** 
 (7.54e-05) (6.04e-05) (5.51e-05) 
Observations 4221870 4221870 4221870 
R-squared 0.018 0.012 0.005 
Note: This table presents estimates of the price impact regression using effective Spread. All three 
types of price impacts have been reported here, permanent, total and temporary.  
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫+ 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 + 𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 +
𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒 + 𝛆.   .All variables have been defined in table (5-3). Only relative spread was replaced by 
effective spread “BAS” which is defined as two times the deviation of transaction prices from the 
midpoint prices at the time of the block trade. Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 
the 1% level 
 
 
Effective spread represents the true cost of trading because it measures   how a stock was 
traded relative to the midpoint and whether this trade price in favour of the trader or not “ price 
improvement”. Effective spreads also measure the tendency of block trades to move the prices 
“price impact” as it uses actual execution prices.   
 
The estimates of the parameters in the regression are presented in table 5-4 for the 
entire sample for all three types of price impact permanent, total and temporary. The estimates 
of the slope coefficients on the volume, volatility, turnover, market return, momentum returns 
and finally effective spreads in the regression are all significant, and their signs, for most 
variables, are consistent with prior empirical research. Size of the trade, volatility, BAS and 
market returns all have positively significant relationship with permanent price impact with 
market returns being the most important explanatory variable for price impact consistent with 
Frino et al. (2007). Turnover and momentum returns show negative coefficients indicating 
liquidity in the market mitigate the price impact and that a price run-up increases probability of 
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price reversal. The effective spread (BAS), when used in the second regression instead of 
relative spread differs substantially from the relative spread in the table 5-3 in the sign and 
strength of the coefficient. Effective spread shows positive significant relationship between the 
spread and the price impact which is in line with the conjecture that a wider spread should 
cause higher price impact. It is expected that a higher transaction cost (effective spread) would 
trigger a higher price impact. 
 
It is worthy to note that  in contrast to the permanent price impact behaviour, the 
temporary price impact  has a negative relationship with volatility   and positive signed 
coefficient with  BAS and momentum returns but not significant for the latter  . 
 
The price impact of buy and sell transactions will be investigated separately to explore 
the possibility of different magnitudes for their regression coefficients. The following section 
discusses the relationship between price impact and trade sign. 
 
5.6.1 Price Impact and Trade sign 
 
Table 5-5 investigates block transactions with regard to trade sign.  buy block trades are 
presented in Panel A  and sell block  trades are in  panel B .A permanent price asymmetry 
between buy and sell block trades can be seen in the table in term of magnitude but both have 
negatively signed intercepts which is expected in the sell subsample but not in the buy 
subsample. The negative constant could be a model specification problem or  a mere reflection 
of the bearish market that the SSM has experienced from beginning of 2006 .Our data covers 
almost  four years from 2005 to 2008. Later in this section, we will differentiate between block 
trades in a bullish or bearish market following Chiyachantana et al. (2004) where they show 
that market condition, being bearish or bullish has direct effect on price impact and its 
asymmetry between purchases and sales. 
 
We start our analysis by examining block purchases transactions which have 2,366,099 
observations.  The constant mean return for the permanent price impact is (-1.43%) whereas (-
0.37%) for the transitory effect. We mentioned earlier that the SSM seems to be more sensitive 
to informed trading, which has permanent effect on the price impact, than to liquidity trades 
which have transitory effect on stock prices.  With regards to sell transactions in panel B, the 
mean permanent price impact is (-0.026%) while the temporary price impact is 0.23%.  
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The regression results of the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables are all 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Size (trade volume) coefficients are 
significantly positive for the block purchases and significantly negative for the block sales. The 
size of the trade coefficients show, as the literature suggest, direct positive affect on the price 
impact, the larger the volume the greater the effect. Volume has both transitory and permanent 
effects on prices which mean volume convey information to the market and that other traders 
would change the perceived market value of a stock according to volume traded. The price 
impact is an increasing a function of the trade size. 
  
Volatility as measured by the standard deviation of returns represents the market risk 
faced by the traders, therefore higher volatility has greater price impact on a stock and is 
expected to have a positive relationship with the price effect. Volatility shows positive 
coefficient for the buy block trades and negative for sell trades which confirm the greater price 
impact that is attributed to higher risk and dispersion of beliefs among traders. The volatility 
coefficients are consistent with prior research (e.g., Chan and Lakonishok, 1997; 
Chiyachantana et al., 2004; Frino et al., 2007) 
 
Turnover has negative relationship to price impact for the buy blocks, indicating that 
increased liquidity in the market reduces the price impact of the block trade. Our results 
confirm prior market research that turnover as a measure of liquidity should have negative 
relationship with the price impact. The negative relationship between liquidity and price impact 
can in part be linked to a more general relationship between stock returns and liquidity. For 
example, Hu (1997) argues that turnover is a useful measure of liquidity and a negative relation 
between stock returns and turnover exists. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) also find a 
negative relation between expected returns and liquidity. Conversely, the block sales has 
negative turnover coefficient, indicating that increased liquidity results in greater price impact. 
Large block sales combined with highly active traded stocks might convey negative 
information because they reflect a likely action of informed traders and induce more selling 
which increases the price effect of these large trades.    
   
The market return has positive coefficients for both block purchases and sales, a higher 
market return indicate greater price impact for the block purchases and a lower price impact for 
block sales. Our market return coefficients are consistent with Frino et al. (2007) where they 
have positive coefficient for both subsamples, buy and sell, and the market coefficient is higher 
for block sales than purchases.   
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The momentum has negative (positive) coefficients with the price impact for the block 
purchases (sales), indicating a lower price impact following a price trend. Our result lends 
support to Saar (2001) who finds that recent large price run-up of a stock leads to a lower price 
impact for both block purchases and sales. A stock that has shown an increased momentum 
trend in its performance is expected to have a lower price impact for block trades, the price-run 
up effect. This relation between the price impact of trades and the history of price performance 
is similar to the one documented in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). They report that the 
institutional purchases of stocks with several days of price run-up induce smaller permanent 
price change. 
 
Moreover, the momentum variable for the sell transaction shows a positive relationship 
with regard to the temporary price effect (negatively signed coefficient) and a negative 
relationship with the permanent price impact (positively signed coefficient). The reverse in the 
sign of the momentum indicate the price reversal of the block sales. Finally, we find that BAS 
has positively significant coefficient for buyer- initiated block trades and negatively significant 
coefficient for seller- initiated block trades. When spread is wider the price impact is greater 
for both buy and sell block trades. Our BAS coefficients are consistent with Aitken and 
Frino(1996b) and Gemmil(1996) and Frino et al.(2007) 
 
  Our results provide some evidence that permanent price impact for block purchases 
increases following larger trades, less liquidity, higher volatility and market returns. Permanent 
price impact is decreased when the stock is actively traded and when it has just established a 
weekly trend in its price momentum. In contrasts, the regression results suggest that permanent 
price impact for block sales increases when associated with larger trading volume, higher 
volatility and high turnover. The coefficients for market returns and momentum for the block 
sales suggest that price impact is decreased when there are higher market returns or when a 
stock has recently experienced a recent trend in its returns performance. It is worthy to mention 
that total price effect reports the highest adjusted-R among other price impacts in both buy and 
sell block trades. Total price impact is calculated from five minutes before the execution of the 
block price and it suggests the SSM is very quick into incorporating the block trade 
information into prices. Once a block order ,either sell or  buy , is displayed on screen,the 
market reacts immediately  with greater price impact followed by a price reversal once the 
block trade has been executed.  
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Table  5-5  : Price Impact Estimates and Trade Sign (buy and sell block trades) 
       
  Panel A:  Buy    Panel B: Sell  
 Permanent Total Temporary Permanent Total Temporary 
 effects effects effects effects effects effects 
       
Ln(size) 0.00152*** 0.00114*** 0.000382*** -0.0009 *** 0.000145*** -0.000246*** 
 (8.79e-06) (6.54e-06) (6.69e-06) (1.10e-05) (8.10e-06) (8.63e-06) 
Volatility 0.00157*** 0.00141*** 0.000169*** -0.000568*** -0.000172*** -0.000389*** 
 (1.16e-05) (8.62e-06) (8.82e-06) (1.28e-05) (9.48e-06) (1.01e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000311*** -0.000366*** 4.91e-05*** -0.000362*** -7.54e-05*** -0.000294*** 
 (1.04e-05) (7.70e-06) (7.88e-06) (1.12e-05) (8.29e-06) (8.83e-06) 
Mktreturn 0.0361*** 0.0106*** 0.0252*** 0.0750*** 0.0368*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.000364) (0.000271) (0.000277) (0.000406) (0.000301) (0.000320) 
Momentum -0.000514*** -0.00114*** 0.000606*** 0.00053*** 0.000483*** -0.000459*** 
 (4.13e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.15e-05) (4.27e-05) (3.16e-05) (3.37e-05) 
BAS(relative) 0.247*** 0.361*** -0.109*** -0.327*** -0.507*** 0.188*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00103) (0.00106) (0.00154) (0.00114) (0.00122) 
Constant -0.0143*** -0.0104*** -0.00378*** -0.000206* -0.00251*** 0.00237*** 
 (8.96e-05) (6.66e-05) (6.82e-05) (0.000111) (8.23e-05) (8.77e-05) 
Observations 2366099 2366099 2366099 1855236 1855236 1855236 
R-squared 0.045 0.089 0.009 0.054 0.117 0.020 
Notes: The table presents estimated parameters separately for the buys and sells subsamples. We use tick test for 
trade classification. Buyer initiated trades (2,366,099 observations) are reported in panel A and seller initiated trades 
(1,855,236 observations) are reported in panel B. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table  5-6 : Price Impact Estimates and Trade Sign using Effective Spread 
  Panel A:  Buy    Panel B: Sell  
 Permanent Total Temporary Permanent Total Temporary 
 effects effects effects effects effects effects 
       
Ln(size) 0.00175*** 0.00149*** 0.000262*** -0.000542*** -0.000541*** 1.08e-06 
 (8.57e-06) (6.38e-06) (6.54e-06) (1.07e-05) (8.08e-06) (8.43e-06) 
Volatility 0.000873*** 0.000536*** 0.000340*** -0.000255*** 0.000421*** -0.000679*** 
 (1.25e-05) (9.28e-06) (9.52e-06) (1.38e-05) (1.04e-05) (1.08e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000276*** -0.000329*** 4.80e-05*** -0.000385*** -0.000122*** -0.000270*** 
 (1.03e-05) (7.70e-06) (7.90e-06) (1.13e-05) (8.48e-06) (8.85e-06) 
Mktreturn 0.0324*** 0.00503*** 0.0270*** 0.0814*** 0.0465*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.000363) (0.000270) (0.000277) (0.000407) (0.000306) (0.000319) 
Momentum -0.000860*** -0.00164*** 0.000759*** 0.000483*** 0.00118*** -0.000713*** 
 (4.12e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.15e-05) (4.29e-05) (3.23e-05) (3.37e-05) 
BAS(effective) 0.00472*** 0.00620*** -0.00142*** -0.00353*** -0.00594*** 0.00251*** 
 (2.38e-05) (1.77e-05) (1.82e-05) (2.43e-05) (1.83e-05) (1.90e-05) 
Constant -0.0159*** -0.0130*** -0.00293*** 0.00324*** 0.00277*** 0.000448*** 
 (8.85e-05) (6.59e-05) (6.76e-05) (0.000110) (8.30e-05) (8.67e-05) 
Observations 2366099 2366099 2366099 1855236 1855236 1855236 
R-squared 0.048 0.089 0.008 0.042 0.076 0.017 
Estimates of the price impact regression using Effective spread. We use the same previous model but with effective spread. All 
variables have been defined in table 5-3. The effective spread “BAS”, is defined as two times the deviation of transaction 
prices from the midpoint prices at the time of the block trade. The sample is classified into buy blocks and sell blocks 
according to tick rule. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Price Impact and Trade sign using effective Spread 
 
Table 5-6 reports the same OLS regression model using effective spread instead of relative 
spread. Effective spreads is a measure of the tendency of block trades to move the prices “price 
impact” as it uses actual execution prices. The estimated coefficients using effective spread do 
not change significantly from the previous model using relative spread. The main difference is 
that the constants coefficients are significantly positive for the block sales and significantly 
negative for block purchases. Both relative and effective spread has positive relationship with 
permanent price impact for both subsamples of buys and sells. Nonetheless, the temporary 
effect has an opposite relationship with the   bid-ask spreads, relative and effective spreads. 
When liquidity is low BAS tends to be wider and a higher, therefore, BAS should lead to a 
greater price impact. But in the case of temporary effect which measures the transitory and 
liquidity related effects of a block trade, the relation is negative. BAS reports negatively 
significant coefficient for the block purchases and positively significant coefficient for the 
block sales. The less liquid a stock is, the lower the temporary price impact. A result that seems 
to be odd, liquidity providers should impose liquidity premium on large orders, however it 
seem the transitory effect shows puzzling relationship with regard to liquidity function in the 
market. BAS and Turnover are two proxies for liquidity in the market, both indicate that the 
higher liquidity a stock shows, the higher the transitory price effect. One strong candidate 
explanation of this relationship between liquidity and temporary price impact is that the SSM 
overreact to block trades once an order is entered the book, that is reflected in the higher total 
impact. A price reversal is expected once the block order has been executed, that can be seen 
from the opposite signed coefficients for the temporary price impact. Uninformed traders can 
misinterpret large trades and assume they always contain valuable information.  
An informed trader or even a sophisticated one can benefit from such overreaction 
behaviour in prices and gain abnormal returns. Moreover, the temporary price impact is closely 
related to the bid-ask bounce in prices, the bounce back in prices after block trades is observed 
in both buy and sell trades, however the magnitude of the price reversal is higher for the sell 
trades (liquidity premium). 
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5.6.2 Time of the day effect 
 
Many empirical   research papers have reported that spreads show U pattern throughout the 
day. Spread, as a measure of liquidity, tends to be wider and depth tends to be lower toward the 
beginning and ending of the day. Since price impact is another type of liquidity cost, we expect 
that any block trade occurs at the beginning or ending of the trading day will have higher price 
impact. To investigate whether there are any systematic intraday variations in the magnitude of 
the block trade price impact, a trading day is divided into three time intervals first hour, 
midday, and last trading hours. The details of SSM trading hours and how the trading day is 
divided into three intervals are discussed in the methodology section.  
 
 
Table 5-7 : Price Impact and Time of the Day Effect. 
 All 
 
Buy 
 
Sell 
 
Ln(size) 0.000988*** 0.00175*** -0.000539*** 
 (7.12e-06) (8.56e-06) (1.07e-05) 
Volatility 0.000321*** 0.000914*** -0.000260*** 
 (9.85e-06) (1.25e-05) (1.39e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000338*** -0.000229*** -0.000363*** 
 (8.22e-06) (1.05e-05) (1.15e-05) 
Mktreturn 0.0672*** 0.0324*** 0.0814*** 
 (0.000287) (0.000362) (0.000407) 
Momentum -0.000250*** -0.000913*** 0.000476*** 
 (3.14e-05) (4.12e-05) (4.29e-05) 
BAS(effective) 0.000218*** 0.00463*** -0.00351*** 
 (1.81e-05) (2.39e-05) (2.44e-05) 
TimeDum1 0.000364*** 0.000504*** 0.000273*** 
 (1.73e-05) (2.15e-05) (2.51e-05) 
TimeDum2 0.000168*** -0.000243*** 0.000694*** 
 (1.50e-05) (1.86e-05) (2.18e-05) 
Constant -0.0100*** -0.0159*** 0.00277*** 
 (7.44e-05) (8.98e-05) (0.000112) 
Observations 4221870 2366099 1855236 
R-squared 0.018 0.049 0.042 
Notes: This table lists the estimated coefficients for the cross-section price impact model for the 
entire sample and for the subsamples, buys and sells. Model used: 
  𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 + 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 +
𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 + 𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒 + 𝛃𝟕𝐭𝟏 + 𝛃𝟖𝐭𝟐 + 𝛃𝟗𝐭𝟑 + 𝛆. 
All variables have been defined in the previous analysis.TimeDum1 is a dummy variable that 
assigns the value of 1 for all block trades that took place in the first trading hour, otherwise 
0.Timedum2 is dummy variable taking the value of 1 for all bock trades happened during mid 
trading day, otherwise 0.Timedum3 is the reference group, which is dummy variable for all block 
trades recorded during the last trading hour and all other trades take the value of 0. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The time of the day is divided into three groups, each group is assigned a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the trade takes place in that time, otherwise it takes the 
value of zero.TimeDum1 and TimeDum2 represent the first trading hours and midday trading 
hours, respectively.  The last trading hours (TimeDum3) is the reference group for our dummy 
variables analysis, therefore it is omitted from the regression. The coefficients of the other two 
dummy variables represent the difference in price impact behaviour between the reference 
group and the other two dummy variables. 
 
The price impact in the buyer initiated trades tends to decrease as the trading hours pass 
by. The highest impact is found in the first trading hours where the coefficient is positively 
significant. Trading during the day has the lowest price impact among all three categories. 
Block trades executed in the first trading hours experience the greatest price impact. We can 
infer that informed trading is highest at the beginning of the day and as trading continue the 
information asymmetry decreases or incorporated in the prices. The closest pattern that could 
resemble the SSM price impact behaviour around the day is the reverse J-shape, similar to 
McInish and Wood (1992) who find identical pattern in bid/ask spreads and the time of the day 
dummy variables coefficients. Our time of the day results coincide with Frino et al. (2007) who 
find price impact is the largest for block trades executed in the first hour. Moreover, the 
intraday spread pattern that found by Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000a) in the SSM is 
similar to our finding of the price impact for the buy block trades.  They show that spreads are 
at their highest at the open and narrow over the trading day. 
The seller initiated block trades show similar pattern to the one found in buyer group 
but closely similar to J shapes in general, price impact is lower at beginning of the day and is at 
its highest toward the end of the day. 
5.6.3 Price impact and trade size  
 
Existing theoretical and empirical research suggests, that informed traders submit larger orders than 
do liquidity traders. If that assumption holds true in the SSM, we expect to have an increasing 
function between price impact and order size for both block purchases and sells. To examine how 
trading activities within different size groups might affect price behaviour, we divide block trades 
of buys and sells into different groups according to trading volume. Following Madhavan and 
Cheng (1997), we partition block trades into three size categories of (10K -20K), (20K – 50K) 
and greater than 50K. The SSM is mainly driven by individual investors; larger trades are 
mostly initiated by some wealthy business families and investors but rarely by some 
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governmental funds which are not active in the market. Buy and sell block trades are reported 
in two different tables.   
 
 
Table  5-8: Price Impact and Block Size (Purchases) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
G(1) 
10,000-20,000 
G(2) 
20,000-50,000 
G(3) 
>50,000 
% of total 41% 36% 23% 
Ln(size) 0.00112*** 0.00156*** 0.00220*** 
 (4.98e-05) (4.64e-05) (2.72e-05) 
Volatility 0.000767*** 0.000827*** 0.000602*** 
 (1.63e-05) (2.07e-05) (3.31e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -2.60e-05*** 3.69e-05*** 0.000539*** 
 (6.17e-06) (7.45e-06) (1.10e-05) 
Mktreturn 0.0270*** 0.0319*** 0.0434*** 
 (0.000506) (0.000602) (0.000895) 
Momentum -0.00110*** -0.00127*** -0.000895*** 
 (5.94e-05) (6.77e-05) (9.88e-05) 
BAS(effective) 0.00352*** 0.00477*** 0.00584*** 
 (3.67e-05) (4.06e-05) (4.95e-05) 
TimeDum1 0.000576*** 0.000776*** 0.00130*** 
 (3.17e-05) (3.72e-05) (5.22e-05) 
TimeDum2 -4.84e-05* -0.000159*** -0.000211*** 
 (2.62e-05) (3.13e-05) (4.40e-05) 
Constant -0.00966*** -0.0143*** -0.0203*** 
 (0.000477) (0.000480) (0.000319) 
Observations 971,091 851,890 542,886 
    
R-squared 0.023 0.033 0.056 
Notes: this table lists the estimated coefficients for the cross-section price impact model for the 
block trades purchases  
 𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 + 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 +
𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 + 𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒 + 𝛃𝟕𝐭𝟏 + 𝛃𝟖𝐭𝟐 + 𝛆. 
The Model is run separately for each size category. Block trades are partitioned into three groups. 
10k-20k, 20k-50k, and above 50K. The 10k-20k category has the highest number of observations 
amounting to 41% following by 20k-50k of 36% and finally over 50k category which has 23% of 
total observations. Standard errors in parentheses.  . *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 5-8 presents the price impact coefficients across different block size categories. 
All explanatory variables, except TimeDum2, show significant coefficients at the 1% level.  
Price impact is an increasing function of a trade size, the larger the trade size the greater is the 
price impact. The size coefficient for group 3 is as twice as the size  coefficient of group 1, 
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suggesting that informed traders prefer larger order size which induces higher price impact. 
This finding is consistent with the literature.
 53
 
Volatility has roughly identical positive coefficients, confirming volatility effect that is 
stable over different size categories. Turnover as a proxy for liquidity shows significantly 
negative coefficient in the first group (10k-20k), increased liquidity reduces the price impact of 
block trades. However, the coefficients signs for the other two groups are positive suggesting 
positive relationship between liquidity available to the market and the price impact. For the 
higher volume groups, liquidity increases the price impact of block purchases. Larger block 
trades change the market value perception about the stocks traded, regardless of the liquidity 
available in the market.  The facts that   Insider trading is not transparent in the SSM and the 
absence of analyst forecasts both have created a higher weights on trading volume as a mean 
by which traders interpret as a strong indication of informed trading. 
Market return as found previously has a positive relationship with price impact and 
again the coefficient for the higher volume group is twice as much as the lower volume group. 
The difference in market return coefficients among different size categories, can confirm the 
hypothesis that larger trades tend to be more informative than smaller trades. Block trade 
purchasers might have some expectation about the market wide movement and time their 
buying accordingly.  The negative momentum coefficient shows that block trade purchases are 
information incentive not just following a trend of a price increase. Block trades in the higher 
volume category act according to fundamental information rather than positive feedback 
trading. 
The effective spread (BAS) shows positive increasing function between BAS, price 
impact and size. Higher transaction cost represented by the effective spread encourages larger 
price impact in an increasing behaviour relative to trade size.  The positive continuation of 
price impact following block trade purchases works as a compensation for the higher costs 
these block trades face. Finally, the time dummies do not show intraday variations in their 
patterns among different size groups. Block purchases at the beginning of the day have the 
greatest price impact.  
 
 
 
                                                        
53 See for example, Huang and Stoll (1997) and Glosten and Harris(1988). 
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Table  5-9 : Price Impact and Block Size (Sales) 
VARIABLES G(1) 
10,000-20,000 
G(2) 
20,000-50,000 
G(3) 
>50,000 
% of total 42% 37% 21% 
Ln(size) -0.000958*** -0.000800*** -2.22e-06 
 (5.76e-05) (5.42e-05) (3.73e-05) 
Volatility -0.000233*** -0.000180*** 6.32e-05* 
 (1.80e-05) (2.31e-05) (3.84e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000311*** -0.000353*** -0.000292*** 
 (7.05e-06) (8.61e-06) (1.33e-05) 
Mktreturn 0.0703*** 0.0851*** 0.105*** 
 (0.000568) (0.000678) (0.00104) 
Momentum 0.000745*** 0.000849*** 0.000236** 
 (5.99e-05) (7.26e-05) (0.000106) 
BAS(effective) -0.00278*** -0.00397*** -0.00406*** 
 (3.58e-05) (4.19e-05) (5.35e-05) 
TimeDum1 -0.000464*** -9.31e-05** 0.000586*** 
 (3.65e-05) (4.33e-05) (6.41e-05) 
TimeDum2 0.000368*** 0.000655*** 0.00101*** 
 (3.05e-05) (3.64e-05) (5.40e-05) 
Constant 0.00611*** 0.00456*** -0.00437*** 
 (0.000551) (0.000561) (0.000432) 
    
Observations 789197 683068 382807 
R-squared 0.037 0.047 0.047 
Notes: this table presents the estimated coefficients for the cross-section price impact model for 
the block trades sales.  The Model is run separately for each size category. Block trades are 
partitioned into three groups: 10k-20k, 20k-50k and above 50K. The 10k-20k category has the 
highest number of observation amounting to 42% followed by 20k-50k of 37% and finally over 
50k category which has 21% of total observations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 5-9 lists the regression coefficients for different size groups for the block sales. 
Size has positively significant relationship with the permanent price impact for the first two 
size groups. However, the largest size group (over 50k) does not show a statistically significant 
coefficient. The coefficients for the size variable suggest that small to medium block trades are 
more informative than larger block trades.  They indicate  informed traders might  split orders 
into small and medium orders and that is why size of the trade appears significant at the small 
and medium categories but not in the large blocks category. Volatility also exhibits intriguing 
coefficient behaviour, the largest size group has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 
10% level. It is assumed that when a stock shows higher volatility on the trading day we would 
expect greater price impact for the risk level that is taken, which we experience in the first two 
size  categories . Nonetheless, the largest group shows a negative relationship between 
volatility and price impact. The liquidity (turnover) has a positive relationship with price 
impact, negative signed coefficients that are significant at the 1% level for all block size 
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categories. The market return coefficient   , which is larger in the sell blocks than the buy 
blocks, suggests that general market movements play an important role in influencing price 
impact. Higher market returns seem to contribute to the price impact asymmetry between the 
buy and sell as they increase the permanent price effect for the buys and decrease the 
permanent price effect for the sells. 
 
The behaviours of liquidity, size and momentum in the SSM for the block sales among 
different size groups, suggest that block sales are less information driven than block purchases.  
Uninformed investors seem to engage in momentum trading for the block sales which can be 
implied from the positive relationship between momentum trend and price impact.  Moreover, 
the effect of momentum may be due to return autocorrelation property. The SSM has two 
characters that might induce returns autocorrelation, which is the prohibition of the short 
selling and the 10% daily cap on price movements. Short selling can mitigate the momentum 
or herding effect .Moreover, limit on prices might create additional “artificial” autocorrelation 
in stock returns. The intraday time dummy variation supports our finding that small to medium 
size categories, 10k-20k and 20k-50k, are more informed than the largest group size. Informed 
trading is highest at the beginning of the day then information slowly is incorporated into 
prices, until informed trading reaches its lowest point and stay low for the rest of the day. The 
inverse J-shaped pattern found is similar to the results of Nyholm(2002) who documents an 
inverse J-shaped informed trading pattern throughout the day  . This informed trading pattern 
holds true for the first two categories but not for the last category, over 50k, where the price 
impact and supposedly the informed trading is at its highest toward the end of the day. 
5.6.4 Price impact and market condition (year-by-year analysis) 
 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004), link the price impact asymmetry to the market condition. They 
study two separate periods to test whether price impact of institutional trades vary significantly 
in bullish and bearish markets. Likewise, we run separate tests for each year to show any 
variance in the price impact behaviour according to the market condition .We run the cross-
section model of price impact on each year of our sample separately, aiming to capture any 
micro-structural changes or development in the market. The period 2005-2008 experienced 
tremendous changes in the market in terms of regulation, development and trading rules. 
Moreover, years 2005 and 2007 were extremely bullish market where the index grew by more 
than 100 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. Years 2006 and 2008 experienced a bearish 
market where they declined by 52.5 per cent and 57 per cents, respectively. 
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Table  5-10: Price Impact and Market Condition (Block Purchases) 
Mkt Performance 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
104% (-52%) 40% (-57%) 
Ln(size) 0.00190*** 0.00213*** 0.00178*** 0.000735*** 
 (1.28e-05) (2.00e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.81e-05) 
Volatility 0.000427*** 0.000489*** 0.00139*** 0.00187*** 
 (2.17e-05) (2.02e-05) (3.42e-05) (5.01e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.00345*** -0.000100*** 0.000155*** 0.000284*** 
 (7.71e-06) (1.07e-05) (7.61e-06) (1.14e-05) 
Mktreturn 0.0156*** 0.0398*** 0.0203*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.000865) (0.000596) (0.000809) (0.000825) 
Momentum -0.000178*** -0.00177*** -0.00263*** -0.00151*** 
 (4.40e-05) (9.93e-05) (0.000113) (0.000158) 
BAS(effective) 0.00562*** 0.00425*** 0.00552*** 0.00341*** 
 (5.09e-05) (3.86e-05) (6.08e-05) (5.87e-05) 
TimeDum1 0.000977*** 0.000625*** 0.000257*** 0.000952*** 
 (3.59e-05) (4.94e-05) (3.75e-05) (5.11e-05) 
TimeDum2 0.000385*** -0.000164*** -0.000791*** 8.35e-05** 
 (2.99e-05) (4.08e-05) (3.14e-05) (4.22e-05) 
Constant -0.0184*** -0.0193*** -0.0160*** -0.00538*** 
 (0.000138) (0.000213) (0.000164) (0.000197) 
Observations 610080 766174 658692 331150 
R-squared 0.068 0.044 0.052 0.035 
Notes: this table presents the estimated coefficients for the cross-section price impact model for 
the block trades purchases. Model used: 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 + 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 +
𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 + 𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒 + 𝛃𝟕𝐭𝟏 + 𝛃𝟖𝐭𝟐 + 𝛆.   
The Model is run separately for each year in the sample. The Bull market years ,2005 and 2007 
show higher adjusted R-squared than the bear market years 2006 and 2008 . Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 5-10 shows that all coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
54
 Volume and 
volatility of the stock bought in bulk remain positively related to price impact across all years.  
The liquidity, measured in turnover, shows negative relationship with price impact for first two 
years, then the sign of the coefficient shift to a positive. The more traded stocks have higher 
price impact for the years 2007 and 2008.  This positive relationship between liquidity and 
price impact is different from prior studies where it is found that liquidity reduces price impact. 
One of the reasons behind this unexpected  coefficient signs is that the SSM lacks the presence 
of designated market makers who help to reduce volatility because of their obligation to 
provide liquidity to the market to insure continuous trading and smooth price changes from 
                                                        
54 Except for the Timedum2 with respect to price impact of year 2008 where it shows significance level 
of 5%. 
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trade to trade. When a stock is highly traded, it attracts more attention and sends a signal to the 
market that this particular stock may possess new fundamental information that should affect 
the value of the stock being traded. 
  The market return is the only explanatory variable that shows clearly a distinguished 
relationship between price impact and market return according to the market condition. Price 
impact of buy block trades tends to be higher in bull market years than in bear market years, 
twice as much. Our market returns result is similar to Chiyachantana et al. (2004) who show 
that price effects , in general,   of  buys block trades  in a bull market tend to be larger than 
those of buys in bear market. The liquidity available to traders and whether block trades are 
transacted on the same side of the market or against are all factors that affect the magnitude of 
the price impact. The other variables momentum, BAS and time dummies do not vary 
significantly according to market condition and show similar coefficients to previous models, 
momentum remains negatively related to the price effect.  The consistent coefficients signs and 
levels over the years in different market conditions, suggest that block purchases are more of 
information incentive trades. The following table shows the same test conducted for the sales 
block trades. 
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Table  5-11 : Price Impact and Market Condition (Block Sales) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mkt Performance 104% (-52%) 40% (-57%) 
Ln(size) 2.16e-05 -0.000511*** -0.00143*** -0.000617*** 
 (1.35e-05) (2.43e-05) (2.20e-05) (2.46e-05) 
Volatility 2.98e-05 4.23e-05* 2.17e-05 -0.000352*** 
 (2.16e-05) (2.25e-05) (4.02e-05) (5.75e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000152*** -0.000345*** -0.000432*** -0.000407*** 
 (7.39e-06) (1.19e-05) (9.65e-06) (1.41e-05) 
Mktreturn 0.0672*** 0.0879*** 0.0785*** 0.0647*** 
 (0.000819) (0.000663) (0.00102) (0.00100) 
Momentum -0.000114*** 0.00151*** 7.39e-05 0.00301*** 
 (3.95e-05) (0.000109) (0.000136) (0.000173) 
BAS(effective) -0.00361*** -0.00344*** -0.00529*** -0.000573*** 
 (4.84e-05) (3.88e-05) (6.73e-05) (6.24e-05) 
TimeDum1 -0.000216*** 0.000515*** -0.000455*** -0.000577*** 
 (3.47e-05) (5.61e-05) (4.93e-05) (6.57e-05) 
TimeDum2 9.65e-05*** 0.00102*** 0.000508*** 0.000755*** 
 (2.85e-05) (4.67e-05) (4.15e-05) (5.53e-05) 
Constant -0.00216*** 0.000603** 0.0106*** 0.00186*** 
 (0.000144) (0.000257) (0.000232) (0.000265) 
Observations 566876 640521 436269 211563 
R-squared 0.026 0.045 0.051 0.032 
Notes: this table presents the estimated coefficients for the cross-section price impact model for 
the sale block trades. Model used:   
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 + 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 +
𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 + 𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒 + 𝛃𝟕𝐭𝟏 + 𝛃𝟖𝐭𝟐 + 𝛆. 
The Model is run separately for each year in the sample. The years  2005 and 2007 are considered 
Bull market whereas the years 2006 and 2008 are bear market. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 5-11 shows the regression coefficients for different years in the sample for the 
seller initiated block trades. The volume shows positive relationship with price impact 
(negative sign) for all years except year ‟05 which is not statistically significant. The volume of 
the block sales in a strongly growing market (more than 100% growth) does not appear to have 
any effect on the price impact. In other words, liquidity providers do not discount heavily block 
sales in a bullish market because, naturally, liquidity available to sell orders is higher in bullish 
markets, a notion mentioned first by Chiyachantana et al. (2004). 
 
  Volatility does not show any significant coefficients for the years 2005 and 2007 where 
the market were bullish. It seems that traders in the SSM are less concerned with volatility and 
size of the trade in a bullish market. Expectations about growth in the market ignore the effect 
of trade size on prices or even how volatile a stock is.  The momentum in price trend seems to 
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have even greater price impact in the year „05 which is a bullish market year.55  The declining 
market years of 2006 and 2008 report an inverse relationship between price impact and 
momentum. The higher the momentum the lower the price impact of block trades.BAS which 
is another measure of liquidity besides turnover in our study shows positive relationship 
(negative coefficients) between price impact and BAS regardless of market condition. When 
liquidity available in the market is lower, bid ask spreads tend to widen and price effect of 
block sales increased. 
 
5.6.5 Information Asymmetry and Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
The bid ask spread has long been of interests to traders, regulators and researchers. Many 
spread decomposition models have been designed and implemented to infer about the 
components of the spread.  Two-way models combine order processing and inventory costs 
into one component and the information asymmetry into another. On the other hands, three-
way models decompose the spread into order processing, inventory cost and information 
asymmetry component. The information asymmetry component is the cost reflected in the bid 
ask spread when there are informed traders. One prominent group of spread decomposition 
models is the trade indicator models   which are spread decomposition models that are derived 
solely by the direction of the trade. Spread decomposition models have been able to isolate the 
adverse selection component of the spread to an extent which leads to more powerful analysis 
using the informed trading component instead of the total spread (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). Van 
Ness et al. (2001) have examined and compared the performance of several structural models 
that are commonly used for spread decomposition in the finance literature. They conclude that 
no single model appears to perform better than the others. 
We attempt to apply the spread decomposition method of Huang and Stoll (1997) to 
estimate the information asymmetry component of the spread and then use that estimated 
component of the spread to measure how the informed trading cost might affect the price 
impact in our model. We are more interested to see how the information asymmetry component 
of the spread might affect the price impact of block trades, since these block trades have higher 
probability of being informed trades. We obtain Huang and Stoll (1997) estimate of the adverse 
selection component by estimating the following firm-specific regression using OLS: 
                                                        
55 Year 2005 experiences the highest growth in all market aspects, even in the number of first time subscribers 
who naturally follow herding process due to lack of expertise. 
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 ∆𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒊.𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏 ,𝒊𝑸𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 ,𝒊𝑸𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑 ,𝒊𝑸𝑨,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒆𝒕 
 
(9)  
 
 
Where ∆ denotes a change in prices (returns) from a previous trade and 𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡  equals 1(-1) 
if the trade at time t was a buy (sell). We use tick test rule as explained earlier to sign trades.
56
 
Trades at a price greater than the price at 𝑡 − 1 are assigned  𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡 = 1 , and trades at a price less 
than price at 𝑡 − 1 are assigned 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = −1 . For trades that do not have a price change between 
current trade price and previous trade price, we compare to previous trade until we stop 
at  t − 5.  If the price change is still zero at t − 5  then this trade is unclassified and 
omitted. 𝑄𝐴,𝑡−1 is the sign of the trade at time 𝑡 − 1 .The third term 𝑄𝐴,𝑡−1   is the lag of an 
aggregate buy/sell indicator that should capture market wide pressure on liquidity and prices, it 
takes the value of 1 if the sum of 𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡−1 across all stocks is positive, otherwise it takes the value 
of -1. Following Heflin and Shaw (2000), when they indicate that the estimate of 𝛽1  is one-half 
the estimated effective spread, and suggest the adverse selection component equals   2(𝛽2,𝑖 +
𝛽1,𝑖). This estimated component, well replace bid ask spread (BAS) as the fitted spreads to see 
how this new variable might pick the information asymmetry and how it would interact in our 
model.  In Huang and Stoll (1997) model, effective spread is estimated to reflect the true 
transaction cost for an average sized trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
56 Heflin and Show (2000) use both tick test and midpoint test and report more than 0.98 correlation between the 
two estimates. 
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Table  5-12: Block Purchases Price Impact coefficients using Estimated Bid-Ask Spread 
Component.  
 Permanent Total Temporary 
VARIABLES effects effects effects 
    
Ln(size) 0.00175*** 0.00149*** 0.000262*** 
 (8.57e-06) (6.38e-06) (6.54e-06) 
Volatility 0.000873*** 0.000536*** 0.000340*** 
 (1.25e-05) (9.28e-06) (9.52e-06) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000276*** -0.000329*** 4.80e-05*** 
 (1.03e-05) (7.70e-06) (7.90e-06) 
Mktreturn 0.0324*** 0.00503*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.000363) (0.000270) (0.000277) 
Momentum -0.000860*** -0.00164*** 0.000759*** 
 (4.12e-05) (3.07e-05) (3.15e-05) 
BAS(Estimated) 0.488*** 0.640*** -0.146*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00183) (0.00188) 
Constant -0.0159*** -0.0130*** -0.00293*** 
 (8.85e-05) (6.59e-05) (6.76e-05) 
R-squared 0.048 0.089 0.008 
This table presents estimates of the price impact using estimated Huang and Stoll (1997) adverse 
selection component of the spread as the realised effective spread to reflect the true measure of 
execution costs. All three types of price impacts have been reported here, permanent, total and 
temporary. 
𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐭 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏𝐈𝐧𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑𝐈𝐧𝐓𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 + 𝛃𝟒𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 +
𝛃𝟓 𝐌𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐮𝐦 + 𝛃𝟔𝐁𝐀𝐒(𝐄𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝) + 𝛆.  2,366,099 block purchases are included in the 
regression analysis. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The coefficients results are similar to previous relationships that we have already 
discussed where all variables show significant coefficients at the 1%. The estimated BAS 
shows large positive coefficients for the three price impacts. The total price effect which is 
calculated as the cumulative price returns from five trades “minutes” before the block trade to 
the block trade price shows the highest coefficients among all price effects suggesting that 
price discovery is very quick in the SSM. Best five quotes for the bid and ask are shown to all 
traders in market. Once a block trade arrives to the order book, it conveys the arrival of new 
information to the market, subsequently, traders update quotes and prices. On average, new 
information explain 64% of the price increase of block purchases at the execution. Once the 
block purchase is executed, the price drops by 14% (temporary effect) resulting in a permanent 
price impact of 49%. Since the identity of the trader is anonymous   in the SSM, traders put 
stronger weight on the order size. Once a large order appears on the screen, the market 
perception about the true values of the assets being trades changes quickly. However, price 
impact diminishes on average of -14% five minutes after the block trade.  
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Table  5-13: Block Sales Price Impact coefficients using Estimated Bid-Ask Spread Component. 
 Permanent Total Temporary 
VARIABLES effects effects effects 
    
Ln(size) -0.000542*** -0.000541*** 1.08e-06 
 (1.07e-05) (8.08e-06) (8.43e-06) 
Volatility -0.000255*** 0.000421*** -0.000679*** 
 (1.38e-05) (1.04e-05) (1.08e-05) 
Ln(turnover) -0.000385*** -0.000122*** -0.000270*** 
 (1.13e-05) (8.48e-06) (8.85e-06) 
Mktreturn 0.0814*** 0.0465*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.000407) (0.000306) (0.000319) 
Momentum 0.000483*** 0.00118*** -0.000713*** 
 (4.29e-05) (3.23e-05) (3.37e-05) 
BAS(estimated) -0.364*** -0.614*** 0.260*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00189) (0.00197) 
Constant 0.00324*** 0.00277*** 0.000448*** 
 (0.000110) (8.30e-05) (8.67e-05) 
Observations 1855236 1855236 1855236 
R-squared 0.042 0.076 0.017 
Notes: this table reports the regression coefficients for the seller initiated block trades. Three types of 
Price effect are listed permanent, total and temporary.   Effective spread was estimated using Huang 
and Stoll (1997) model to capture the information asymmetry component of the spread  . 
  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐t =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽5 𝑀𝑜mentum + β6BAS(Estimated) + ε.  1,855,236 block sales are included in the regression 
analysis. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
The seller initiated blocks exhibit similar price behaviour with regard to trading 
activities as reported earlier. Temporary price impact has a positive coefficient with size of the 
trade, however, not significant. Size of the buy block trade moves the prices (all types of price 
effects) on average three times the size effects of block sales. A volume- price effect 
asymmetry is observed in the SSM.  The estimated spreads (BAS) which is a reflection of the 
price asymmetry effect have similar pattern to the information asymmetry effect for the block 
purchases.  Information asymmetry is responsible for 61% of price decrease that a block sale 
experiences at the time of execution.  
 
A price reversal usually follows block sale execution of about 26% resulting in a 
permanent price effect of around 36%.  Again, information asymmetry explains the price 
impact asymmetry between buy and sell block trades. Block sales are more affected by 
liquidity constraints, and block sellers usually pay higher liquidity premium than block buyers. 
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Table  5-14 : Information Asymmetry and Size, Volatility and Time of the Day  
 Buy Sell 
Independent Variables InfoBAS InfoBAS 
   
Ln(size) 0.000251*** 0.000206*** 
 (2.24e-06) (3.12e-06) 
volatility 0.00195*** 0.00213*** 
 (2.73e-06) (3.38e-06) 
TimeDum1 0.000766*** 0.000824*** 
 (5.55e-06) (7.16e-06) 
TimeDum2 0.000137*** 0.000126*** 
 (4.87e-06) (6.31e-06) 
Constant -0.00181*** -0.00133*** 
 (2.36e-05) (3.26e-05) 
Observations 2,366,099 1,855,236 
R-squared 0.180 0.178 
Notes: this table presents Cross-sectional OLS regression of the asymmetric information 
component of the spread as a function of size and volatility. Time of the day adverse section is 
examined through time dummies .T1=first trading hour, t2= midday trading hours, and t3=last 
trading hour (reference group). The sample is split into two subsamples buy and sell block trades 
using the following model :   𝑰𝒏𝒇𝑩𝑨𝑺 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝒏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟑𝐭𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝒕𝟐 + 𝜺.   
InfoBAS is the asymmetric information component of the bid ask spread estimated using Haung 
and Stoll (1997) model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   *** p<0.01. 
 
All variables have significant coefficients at the 1% level. Similar to Huang and Stoll 
(1997) who found trade size increase effective spread for NYSE stocks, we find that the 
adverse selection component of the spread is a function of the trade size. Volatility shows 
positive relationship with information asymmetry of the spread; the more volatile stocks imply 
higher information asymmetry and higher execution costs. Time dummies are constructed for 
the first trading hour t1, midday trading t2 and final hour t3 (reference group). Intraday time 
pattern shows diurnal behaviour where information asymmetry is at its highest at the beginning 
of the day, after the open as we exclude open transactions from the analysis. Information 
asymmetry decreases as prices impound information until it reaches its lowest for the final 
hour which show negative sign (constant) for block buys and sells, at (-0.18%)and (-0.13%), 
respectively. 
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5.6.6 Liquidity determinants and cross-sectional variation 
 
The bid-ask spread is an indicator of the cost of trading and is a measure of market illiquidity. 
A central issue in the market microstructure research is the determinants of bid ask spread and 
its variation across securities or time. Prior research has made substantial contribution toward 
understanding the determinants and components of the bid/ask spread. A line of research that 
focuses empirically on which variables or trading activity measures can determine bid-ask 
spread and also capture variation in spread cross-sectionally include but not limited to Demsetz 
(1968), Tinic (1972), Stoll (1978b), Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993) and Heflin and 
Shaw (2000). The results of these variables differ , but some of the main findings are that 
spread is a function of price level, volatility ,firms size ,volume and the number of market 
makers. For example, Stoll (1978b) and Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993) find that spread 
is correlated negatively with the price level, volume and the number of market makers, and 
positively associated with volatility. Heflin and Shaw (2000) find that spread is positively 
related to volatility and ownership concentration while negatively correlated to share prices, 
trade size and firm size. 
Intuitively, higher volume reduces inventory cost for the market maker which would be 
reflected in the bid-ask spread. Moreover, the volatility variable seems always to have a 
positive relationship with the spread because of the uncertainty and adverse selection problems 
that are usually associated with higher volatile stock. All previously mentioned studies have 
the intention to capture which trading activities affect the spread, however, they were 
conducted in a market maker environment where the market maker is mainly responsible for 
setting the bid and ask quotes. The hypothesis that trading activity is indeed an important cause 
of liquidity is confirmed in limit older markets as well, including some of the recent theoretical 
work on limit order market (see, e.g., Foucault, et al., 2005; and Rosu, 2009). 
The SSM is a purely order –driven market where the bid and ask prices are set by the 
demand and supply of traders in the market. We anticipate that trading activities will have 
similar effect that found in quote-driven market but some deviations are expected too. For 
example, the volume of the trade variable might reflect an adverse selection problem in an 
order-driven market rather than an inventory cost as in a specialist market, hence we expect 
some variables in the SSM to capture different aspects of the trading activities and will have 
different effects than those found in the literature .  We focus on the determinants of bid-ask 
spread across different trading activities attributes and across time of the day to examine any 
variation or irregularities in the market using multivariate regression analysis. We attempt to 
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examine cross-sectionally the relationship between bid/ask spread and trading activities similar 
to prior established work of Demsetz (1968), and Heflin and Shaw (2000). We also analyse 
intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads through dividing the trading day into three times intervals 
and use dummy variables for each interval. Contrary to the quote-driven market where market 
makers set the quotes, the interaction between market orders that demand liquidity and limit 
orders that supply liquidity determines the liquidity in an order driven market. As mentioned 
earlier in this thesis, there are various dimensions of liquidity that were discussed in the 
literature.   For example, Harris (1990) defines four dimensions of liquidity: width, depth, 
immediacy and resiliency. We measure how trading activities affect the bid-ask spread which 
is the width measure of liquidity. However, other dimensions of liquidity are examined as well. 
To examine the relationship between market liquidity and trading activities we estimate various 
forms of the following OLS cross-section regression that is similar in principal to Heflin and 
Shaw (2000) Model where they measure the relationship between liquidity and ownership 
structure.  Our model is similar also to Harris (1994) who uses the market value of shares 
outstanding as a proxy for adverse selection and also uses the standard deviation of returns as a 
direct measure of volatility.  
For the determinants of liquidity, we include  well documented variables from the 
literature ; size of the trade, volatility of returns, size of the company, number of trades per day, 
sign of the trade (buy or sell) , and dummy variables for time of the day. 
𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟑 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑵𝒐 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒔 
+ 𝜷𝟓 (𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏) + 𝜷𝟔(𝐭𝟏) + 𝜷𝟕(𝒕𝟐) + 𝜷𝟖(𝒕𝟑) + 𝜺 
 
(10)  
 
Where liquidity is either quoted spread (QBAS), relative spread (RBAS) or effective 
spread (EBAS).  Volume is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per trade. Volatility 
is the standards deviation of returns computed from beginning of the day midpoint to the last 
trade prior to the current trade. Size is natural logarithm of the market value of common equity 
for each firm. Number of trades is the cumulative number of trades per day for each stock 
matched with the date of the trade. Trade sign is a dummy variable representing the direction 
of the trade using Lee and Ready (1991) “tick rule” classification technique, we assign value of 
1 for buyer-initiated trades and value of 0 for seller-initiated trades. We include three dummy 
variables for the time of the day where the trading day is divided into three time intervals, first 
trading hour  (t1) , midday trading(t2) and last trading hour(t3). All variables are computed 
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from the intraday data of block trades, we include only trades with volume larger than 10,000 
shares. 
 
 
Easley and O‟Hara (1987) indicate that informed traders prefer to trade a large amount 
at any given price, a finding that confirmed by many researchers.
57
 If this finding holds true, 
the adverse selection component of the spread should increase with trade size, subsequently, 
bid-ask spread should be higher. We expect trade size to have a positive signed coefficient with 
regard to bid-ask spread.  Volatility is directly measured as the standard deviation of price 
returns. Volatility as a measure of risk is expected to widen the bid-ask spread, therefore we 
expect to have a positive coefficient with liquidity.  The natural logarithm of the market value 
of shares outstanding serves as an inverse proxy for adverse selection costs. The larger the 
firm, the larger the government and other funds ownership which could indicated a greater 
degree of public information. Therefore, larger firms are believed to show less information 
asymmetry among investors and smaller adverse selection cost.  We expect firm size to have a 
negative coefficient with the bid/ask spread. 
 
The number of trades is a measure of trading frequency; the higher trading frequency 
the stock is the lower the spread and which induce lower transaction cost and higher liquidity 
in the market. The sign of coefficient for  the number of the trades is expected to have negative 
relationship with regards to bid-ask spread. Trade sign is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the trades are classified as buy and 0 for sell trades. We attempt to examine if a trade 
sign has any effect on liquidity in the market. Prior research has establish a price asymmetry 
between buy and sell block trades indicating that buy trades have permanent price impact on 
stocks while sell trades have somehow  lower price impact that tends be transitory. In other 
words, sellers of block trades pay a liquidity premium.  In fact the natural asymmetry between 
liquidity buyers and liquidity sellers lead to the asymmetry in price impact. If sale trades 
contain less information and are more motivated by liquidity then we would expect that 
purchase trades to have higher bid-ask spreads because of the higher probability of informed 
trading. Our results indicate that purchases have much greater effects on bid-ask spread than 
sales which can be explained by the fact that they are less likely to be driven by liquidity. our 
result is in favour of the literature explanation of this asymmetry, that is in purchases traders 
have to make actual investment decision whereas in sales the decision can be induced by a 
number of factors such as liquidity requirements or diversification needs.  
                                                        
57 Look for example, (Kyle, 1985; and   subrahmanyam, 1991). 
 172 
 
 
Finally, the time dummy variables are included in the regression to examine any 
intraday patterns of liquidity. The microstructure literature has detected and reported  various 
patterns of liquidity  .One of the most famous pattern is the U-shaped bid-ask spread where the 
spread is at its highest at the opening and closing of the trading day (McInish and Wood, 
1992).
58
 Similarly, AlSuhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000a) document the U-shaped pattern of 
liquidity in the SSM even though the market shows different structure and characteristics. Most 
of these patterns indicate high spread at the beginning of the trading session then declining 
during the day, a behaviour that can be related to uncertainty. The similarity in liquidity 
patterns in different market system, suggests that market maker alone, in a quote-driven 
market, cannot be accounted totally to the widening of the spread at the open and close of the 
trading session. Accordingly, we expect bid-ask spread to be at its highest at the opening and 
narrows as the trading hours continue and prices incorporate new information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
58 Some other well documented patterns include   inverse U-shaped ,J-shaped, inverse J-shaped  along with other 
patterns ( e.g., Wood et al.,1985,  Chan et al., 1995, Madhavan et al., 1997, McInish and Ness, 2002). 
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Table 5-15 : Liquidity Determinants in the SSM  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES QBAS RBAS EBAS 
    
Volume 0.0682*** 0.00155*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.000222) (3.28e-06) (0.000199) 
Volatility 0.321*** 0.00124*** 0.219*** 
 (0.000250) (3.68e-06) (0.000223) 
Size -0.00501*** -0.000357*** 0.00118*** 
 (0.000116) (1.72e-06) (0.000104) 
No of Trades -0.00121*** -2.81e-06*** -0.00115*** 
 (4.66e-06) (6.88e-08) (4.17e-06) 
Trade sign 0.0269*** 0.000251*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.000350) (5.16e-06) (0.000313) 
TimeDummy1 0.0202*** 0.000462*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.000645) (9.52e-06) (0.000577) 
TimeDummy2 -0.0325*** -0.000478*** -0.0341*** 
 (0.000489) (7.22e-06) (0.000438) 
Constant -0.277*** -0.00282*** -0.221*** 
 (0.00333) (4.92e-05) (0.00298) 
Observations 4221872 4221872 4221872 
R-squared 0.291 0.085 0.192 
Notes:  this table presents Cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients of the liquidity 
determinants in the SSM.  
𝐋𝐢𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐲 =  𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏 𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞 + 𝛃𝟐 𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 + 𝛃𝟑 𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 + 𝛃𝟒 𝐍𝐨 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐬 
+ 𝛃𝟓 (𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐧) + 𝛃𝟔(𝐭𝟏) + 𝛃𝟕(𝐭𝟐) + 𝛃𝟖(𝐭𝟑) + 𝛆 
Volume is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per trade, volatility is the standards 
deviation of returns computed from beginning of the day midpoint to the last trade prior to the 
current trade, size is natural logarithm of the market value of common equity for each firm. 
Number of Trades is the cumulative number of trades per day for each stock matched with the 
date of the trade. Trade sign is a dummy variable taking value of 1 for buy trades and 0 for sell 
trades. Time of the day variation of liquidity patterns is examined through time dummies, t1=first 
trading hour, t2= midday trading hours, and t3=last trading hour. Sample is split into two 
subsamples buy and sell block trades .Three measures have been used to proxy for liquidity that 
is quoted spread (QBAS), 2) relative Spread (RBAS) and 3) effective Spread (EBAS).spreads are 
calculated as the following:  
 1)𝐐𝐁𝐀𝐒 = 𝐚𝐬𝐤 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭 − 𝐛𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭 ,  
2)𝐑𝐁𝐀𝐒 =
(𝐚𝐬𝐤 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐭 −𝐛𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐭)
𝐦𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐭
, and 
3)𝐄𝐁𝐀𝐒 = 𝟐 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭 −  𝐦𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭  . 
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The quoted spread and effective spread report higher R-squared at 27 and 22 percent, 
respectively. The relative spread report a lower R-squared at 8 percent only. Someone has to be 
careful when including the relative spread as a measure of liquidity. Bollen et al (2004) when 
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reviewing Tinic and West (1974) work on the bid-ask determinants, states “For the relative 
spread regression to be correctly specified, all of the explanatory variables must be deflated by 
share price”. All explanatory variables report significant coefficients at the 1% level for all 
forms of the models. Volume show positive relationship with the spreads indicating that 
informed traders tend to transact large volume, confirming to Easley and O‟Hara (1987) model 
of informed trading. Volatility has significant positive effect, in fact its coefficients are the 
highest among all variables at 0.32 and 0.22 for the quoted and effective spread. Volatility 
augments spread in the SSM, a relationship that is very well documents in the literature. Size 
of the company has a negative relationship with the quoted bid-ask spread as expected with 
coefficient that is (-0.005).  The larger the firm the more well known and lower the possibility 
of adverse selection cost that is reflected in the spread. Our firm size relationship coincides 
with  Heflin and Shaw (2000) who report a firm size  coefficient of (-0.008).Smaller firms in 
the SSM tend to be the target of both informed and speculative trading due to smaller number 
of shares and higher ability to control price movement of stocks regardless of fundamental 
values, therefore, smaller firms‟ stocks tend to show higher volatility and adverse selection 
costs. 
 However, the effective spread shows a positive coefficient with the size of the 
company, the larger the firm the higher the  effective transaction  cost .Effective  spread shows 
how a round-trip  trade price  was placed relative to the midpoint price(price improvement) and 
the tendency for larger orders to move the price (price impact) . Naturally, larger orders are 
associated with larger company size, the positive relationship between firm size and effective 
spread maybe due to the price impact of larger orders. Moreover, larger companies in the SSM 
exhibit higher stock prices, hence higher effective spread is also expected. 
 
Number of trades which is a measure of the trading frequency appears to have a 
negative relationship with all types of spreads, confirming to prior research ( Kim and 
Ogden,1996; Heflin and and Shaw ,2000; Giouvris and Philppatos, 2008) who also found  
significant negative relationship  between number of trades per day and the components of the 
bid-ask spread. Number of trades can be explained as a way of reducing information 
asymmetry in the market.  If a stock is relatively traded frequently, traders relate frequency of 
the trade as a high liquid stock, therefore the spread tightens between the bid and the ask 
prices.   The trade sign dummy variable, 1 for buy trades and 0 for sell trades, indicates that on 
average buyer-initiated trades increase the spread more than seller-intuited trades with 
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coefficients of    2.7% and 1.5% for the quoted and effective spread, respectively. A 
relationship that is confirmed by our previous analysis of the higher price impact for block 
purchases than block sales and is also supported by the numerous literature findings of price 
impact asymmetry between buy and sell block trades.  Finally, the time dummies suggest that 
liquidity cost is at its highest at the beginning of the trading day then decreases throughout the 
trading day before it bounces again toward the end of the trading day forming an inverse J-
shaped bid-ask spread pattern similar to McInish and Wood (1992)
59
  . The time dummies 
coefficients for all types of spreads quoted, relative and effective report similar patterns of a 
positive coefficients for time dummy1  at 0.2, 0.0004, and 0.015 ,respectively, then followed 
be negative signs reported in the same order for timedummy2 at  (-0.03),(-0.0005) and(-0.034). 
Our time of the day results are consistent with Frino et al.(2007) who find liquidity cost or 
price impact  is the largest for of block trades executed at the first hour. Moreover, our intraday 
spread pattern is somehow similar to Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000a, 2000b) who find 
that spreads are at their highest at the open and narrow over the trading day in the SSM. An 
obvious explanation for this pattern is that adverse selection is highest at the beginning of the 
day and as trading continues the information asymmetry decrease or incorporated in the prices. 
Graph (1) shows the average bid- ask spread pattern throughout the trading hours. 
 
                                                        
59
  Some other studies who document the reversed J-shaped document the reversed-J shape pattern  of spreads and 
U-shape pattern of volume include ( Wood et al., 1985, Foster and Viswanathan ,1990, and Jain and Joh ,1988) 
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Figure  5-1 : Intraday Variation Pattern of the Spread 
 
Notes: The graph shows the intraday pattern for the effective bid/ask spread in the SSM averaged 
across  all observation by the minute  as the following: 
𝐄𝐁𝐀𝐒𝐭 =
𝟏
𝐍  
 𝟐 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭 −  𝐦𝐢𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐭  
𝟐𝟕𝟎
𝐭=𝟏  . Spread is at its highest  at the beginning of the 
trading hours then decreases throughout the trading day before it bounces again toward the end 
of the trading day forming an inverse J-shaped pattern similar to McInish and Wood (1992) and  
closely confirming Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000a,2000b )  for the Saudi market.   
 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter tests the price impact determinants for block trades in the SSM. The price impact 
asymmetry between buyer- and seller-initiated block trades indicates that separate regression 
should be run according to the trade sign. We test the price impact with relative to trade sign, 
trade size, market condition and time of the day. We use various forms of price impacts and 
spreads in our tests of the effects of the block trades. We also measure liquidity and 
information asymmetry determinants and behaviour. 
 Our results suggest that informed traders in the SSM tend to trade large volume; the 
tendency is higher for the block purchases. The number of trades for each trade size group 
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indicates that both buyers and sellers of block trades in the SSM follow similar trading 
strategies when it comes to splitting orders or “stealth trading”. 
Price discovery is very quick in the SSM, the largest portion of the price reaction takes place in 
the five minutes prior to a block trade execution. On average, the price effect of block trades is 
small and short-lived. Our finding suggest that resiliency is high in the SSM, price effect is at 
its highest at the execution , then five trades “minutes”  after the block trade has been executed 
a  prices reversal is expected .However the price reversal is higher for block sales.  On average, 
informed trading explains 64% of the price increase of block purchases at the execution. Once 
the block purchase is executed, the price drops by 14% (temporary effect) with 49% of the 
permanent price impact that is estimated to be related to information asymmetry. For block 
sales, informed trading explain 61% of the price decrease which reverts by 26 % five minutes 
after the exaction leaving 35% permanent price impact. 
 
In spite of the unique structure of the SSM; price impact, volatility and spread show 
similar intraday patterns that were found in previous literature. For example, information 
asymmetry is at its highest in the beginning of the day (after the open) then shows diurnal 
pattern through the day. The price impact demonstrates an inverse J-shaped intraday pattern. 
Finally, Informed or sophisticated traders can gain abnormal profits in the SSM through 
“free riding”, a trader can benefit from the overreaction before the block trade execution and 
price reversal after the block trade. 
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Conclusions 
 
This dissertation brings up further evidence on the effect of different market characteristics on 
stock return behaviour and liquidity in the market. The research provides empirical evidence on 
issues such as the efficiency of the market, information asymmetry and price impact and the 
liquidity of block trades.  Two main lines of finance research dominate the thesis. First, 
literature in the context of capital market research was used to investigate the informativeness 
of quarterly earnings announcements and to examine other aspects of the market around 
earnings announcements (i.e., liquidity, information asymmetry, volume, volatility and 
investors‟ placement strategy). Event study methodology was the main research tool used to 
infer the market reaction to corporate events through computing and investigating cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for both types of news, good and bad. Second, a market 
microstructure framework was employed to investigate block trades in the SSM. I compute 
different types of price impact to examine the cost of trading large volumes in a market where 
institutional investment is not yet well established.  Variations in the magnitude of the price 
impact and liquidity of block traders were examined through various cross-section models. In 
this section, I also analyse intraday liquidity patterns using time dummy variables. 
The research is divided into an introductory chapter and four essays. The first part 
(Chapters 2 & 3) examines stock returns behaviour and trading activity around earnings 
announcements. The second part (Chapters 4 & 5) examines price impact asymmetry and the 
price/liquidity effects of block trades in the market microstructure context. Each essay 
addresses some aspects of market microstructure and stock returns behaviour in order to aid 
researchers, investors and regulators to understand a market which lacks research coverage. 
 
Chapter One shows the importance of the study and why the SSM is a very interesting 
experimental environment to test.  Growth, development and market characteristics are 
discussed in this chapter to give the reader an understanding of the way in which the market 
evolved. The chapter briefly reviewed the few previous studies covering this market and then 
identified the research gap which aroused my curiosity and gave me the motivation to embark 
upon this study.  
 
The first of the four essays is titled “How Markets React to Earnings Announcements in 
the Absence of Analysts and Institutions” and is organised in two parts. In part one, I document 
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the functionality of the SSM and compare it with those of developed markets. The objective of 
this part is to describe the differences of the SSM and show how these differences might affect 
its behaviour. In part 2, I use standard event study to measure price reaction to earnings 
announcements, where I find post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD).   I further analyse the 
market reaction using different measures of abnormal returns and earnings surprise. I also 
conduct sector-level analysis to examine whether government ownership and company size can 
affect the magnitude of the price drift.  
The first essay goes on to analyse the price reaction to earnings announcements on the 
Saudi market. The analysis is conducted on two levels, market-level and sector-level. Various 
short event windows and portfolios around the release day are constructed to test the price 
reaction, which is measured using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR).  1667 quarterly earnings announcements for the period 2001-2007 
are included in this chapter. It provides evidence on the post-earnings announcement drift 
(PEAD) in an environment which lacks both institutional investment and analysts‟ forecasts.  
 
The results pose a challenge to the efficiency of the SSM. The SSM seems to 
underreact to positive news for the first five days and then produces a positive reaction which 
tends to be stronger for the following weeks, indicating the existence of a post-earnings 
announcement drift. In contrast, the SSM overreacts to negative news in the first five days and 
then reverses its direction and reports an upward post-earnings announcement drift.  Our results 
suggest that the market is slow to adjust to new information when there is good news and 
reacts irrationally to bad news. The results are robust using different earnings surprises, EAR, 
and time-series earning expectation models. The absence of analysts‟ forecasts and an 
individually dominated market are the main explanation of this underreaction to positive news 
and overreaction to negative news. It is confirmed by higher PEAD in sectors containing 
smaller firms and where there is lower government and institutional ownership. 
 
The second of the four essays has the title “Information Asymmetry, Trading Activity 
and Investor Behaviour around Quarterly Earnings Announcements”. Covering 2,437 earnings 
announcements, it analyses the variation in stock returns, trading activity, volatility, 
information asymmetry and liquidity caused by earnings announcements for the period 2002-
2009. It also investigates traders‟ placement strategy around earnings announcements 
distinguishing between small and large investors. The magnitude of the abnormal returns, 
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liquidity and information asymmetry around earnings releases were also investigated, using a 
cross-section regression analysis. 
 Overall, this essay shows a higher level of private information acquisition in the pre-
announcement period and persistent information asymmetry in the post-announcement period 
which can be attributed to the difference in investors‟ ability to interpret news.  I observe a rise 
in trading activity and volatility around earnings announcements, with a higher information 
asymmetry which gradually reduces in the 20 days following the announcement date. The 
persistence of volatility and information asymmetry in the post announcement period can be 
explained by the heterogeneity in investors‟ ability to process the information in public 
announcements. Moreover, large investors show higher informed trading even before the 
announcement, whereas small investors show stronger reaction to news. The abnormal returns 
were found to be positively associated with pre-announcement trading activity and negatively 
related to firm size and time-series earning surprise measures. Finally, most of the rise in bid-
ask spread around earnings announcements is attributed to the increase of the information 
asymmetry component, which is induced by uncertainty and the difficulty in interpreting news.  
The third essay (Chapter 4) takes the title “Bid-Ask Spread and the Price Impact 
Asymmetry of Block Trades”.  In this paper, I empirically examine the price impact of block 
trades in the SSM over the time period 2005-2008. Using a unique dataset of intraday data 
consisting of 2.3 million block buys and 1.9 million block sales, I replicate the asymmetry 
between block purchases and sales documented in the previous literature. However, unlike 
prior research, the price impact asymmetry persists even when I encapsulate the biases in block 
transactions through the existence of the bid-ask spread. Overall, the findings suggest that, in 
an emerging market where institutional trading is relatively scarce, market microstructure 
cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of large trades. In addition, my results are 
consistent with Benveniste et al (1992) and Snell and Tonks (2003) in finding that market 
makers are superior in resolving information asymmetry than the order book system.  
 
The final essay of the four (Chapter 5) explores the determinants of the price impact 
and liquidity  of block trades in the market and is entitled “Liquidity and the Price Impact of 
Block Trades”. Permanent, temporary and total price impacts were empirically investigated 
with regard to trade size category, market condition and time of day effects. Bid-ask spread as 
a measure of liquidity was decomposed, using the model of Huang and Stoll (1997) to infer the 
information asymmetry patterns in the market. 
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The results suggest that informed traders in the SSM tend to trade large volumes; the 
tendency is higher for block purchases. Price discovery is very quick in the SSM: the largest 
portion of the price reaction takes place in the five minutes prior to a block trade execution. On 
average, the price effect of block trades is small and short-lived. Our findings suggest that 
resiliency is high in the SSM. Once a block trade is executed, a reversal in price is expected:  
however, block sales price reversal is stronger than block purchases. Finally, informed or 
sophisticated traders can gain abnormal profit in the SSM through “free riding”, whereby a 
trader can benefit from the overreaction before the block trade and price reversal after the 
block trade. 
The four essays and their conclusions outline several possible directions for future 
research. The abnormal returns could be further investigated in relation to more firm-specific 
balance sheet variables. The effect of major government and family ownership on information 
asymmetry in the market is also a research gap which should be filled. 
 
The intraday data which has been constructed expands the horizon for future research 
using high frequency data, for example, to investigate the probability of informed trading (PIN) 
or illiquidity measures in the market and their relationship with stock returns. A comparison 
between block and non-block trading data is another possible direction for  future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
References: 
ABDELSALAM, M., 1990. The use of corporate financial reports by investors in Saudi Arabia. 
Advances in International Accounting, 3, 25-39.  
ACKER, D., 2002. Implied standard deviations and post-earnings announcement volatility. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 29(3&4), 429-456.  
AFFLECK-GRAVES, J., CALLAHAN, C.M. and CHIPALKATTI, N., 2002. Earnings predictability, 
information asymmetry, and market liquidity. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 561-583.  
AITKEN, M. and FRINO, A., 1996a. Execution costs associated with institutional trades on the 
Australian Stock Exchange. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 4(1), 45-58.  
AITKEN, M. and FRINO, A., 1996b. Asymmetry in stock returns following block trades on the 
Australian Stock Exchange: A note. Abacus, 32(1), 54-61.  
AKERLOF, G.A., 1970. The market for" lemons": quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The 
quarterly journal of economics, 84(3), 488-500.  
AL-ABDULQADER, K.A., 2003. Share evaluation and stock market efficiency in the Saudi stock 
market, University of Dundee, UK.  
AL-BOGAMI , S.A., GREEN, C.D. and POWER, D.M., 1997. The Share Price Response to Interim 
Financial Reports in Less-Developed Countries: The Case of the Kingdom of saudi Arabia . Accounting 
Research, 1(5), 465-504.  
 ALJABR, Y., 2007. The Timeliness of Saudi Financial Reports and Firm Characterisrics. Public 
Administration, Forty Seven(Number 2), 167-188.  
AL-SEHALI, M. and SPEAR, N., 2004. The decision relevance and timeliness of accounting earnings 
in Saudi Arabia. International Journal of Accounting, 39(2), 197-217.  
ALSUBAIE, A. and NAJAND, M., 2009. Trading volume, time-varying conditional volatility, and 
asymmetric volatility spillover in the Saudi stock market. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, 19, 139-159.  
AL-SUHAIBANI, M. and KRYZANOWSKI, L., 2000a. The Information Content of Orders on the 
Saudi Stock Market. Journal of Financial Research, 23(2), 145-156.  
AL-SUHAIBANI, M. and KRYZANOWSKI, L., 2000b. An exploratory analysis of the order book, and 
order flow and execution on the Saudi stock market. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24, 1323-1357.  
AMIHUD, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal of 
Financial Markets, 5(1), 31-56.  
AMIHUD, Y. and MENDELSON, H., 1987. Trading mechanisms and stock returns: An empirical 
investigation. Journal of Finance, 42, 533-553.  
AMIHUD, Y. and MENDELSON, H., 1980. Deallership Market. Market-Making with Inventory. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 8, 31-53.  
AMIHUD, Y., MENDELSON, H. and MURGIA, M., 1990. Stock market microstructure and return 
volatility: Evidence from Italy. Journal of Banking and Finance, 14(2-3), 423-440.  
 183 
 
AMIHUD, Y. and MENDELSON, H., 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 17(2), 223-249.  
AWWAD , A.S., 2000. legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market, and prospects for Reforms, 
University of Warwick, Uk.  
Bagehot, W. 1971.The only game in town. Financial Analysts Journal, 27(2), 12-22. 
BAJO, E., 2009. The Information Content of Abnormal Trading Volume. working paper edn. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=675587 .  
BAKER, M. and STEIN, J.C., 2004. Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 7(3), 271-299.  
BAKHEET, B., 1999. Developing GCC Stock Markets: The Private Sector Role. Middle East Policy, 
VI(3),.  
BALL, R., 1992. The Earnings-Price Anomaly. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15(2/3), 319–
45.  
BALL, R. and BARTOV, E., 1996. How naïve is the stock market‟s use of earnings information. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21, 319-337.  
BALL, R. and BROWN, P., 1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 6(2), 159-178.  
BALL, R., KOTHARI, S.P. and WATTS, R.L., 1993. Economic determinants of the relation between 
earnings changes and stock returns. Accounting Review, 68(3), 622-638.  
BAMBER, L.S., 1986. The information content of annual earnings releases: A trading volume 
approach. Journal of Accounting Research, 24(1), 40-56.  
BAMBER, L.S. and CHEON, Y.S., 1995. Differential price and volume reactions to accounting 
earnings announcements. Accounting Review, 70(3), 417-441.  
BARBER, B.M. and ODEAN, T., 2008. All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying 
behavior of individual and institutional investors. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2), 785-818.  
BARBERIS, N., SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R., 1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 49(3), 307-343.  
BARBERIS, N. and THALER, R., eds, 2004. A survey of behavioral finance. In the Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance. edited by, G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stultz; North-Holland. edn. 
North-Holland .  
BARCLAY, M. and WARNER, J., 1993. Stealth trading and volatility: Which trades move prices? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 34(3), 281-305.   
BATTALIO, R.H. and MENDENHALL, R.R., 2005. Earnings expectations, investor trade size, and 
anomalous returns around earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 289-319.  
BEAVER, W.H., 1968. The information content of annual earnings announcements. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 6(3), 67-92.  
 184 
 
BEKAERT, G. and HARVEY, C.R., 2002. Research in emerging markets finance: looking to the 
future. Emerging Markets Review, 3(4), 429-448.  
BEKAERT, G., HARVEY, C.R. and LUNDBLAD, C., 2007. Liquidity and expected returns: Lessons 
from emerging markets. Review of Financial Studies, 20(6), 1783.  
BENEISH, M.D. and GARDNER, J.C., 1995. Information Costs and Liquidity Effects from Changes in 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average List. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS, 30(1), 135-157.  
BENVENISTE, L.M., MARCUS, A.J. and WILHELM, W.J., 1992. What‟s special about the specialist. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 61-86.  
BERKMAN, H., DIMITROV, V., JAIN, P.C., KOCH, P.D. and TICE, S., 2009. Sell on the news: 
Differences of opinion, short-sales constraints, and returns around earnings announcements. Journal of 
Financial Economics.92(3), 376-399. 
BERNARD, V.L. and THOMAS, J., 1990. Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13(4), 305-
340.  
BERNARD, V.L. and THOMAS, J., 1989. Post-earnings-announcement drift: Delayed price response 
or risk premium. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(1), 1-48.  
BHATTACHARYA, N., 2001. Investors' trade size and trading responses around earnings 
announcements: An empirical investigation. Accounting Review, 76(2), 221-244.  
BHUSHAN, R., 1994. An informational efficiency perspective on the post-earnings announcement 
drift. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(1), 45-65.  
BIAIS, B., GLOSTEN, L. and SPATT, C., 2005. Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, 
empirical results, and policy implications. Journal of Financial Markets, 8(2), 217-264.  
BINDER, J., 1998. The Event Study Methodology Since 1969. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 11(2), 111-137.  
BOLLEN, N.P.B., SMITH, T. and WHALEY, R.E., 2004. Modeling the bid/ask spread: measuring the 
inventory-holding premium. Journal of Financial Economics, 72(1), 97-141.  
BONSER-NEAL, C., LINNAN, D. and NEAL, R., 1999. Emerging market transaction costs: Evidence 
from Indonesia. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 7(2), 103-127.  
BOOTH, G.G., KALLUNKI, J.P. and MARTIKAINEN, T., 1996. Post-announcement drift and income 
smoothing: Finnish evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23(8), 1197-1211.  
BRADSHAW, M.T. and SLOAN, R.G., 2002. GAAP versus the Street: An empirical assessment of 
two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 41-66.  
BRANDT, M.W., KISHORE, R., SANTA-CLARA, P. and VENKATACHALAM, M., (January 22, 
2008). Earnings Announcements are Full of Surprises. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=909563 
BRENNAN, M.J. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 1996. Market microstructure and asset pricing: On the 
compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(3), 441-464.  
 185 
 
BROCK, W.A. and KLEIDON, A.W., 1992. Periodic market closure and trading volume: A model of 
intraday bids and asks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16, 451-489.  
BROCKMAN, P. and CHUNG, D.Y., 1999. Bid-ask spread components in an order-driven 
environment. Journal of Financial Research, 22, 227-246.  
BROWN, K.C., HARLOW, W.V. and TINIC, S.M., 1988. Risk aversion, uncertain information, and 
market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 22(2), 355-385.  
BROWN, L.D., 1993. Earnings forecasting research: its implications for capital markets research. 
International Journal of Forecasting, 9(3), 295-320.  
BROWN, P., THOMSON, N. and WALSH, D., 1999. Characteristics of the order flow through an 
electronic open limit order book. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, 
9(4), 335-357.  
BROWN, S.J. and WARNER, J.B., 1985. Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31.  
BROWN, S.J. and WARNER, J.B., 1980. Measuring security price performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 8(3), 205-258.  
BUSHEE, B.J., 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(2), 207-246.  
BUSHEE, B.J., MATSUMOTO, D.A. and MILLER, G.S., 2003. Open versus closed conference calls: 
the determinants and effects of broadening access to disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
34(1-3), 149-180.  
BUTLER, K.C. and MALAIKAH, S.J., 1992. Efficiency and inefficiency in thinly traded stock 
markets: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Journal of Banking and Finance, 16(1), 197-210.  
CHAKRAVARTY, S., 2001. Stealth-trading: Which traders‟ trades move stock prices? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 61(2), 289-307.  
CHAN, K., CHUNG, Y.P. and JOHNSON, H., 1995. The intraday behavior of bid-ask spreads for 
NYSE stocks and CBOE options. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30, 329-346.  
CHAN, K. and FONG, W.M., 2000. Trade size, order imbalance, and the volatility–volume relation. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2), 247-273.  
CHAN, K.C. and LI, C., 2005. Change in Bid-Ask Spread Around Earnings Announcements of US-
Listed Foreign Firms. Review of Accounting and Finance, 4(3), 30-51.  
CHAN, K.C., CHRISTIE, W.G. and SCHULTZ, P.H., 1995. Market structure and the intraday 
evolution of bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ securities. Journal of Business, 68(1), 35-60.  
CHAN, L. and LAKONISHOK, J., 1993. Institutional trades and intra-day stock price behavior. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33(2), 173-199.  
CHAN, L.K.C., JEGADEESH, N. and LAKONISHOK, J., 1996. Momentum strategies. Journal of 
Finance, 51(5), 1681-1713.  
CHAN, L.K.C. and LAKONISHOK, J., 1997. Institutional equity trading costs: NYSE versus Nasdaq. 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 52, 713-736.  
 186 
 
CHAN, L.K.C. and LAKONISHOK, J., 1995. The behavior of stock prices around institutional trades. 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 50, 1147-1147.  
CHIANG M, Wang .J. 2007. Information Asymmetry and Investors behavior around earnings 
announcements . working paper edn. Vienna, Austria: European Financial Management Association.  
CHIYACHANTANA, C.N., JAIN, P.K., JIANG, C. and WOOD, R.A., 2004. International evidence on 
institutional trading behavior and price impact. Journal of Finance, 59, 869-898.  
CHORDIA, T., ROLL, R. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 2005. Evidence on the speed of convergence 
to market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2), 271-292.  
CHORDIA, T., ROLL, R. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 2002. Order imbalance, liquidity, and market 
returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(1), 111-130.  
CHORDIA, T., ROLL, R. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 2001. Market liquidity and trading activity. 
Journal of Finance, 56, 501-530.  
CHORDIA, T. and SHIVAKUMAR, L., 2005. Inflation illusion and post-earnings-announcement drift. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 43(4), 521-556.  
CHORDIA, T. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 2004. Order imbalance and individual stock returns: 
Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 72(3), 485-518.  
COHEN, D.A., DEY, A., LYS, T.Z. and SUNDER, S.V., 2007. Earnings announcement premia and the 
limits to arbitrage. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(2-3), 153-180.  
COHEN, K.J., MAIER, S.F., SCHWARTZ, R.A. and WHITCOMB, D.K., 1981. Transaction costs, 
order placement strategy, and existence of the bid-ask spread. The Journal of Political Economy, 89, 
287-305.  
COLLER, M. and YOHN, T.L., 1997. Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An 
examination of bid-ask spreads. Journal of Accounting Research, 35(2), 181-191.  
CORRADO, C.J. and ZIVNEY, T.L., 1992. The Specification and Power of the Sign Test in Event 
Study Hypothesis Tests Using Daily Stock Returns. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 27, 465-465.  
DAMODARAN, A., 1989. The weekend effect in information releases: A study of earnings and 
dividend announcements. Review of Financial Studies, 28(4), 607-623.  
DANIEL, K., HIRSHLEIFER, D. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 1998. Investor psychology and 
security market under-and overreactions. Journal of Finance, 53, 1839-1885.  
DE FRANCO, G., LU, H. and VASVARI, F.P., 2007. Wealth Transfer Effects of Analysts' Misleading 
Behavior. Journal of Accounting Research, 45(1), 71-110.  
DEBONDT, W.F.M. and THALER, R., 1985. Does the stock market overreact. Journal of Finance, 
40(3), 793-805.  
DEFUSCO, R.A., MCCABE, G.M. and YOOK, K.C., 1993. Day of the week effects: a test of the 
information timing hypothesis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 20(6), 835-842.  
DEMSETZ, H., 1968. The Cost of Transacting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82(1), 33-53.  
 187 
 
DEMSKI, J.S. and FELTHAM, G.A., 1994. Market response to financial reports. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 17(1-2), 3-40.  
DIAMOND, D.W. and VERRECCHIA, R.E., 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. 
Journal of Finance, 46, 1325-1359.  
DOMOWITZ, I., GLEN, J. and MADHAVAN, A., 2001. Liquidity, volatility and equity trading costs 
across countries and over time. International Finance, 4(2), 221-255.  
DOUGLAS, W., 1933. Protecting the investor. Yale Review, 21.  
DOYLE, J.T., LUNDHOLM, R.J. and SOLIMAN, M.T., 2006. The Extreme Future Stock Returns 
Following IBES Earnings Surprises. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 849-887.  
DUFOUR, A. and ENGLE, R.F., 2000. Time and the price impact of a trade. Journal of Finance, 55, 
2467-2498.  
DUGAR, A. and NATHAN, S., 1995. The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial 
Analysts‟ Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
12(1), 131-160.  
EASLEY, D., HVIDKJAER, S. and O'HARA, M., 2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset 
returns? Journal of Finance, 57, 2185-2221.  
EASLEY, D., KIEFER, N.M., O'HARA, M. and PAPERMAN, J.B., 1996. Liquidity, information, and 
infrequently traded stocks. Journal of Finance, 51, 1405-1436.  
EASLEY, D. and O‟HARA, M., 1987. Price, trade size, and information in securities markets. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 19, 69-90.  
EDWARDS, W., 1968. Conservatism in human information processing. Formal Representation of 
Human Judgment, , 17-52.  
ENGLE, R.F. and RUSSELL, J.R., 1998. Autoregressive conditional duration: A new model for 
irregularly spaced transaction data. Econometrica, 66, 1127-1162.  
FAMA, E.F., 1998. Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 49(3), 283-306.  
FISHER, S.J., 1994. Asset trading, transaction costs and the equity premium. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 9, 71-94.  
FORNER, C., SANABRIA, S. and MARHUENDA, J., October 10, 2008. POST-EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT: SPANISH EVIDENCE. Spanish Economic Review, (online First).  
FOSTER, F.D. and VISWANATHAN, S., 1990. A theory of the interday variations in volume, 
variance, and trading costs in securities markets. Review of Financial Studies, 3, 593-624.  
FOSTER, G., 1977. Quarterly Accounting Data: Time-Series Properties and Predictive-Ability Results. 
The Accounting Review, 52(1), 1-21.  
FOUCAULT, T., KADAN, O. and KANDEL, E., 2005. Limit order book as a market for liquidity. 
Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1171-1217.  
 188 
 
FRANCIS, J. and SOFFER, L., 1997. The relative informativeness of analysts' stock recommendations 
and earnings forecast revisions. Journal of Accounting Research, 35(2), 193-211.  
FRANKEL, R., KOTHARI, S.P. and WEBER, J., 2006. Determinants of the Informativeness of 
Analyst Research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1-2), 29-54.  
FRAZZINI, A. and LAMONT, O.A., 2007. The earnings announcement premium and trading volume. 
NBER working paper, .  
FRIED, D. and GIVOLY, D., 1982. Financial Analysts‟ Forecasts of Earnings: A Better Surrogate for 
Market Expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 4(2), 85-107.  
FRINO, A., JARNECIC, E. and LEPONE, A., 2007. The determinants of the price impact of block 
trades: further evidence. Abacus, 43(1), 94-106.  
FRINO, A., MOLLICA, V. and WALTER, T., 2003. Asymmetric price behaviour surrounding block 
trades: a market microstructure explanation. working paper series No.154 edn. university of Aarhus: 
CAF, Centre for Analytical Finance.  
GAJEWSKI, J.F. and QUÉRÉ, B.P., 2001. The information content of earnings and turnover 
announcements in France. European Accounting Review, 10(4), 679-704.  
GALLO, G.M. and PACINI, B., 2000. The effects of trading activity on market volatility. The 
European Journal of Finance, 6(2), 163-175.  
GARFINKEL, J.O.N.A. and SOKOBIN, J., 2006. Volume, Opinion Divergence, and Returns: A Study 
of Post-Earnings Announcement Drift. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1), 85-112.  
GEMMILL, G., 1996. Transparency and liquidity: A study of block trades on the London Stock 
Exchange under different publication rules. Journal of Finance, 51, 1765-1790.  
GEORGE, T.J., KAUL, G. and NIMALENDRAN, M., 1991. Estimation of the bid-ask spread and its 
components: A new approach. Review of Financial Studies, 4, 623-656.  
GERVAIS, S., KANIEL, R. and MINGELGRIN, D.H., 2001. The High-Volume Return Premium. The 
Journal of Finance, 56(3), 877-919.  
GIOUVRIS, E. and PHILIPPATOS, G., 2008. Determinants of the Components of the Bid-Ask Spreads 
on the London Stock Exchange: The Case of Changes in Trading Regimes. Journal of Money, 
Investment and Banking, (1), 49-61.  
GLOSTEN, L. and MILGROM, P., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with 
heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 71-100.  
GLOSTEN, L.R., 1994. Is the electronic open limit order book inevitable? Journal of Finance, 49, 
1127-1161.  
GLOSTEN, L.R. and HARRIS, L., 1988. Estimating the components of the bid-ask spread. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 21(1), 123-142.  
GREGORIOU, A., 2008. The asymmetry of the price impact of block trades and the bid-ask spread. 
Journal of Economic Studies, 35(2), 191-199.  
 189 
 
GREGORIOU, A. and IOANNIDIS, C., 2007. Generalized method of moments and present value tests 
of the consumption-capital asset pricing model under transactions costs: evidence from the UK stock 
market. Empirical Economics, 32(1), 19-39.  
GREGORIOU, A., IOANNIDIS, C. and SKERRATT, L., 2005. Information Asymmetry and the Bid-
Ask Spread: Evidence From the UK. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(9-10), 1801-1826.  
GROSSMAN, S.J. and MILLER, M.H., 1988. Liquidity and market structure. Journal of Finance, 43, 
617-633.  
HAKANSSON, N.H., 1977. Interim disclosure and public forecasts: An economic analysis and a 
framework for choice. Accounting Review, 52(2), 396-426.  
HANDA, P., SCHWARTZ, R. and TIWARI, A., 2003. Quote setting and price formation in an order 
driven market. Journal of Financial Markets, 6(4), 461-489.  
HANDA, P., SCHWARTZ, R.A. and TIWARI, A., 1998. The Ecology of An Order-Driven Market 
System, 31st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 1998 , pp353-362.  
HARRIS, L.E., 1994. Minimum Price Variations, Discrete Bid--Ask Spreads, and Quotation Sizes. 
Review of Financial Studies, 7(1), 149-178.  
HARRIS, L.E., 1990. Liquidity, trading rules, and electronic trading systems. (New York, N.Y.): New 
York University Salomon Center.  
HARVEY, C.R., 1995. Predictable risk and returns in emerging markets. Review of Financial Studies, 
8(3), 773-816.  
HASBROUCK, J., 1991b. The summary informativeness of stock trades: An econometric analysis. 
Review of Financial Studies, 4, 571-595.  
HASBROUCK, J., 1991a. Measuring the information content of stock trades. Journal of Finance, 46, 
179-207.  
 HASBROUCK, J. and SEPPI, D.J., 2001. Common factors in prices, order flows, and liquidity. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 59(3), 383-411.  
HAYN, C., 1995. The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(2), 125-
153.  
HEALY , P.M., HUTTON, A.P. and PALEPU, K.G., 1999. Stock performance and intermediation 
changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(3), 485-
520.  
HEFLIN, F. and SHAW, K.W., 2000. Blockholder ownership and market liquidity. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, 621-633.  
HEFLIN, F., SHAW, K.W., WILD, J.J. and BUILDING, R.B., 2005. Disclosure quality and market 
liquidity : impact of depth quotes and order size. 22(4), 829-65.  
HEW, D., SKERRATT, L., STRONG, N. and WALKER, M., 1996. Post-earnings-announcement drift: 
some preliminary evidence for the UK. Accounting and Business Research, 26, 283-294.  
 190 
 
HIRSHLEIFER, D., MYERS, J., MYERS, L.A. and TEOH, S.H., 2008. Do individual investors drive 
post-earnings announcement drift. working paper edn. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120495: .  
HOLDEN, C.W. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 1992. Long-lived private information and imperfect 
competition. Journal of Finance, 47, 247-270.  
HOLTHAUSEN, R., LEFTWICH, R. and D. MAYERS, 1987. The Effect of Large Block Transactions 
on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 237-267.  
HOLTHAUSEN, R., LEFTWICH, R. and MAYERS, D., 1990. Large Block Transactions, the Speed of 
Response, and Temporary and Permanent Stock Price Effects. Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 71-
95.  
HONG, H., LIM, T. and STEIN, J.C., 2000. Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and the 
profitability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance, 55, 265-295.  
Huang, Y.C.2004. The components of bid-ask spread and their determinants: TAIFEX versus SGX-DT. 
Journal of Futures Markets, 24(9), 835-860. 
HUANG, R.D. and STOLL, H.R., 1997. The components of the bid-ask spread: a general approach. 
Review of Financial Studies, 10(4), 995-1034.  
HUANG, R.D. and STOLL, H.R., 1996. Dealer versus auction markets: A paired comparison of 
execution costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(3), 313-357.  
HUANG, R.D. and STOLL, H.R., 1994. Market microstructure and stock return predictions. Review of 
Financial Studies, 7, 179-213.  
HU, S., 1997. Trading turnover and expected stock returns: The trading frequency hypothesis and 
evidence from the Tokyo stock exchange. working paper. Available at 
SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=15133.  
IMF COUNTRY REPORT, 2006. Saudi Arabia: Financial System Stability Assessment. 06/199. 
International Monetary Fund.  
JACOBY, G., FOWLER, D.J. and GOTTESMAN, A.A., 2000. The capital asset pricing model and the 
liquidity effect: A theoretical approach. Journal of Financial Markets, 3(1), 69-81.  
Jackson, D., Madura,2003. Profit warnings and timing .The Financial Review, 38(4), 497-513.  
JARRELL, G.A. and POULSEN, A.B., 1989. The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers: Evidence 
from three decades. Financial Management, 18(3), 12-19.  
JEGADEESH, N. and SUBRAHMANYAM, A., 1993. Liquidity effects of the introduction of the S&P 
500 index futures contract on the underlying stocks. The Journal of Business, 66(2), 171-187.   
KAHNEMAN, D. and TVERSKY, A., 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263-292.  
KANDEL, E. and PEARSON, N.D., 1995. Differential interpretation of public signals and trade in 
speculative markets. Journal of Political Economy, 103(4), 831-872.  
KARPOFF, J.M., 1986. A theory of trading volume. Journal of Finance, 41, 1069-1087.  
 191 
 
KE, B. and PETRONI, K., 2004. How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence 
from Their Trading Behavior before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 42(5), 895-927.  
KEIM, D.B. and MADHAVAN, A., 1996. The upstairs market for large-block transactions: Analysis 
and measurement of price effects. Review of Financial Studies, 9(1), 1-36.  
KEIM, D.B. and MADHAVAN, A., 1995. Anatomy of the trading process empirical evidence on the 
behavior of institutional traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 37(3), 371-398.  
KEMPF, A. and KORN, O., 1999. Market depth and order size. Journal of Financial Markets, 2(1), 29-
48.  
KIGER, J.E., 1972. An empirical investigation of NYSE volume and price reactions to the 
announcement of quarterly earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 10(1), 113-128.  
KIM, O. and VERRECCHIA, R.E., 1994. Market liquidity and volume around earnings 
announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17(1), 41-67.  
KIM, O. and VERRECCHIA, R.E., 1991. Market reaction to anticipated announcements. Journal of 
Financial Economics ,30 (2), 273-309. 
KIM, O. and VERRECCHIA, R.E., 1997. Pre-announcement and event-period private information. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(3), 395-419.  
KIM, S.H. and OGDEN, J.P., 1996. Determinants of the components of bid-ask spreads on stocks. 
European Financial Management, 2(1), 127-145.  
KOTHARI, S.P., 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
31(1-3), 105-231.  
KOTHARI, S.P. and WARNER, J.B., 2007. Econometrics of event studies. Handbook of Corporate 
Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, chapter 1, B. Espen Eckbo, ed, 1, 3-32.  
KOTHARI, S.P. and WARNER, J.B., 1997. Measuring long-horizon security price performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 301-339.  
KRAUS, A. and STOLL, H.R., 1972. Price impacts of block trading on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Journal of Finance, 27, 569-588.  
KRINSKY, I. and LEE, J., 1996. Earnings announcements and the components of the bid-ask spread. 
Journal of Finance, 51, 1523-1535.  
KYLE, A.S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 53(6), 1315-1335.  
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. and VISHNY, R.W., 1998. Law and 
finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155.  
LAKHAL, F., 2008. Stock market liquidity and information asymmetry around voluntary earnings 
disclosures: New evidence from France. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 4(1), 60-75.  
LAKONISHOK, J. and LEV, B., 1987. Stock splits and stock dividends: Why, who, and when. Journal 
of Finance, 42, 913-932.  
 192 
 
LASFER, M.A., MELNIK, A. and THOMAS, D.C., 2003. Short-term reaction of stock markets in 
stressful circumstances. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(10), 1959-1977.  
LEASE, R.C., MASULIS, R.W. and PAGE, J.R., 1991. An investigation of market microstructure 
impacts on event study returns. Journal of Finance, 46, 1523-1536.  
LEE, C. and READY, M., 1991. Inferring trade direction from intraday data. Journal of Finance, 46(2), 
733-746.  
LEE, C.M.C., 1992. Earnings news and small traders: An intraday analysis. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 15(2-3), 265–302.  
LEE, C.M.C., 1993. Market integration and price execution for NYSE-listed securities. Journal of 
Finance, 48, 1009-1038.  
LEE, C.M.C., MUCKLOW, B. and READY, M.J., 1993. Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings 
information: An intraday analysis. The Review of Financial Studies, 6(2), 345-374.  
LERMAN, A., LIVNAT, J. and MENDENHALL, R.R., April 2008. The High-Volume Return 
Premium and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122463  
LIM, T.K. and KONG, H.C., 2004. New evidence on price impact of analyst forecast revisions. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 13(2), 161-190.  
LIN, J.C., SANGER, G.C. and BOOTH, G.G., 1995. Trade size and components of the bid-ask spread. 
Review of Financial Studies, 8, 1153-1183.  
LINTNER, J., 1965. The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock 
portfolios and capital budgets. The review of economics and statistics, 47, 13-37.  
LIU, H., 2004. Optimal consumption and investment with transaction costs and multiple risky assets. 
Journal of Finance, LIX, 289-338.  
LIU, W., STRONG, N. and XU, X., 2003. Post-earnings-announcement Drift in the UK. European 
Financial Management, 9(1), 89-116.  
LIVNAT, J. and MENDENHALL, R.R., 2006. Comparing the post-earnings announcement drift for 
surprises calculated from analyst and time series forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1), 177-
205.  
LO, A.W., MAMAYSKY, H. and WANG, J., 2004. Asset prices and trading volume under fixed 
transactions costs. Journal of Political Economy, 112(5), 1054-1090.  
MACKINLAY, A.C., 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE, 35, 13-39. 
MADHAVAN, A., 2000. Market microstructure: A survey. Journal of Financial Markets, 3(3), 205-
258.  
MADHAVAN, A. and CHENG, M., 1997. In Search of Liquidity: Block Trades in the Upstairs and 
Downstairs Markets. Review of Financial Studies, 10(1), 175-203.  
MADHAVAN, A., RICHARDSON, M. and ROOMANS, M., 1997. Why do security prices change? A 
transaction-level analysis of NYSE stocks. Review of Financial Studies, 10(4), 1035-1064.  
 193 
 
MAJOIS, C. and DE WINNE, R., 2003. A comparison of alternative spread decomposition models on 
Euronext Brussels. Brussels Economic Review, 46(4), 91-135.  
MARQUERING, W. and VERBEEK, M., 1999. An empirical analysis of intertemporal asset pricing 
models with transaction costs and habit persistence. Journal of Empirical Finance, 6(3), 243-265.  
MCINISH, T.H. and VAN NESS, B.F., 2002. An intraday examination of the components of the bid-
ask spread. The Financial Review, 37(4), 507-524.  
MCINISH, T.H. and WOOD, R.A., 1992. An analysis of intraday patterns in bid/ask spreads for NYSE 
stocks. Journal of Finance, 47, 753-764.  
MERTON, R.C., 1973. An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econometrica, 41, 867-887.  
MILLER, E.M., 1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance, 32, 1151-
1168.  
MORSE, D., 1981. Price and trading volume reaction surrounding earnings announcements: A closer 
examination. Journal of Accounting Research, 19(2), 374-383.  
MORSE, D. and USHMAN, N., 1983. The effect of information announcements on the market 
microstructure. Accounting Review, 58(2), 247-258.  
NG, J., RUSTICUS , T.O. and VERDI , R., 2008. Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post-
Earnings Announcement Drift. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 661-696.  
NYHOLM, K., 2002. Estimating the probability of informed trading. Journal of Financial Research, 
25(4), 485-505.  
O'HARA, M., 1995. Market microstructure theory. Blackwell Publishers.  
O'HARA, M. and OLDFIELD, G.S., 1986. The microeconomics of market making. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21(4), 361-376.  
PASTOR, L. and STAMBAUGH, R.F., 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal of 
Political economy, 111(3), 642-685.  
PERSAUD, A., 2003. Liquidity black holes: understanding, quantifying and managing financial 
liquidity risk. Risk Books.  
ROLL, R., 1984. A simple implicit measure of the effective bid-ask spread in an efficient market. 
Journal of Finance, 39, 1127-1139.  
ROSU, I., 2009. A dynamic model of the limit order book. Review of Financial Studies, (April), 1-41.  
SAAR, G., 2001. Price impact asymmetry of block trades: An institutional trading explanation. Review 
of Financial Studies, 14(4), 1153-1181.  
SADKA, R., 2006. Liquidity risk and asset pricing. Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 309-349.  
SAUDI ARABIAN GENERAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, capital market. Available: 
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/innerpage.asp?ContentID=551&Lang=en [Feberuary 08, 2007].  
SAUDI BRITISH BANK, S., 2003. Saudi Stock Market Review-2002. Riyadh,Saudi Arabia. 
 194 
 
SCHADEWITZ, H.J., KANTO, A.J., KAHRA, H.A. and BLEVINS, D.R., 2005. Post-announcement 
drift in an emerging market. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance 
Evaluation, 2(1/2), 168-185.   
SCHOLES, M.S., 1972. The market for securities: Substitution versus price pressure and the effects of 
information on share prices. Journal of Business, 45, 179-211.  
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, , analyzing analyst recommendations. Available: 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm [March ,05, 2007].  
SEPPI, D.J., 1990. Equilibrium block trading and asymmetric information. Journal of Finance,45,73-94 
SHANTHIKUMAR, D.M., 2004. Small and large trades around earnings announcements: Does trading 
behavior explain post-earnings-announcement drift? Working paper, edn. University of Stanford .  
SHARPE, W.F., 1964. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. 
Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442.  
SHIVAKUMAR, L., 2006. Accruals, Cash Flows and the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(1-2), 1-25.  
SNELL, A. and TONKS, I., 2003. A theoretical analysis of institutional investors' trading costs in 
auction and dealer markets. Economic Journal, 113(489), 576-597.  
SPIERDIJK, L., 2004. An empirical analysis of the role of the trading intensity in information 
dissemination on the NYSE. Journal of Empirical Finance, 11(2), 163-184.  
STAPLEDON, G., 1997. Institutional shareholders and corporate governance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
STOLL, H.R., 1989. Inferring the components of the bid-ask spread: Theory and empirical tests. 
Journal of Finance, 44, 115-134.  
STOLL, H.R., 1978b. The pricing of security dealer services: An empirical study of NASDAQ stocks. 
Journal of Finance, 33(4), 1153-1172.  
STOLL, H.R., 1978a. The supply of dealer services in securities markets. Journal of Finance, 33(4), 
1133-1151.  
SU, Y., TSENG, W. and CHEN, P., 2009. Intraday return and order imbalance relation in NASDAQ 
speculative new highs. Applied Economics Letters, 16(8), 863-869.  
THALER, R.H., 1987. Further evidence on investor overreaction and stock market seasonality. Journal 
of Finance, 42(3), 557-581.  
TINIC, S.M., 1972. The economics of liquidity services. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 86, 79-
93.  
TINIC, S.M. and WEST, R.R., 1974. Marketability of common stocks in Canada and the USA: A 
comparison of agent versus dealer dominated markets. Journal of Finance, 29, 729-746.  
TRUEMAN, B., WONG, M.H.F. and ZHANG, X.J., 2003. Anomalous stock returns around internet 
firms‟ earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34(1-3), 249-271.  
VAN NESS, B.F., VAN NESS, R.A. and WARR, R.S., 2001. How well do adverse selection 
components measure adverse selection? Financial Management, 30(3), 77-98.  
 195 
 
VENKATESH, P.C. and CHIANG, R., 1986. Information asymmetry and the dealer's bid-ask spread: A 
case study of earnings and dividend announcements. Journal of Finance, 41, 1089-1102.  
WOOD, R.A., MCINISH, T.H. and ORD, J.K., 1985. An investigation of transactions data for NYSE 
stocks. Journal of Finance, 40, 723-739.  
ZHANG, F., 2006. Information uncertainty and stock returns. Journal of Finance, 61(1), 105-137.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
 
Appendices: 
Appendix for chapter two 
Table 1: This table shows some financial indicators for the Saudi market from the official starting date 
of 1985 until the end of 2007. This table presents the number of shares traded, value of traded shares, 
market capitalisation, number of transactions and finally the performance of the value weighted index 
(TASI). 
*In April, 2006 there was a stock split of 5:1 for all listed companies. One U.S. Dollar = 3.75 
Saudi Riyals. 
 
 
 
 
 
SHARE MARKET INDICATORS 
End of Number of Value of Market Value Number of General  
Period Shares Traded Shares Traded of Shares Transactions Index (TASI) 
   (in Millions)  (in Million RLs)*  (in Billion RLs)*   (1985 = 1000) 
1985 4 760 67 7,842 690.88 
1986 5 831 63 10,833 646.03 
1987 12 1,686 73 23,267 780.64 
1988 15 2,037 86 41,960 892.00 
1989 15 3,364 107 110,030 1,086.83 
1990 17 4,403 97 85,298 979.80 
1991 31 8,527 181 90,559 1,765.24 
1992 35 13,699 206 272,075 1,888.65 
1993 60 17,360 198 319,582 1,793.30 
1994 152 24,871 145 357,180 1,282.90 
1995 117 23,227 153 291,742 1,367.60 
1996 138 25,397 172 283,759 1,531.00 
1997 312 62,060 223 460,056 1,957.80 
1998 293 51,510 160 376,617 1,413.10 
1999 528 56,578 229 438,226 2,028.53 
2000 555 65,292 255 498,135 2,258.29 
2001 691 83,602 275 605,035 2,430.11 
2002 1,736 133,787 281 1,033,669 2,518.08 
2003 5,566 596,510 590 3,763,403 4,437.58 
2004 10,298 1,773,858 1,149 13,319,523 8,206.23 
2005 12,281 4,138,695 2,438 46,607,951 16,712.64 
2006 54,440 5,261,851 1,226 96,095,920 7,933.29 
2007 57,829 2,557,712 1,946 65,665,500 11,175.96 
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Portfolios performances using Buy-And-Hold-Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
A: Positive Returns Portfolio (807 firms) B:  Negative  Returns Portfolio(860) 
Days Relative to 
Announcements 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
-19 1.000898 0.025357 0.903814 1.110847 0.999296 0.029223 0.888497 1.109487 
-18 1.001412 0.037365 0.815995 1.199031 0.998886 0.042923 0.806938 1.21137 
-17 1.000357 0.045971 0.774438 1.295063 0.997682 0.052058 0.755683 1.286136 
-16 0.998555 0.054228 0.735207 1.423741 0.995959 0.062109 0.733062 1.325484 
-15 0.998284 0.063585 0.678895 1.556179 0.994856 0.072021 0.700037 1.376166 
-14 0.998295 0.065534 0.663424 1.462034 0.995901 0.081547 0.621324 1.529084 
-13 0.998108 0.069942 0.651648 1.432922 0.995055 0.091324 0.551941 1.594877 
-12 0.998594 0.079625 0.618159 1.496977 0.996259 0.093158 0.506798 1.571607 
-11 0.999919 0.086063 0.612375 1.591271 0.997238 0.095179 0.455777 1.589985 
-10 0.999091 0.091298 0.595867 1.649344 1.000391 0.099489 0.409071 1.737172 
-9 1.000599 0.096411 0.543786 1.812392 0.999392 0.099038 0.391976 1.756416 
-8 1.001619 0.105753 0.543852 1.985488 1.000758 0.10132 0.346955 1.922213 
-7 1.001825 0.109403 0.544645 1.861447 1.003945 0.108396 0.385326 2.069583 
-6 1.001694 0.107486 0.504028 1.893764 1.006976 0.118164 0.347663 2.275723 
-5 1.000873 0.107891 0.435922 2.020956 1.008087 0.123227 0.336911 2.49426 
-4 1.000046 0.109804 0.472022 2.083402 1.005445 0.129322 0.369504 2.766792 
-3 0.999722 0.114385 0.508569 2.062791 1.002271 0.140052 0.408137 3.271579 
-2 0.999715 0.118808 0.559484 2.055104 1.000307 0.145768 0.414833 3.14297 
-1 0.997929 0.121794 0.541062 2.050935 0.999724 0.144586 0.426658 2.713395 
0 1.016106 0.128034 0.574702 2.018904 0.978503 0.141681 0.401651 2.672179 
1 1.012575 0.128232 0.62705 1.84583 0.973499 0.139774 0.385101 2.331718 
2 1.012922 0.135426 0.603887 1.971668 0.970087 0.139394 0.338798 2.192669 
3 1.010865 0.13525 0.522933 1.98742 0.968516 0.142325 0.311995 2.142502 
4 1.010149 0.139025 0.517072 2.171148 0.966778 0.146304 0.280136 1.905663 
5 1.010549 0.140967 0.45136 2.186009 0.966503 0.148487 0.264737 1.7394 
6 1.008125 0.143206 0.426254 2.199382 0.967531 0.149323 0.251492 1.703966 
7 1.009918 0.149336 0.417487 2.22583 0.968848 0.148538 0.256207 1.677225 
8 1.011187 0.155422 0.416742 2.335332 0.969542 0.152304 0.237516 1.780678 
9 1.013308 0.160139 0.432371 2.42973 0.971767 0.155059 0.22525 1.708647 
10 1.013737 0.164648 0.421921 2.390192 0.974055 0.157813 0.231118 1.874709 
11 1.015014 0.172046 0.373715 2.657103 0.976058 0.163162 0.243197 1.908682 
12 1.017887 0.1803 0.378924 2.945493 0.978288 0.167359 0.223537 2.056151 
13 1.019457 0.183884 0.409594 2.970548 0.979533 0.174715 0.198696 2.202779 
14 1.02019 0.186055 0.412 3.133574 0.982468 0.184433 0.214846 2.489044 
15 1.020468 0.185525 0.396524 2.86904 0.983796 0.192192 0.234015 2.724611 
16 1.022678 0.18917 0.426693 2.820727 0.985411 0.194358 0.255891 2.857608 
17 1.025454 0.195653 0.424702 2.859558 0.988059 0.195892 0.288852 2.632676 
18 1.026759 0.201033 0.416078 2.767392 0.989235 0.204222 0.258868 2.830196 
19 1.028142 0.204122 0.428324 2.791848 0.991287 0.214506 0.263708 3.119548 
20 1.036704 0.21044 0.437621 2.729794 0.983635 0.221863 0.241556 3.421855 
Table 2: The table shows the performance of a virtual investor‟s portfolio which is equally weighted 
and comprises 89 companies in the SSM .Portfolio performance is calculated using (BHAR) which are 
calculated as follows:   BHARi,t =   1 + Ri,t   
T
t=0 −   1 + MRt   
T
t=0 . 
 
 
 198 
 
The daily mean wealth index in Table (2) shows a constructed wealth index which is averaged 
across firms. We use the Buy-And-Hold-Abnormal Returns method (BHAR) to trace the value 
of One Saudi Riyal, 1.S.R,  invested (in equally weighted portfolios) in all securities 20 days 
before the announcement day and held until 20 days after the announcement day, after 
removing market wide effect from the returns. Two portfolios were constructed according to 
their earnings announcement returns (EAR) in the event window (0, +1). Positive EARs were 
reported in Panel A and negative EARs in Panel B. One unit invested in the positive (negative) 
EAR portfolios would increase (decrease) by 3% (-1.06%) in excess of the market returns for 
the period (-20, +20). The biggest change in the wealth index formation for either the positive 
or negative EAR portfolios took place on the announcement day itself, T=0, where positive 
(negative) EAR portfolios increased (decreased) by 1.81% (-2.12%). This finding suggests that 
earning announcements are informative to the market. Moreover, if the information leakage is 
high in the market and on a large scale, the price reaction would take place in the pre-
announcement period with even higher wealth change in any single day than that on the 
announcement day. Earnings announcement releases provide decision-relevant information to 
the SSM participant, at least in the short run. 
 
Table 3 lists all firms included in the sample with names, symbol and number of announcements for 
each company.  
No Name Symbol Ann No No Name Symbol Ann No 
1 RIBL 1010 25 46 3010 YSCC 27 
2 BJAZ 1020 25 47 3020 SCC 26 
3 SAIB 1030 27 48 3030 QACCO 26 
4 SHB 1040 25 49 3040 SPCC 26 
5 BSFR 1050 27 50 3050 YCC 24 
6 SABB 1060 27 51 3060 E.P.C.C.O 26 
7 ARNB 1080 26 52 3080 TCC 26 
8 SAMBA 1090 27 53 3090 TACCO 25 
9 Al Rajhi 1120 27 54 4010 SHARCO 22 
10 ALBILAD 1140 7 55 4020 SRECO 26 
11 SABIC 2010 25 56 4030 NSCSA 27 
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12 SAFCO 2020 27 57 4040 SAPTCO 26 
13 SARCO 2030 18 58 4050 SASCO 25 
14 Saudi Ceramics 2040 24 59 4061 Anaam 19 
15 Savola Group 2050 27 60 4070 TAPRCO 16 
16 NIC 2060 25 61 4080 Aseer 19 
17 SPIMACO 2070 25 62 4090 TAIBA 21 
18 GASCO 2080 23 63 4100 MCDC 17 
19 NGC 2090 20 64 4110 Mubbard 24 
20 githaiah 2100 25 65 4130 ALbaha 12 
21 SCC 2110 21 66 4140 SIECO 24 
22 SAIC 2120 22 67 4150 ARDCO 25 
23 SIDC 2130 20 68 4160 Thimar 16 
24 ADC 2140 25 69 4170 TECO 9 
25 Zoujaj 2150 21 70 4180 Fitaihi 18 
26 Amiantit 2160 25 71 4190 Jarir 16 
27 Alujain 2170 26 72 4200 Aldrees 7 
28 FIPCO 2180 16 73 4210 SRMG 7 
29 SISCO 2190 19 74 4220 Emaar E 4 
30 APC 2200 15 75 4230 Red Sea 4 
31 Nama 2210 23 76 4240 ALhokair 4 
32 Maadaniyah 2220 24 77 5110 Electric. 22 
33 SCC 2230 20 78 6010 NADEC 25 
34 Zamil Indust 2240 22 79 6020 GACO 15 
35 SIIG 2250 15 80 6030 HADCO 19 
36 Petrochemical 2260 12 81 6040 TADCO 23 
37 SADAFCO 2270 10 82 6050 SFICO 10 
38 Almarai 2280 9 83 6060 SHARQIYA 22 
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39 YANSAB 2290 4 84 6070 ALjouf 13 
40 SPM 2300 6 85 6080 Bishaco 11 
41 SIPCHEM 2310 4 86 6090 JAZADCO 17 
42 AL-BABTAIN 2320 4 87 7010 STC 18 
43 appc 2330 4 88 7020 Etihad 11 
44 AlAbdullatif 2340 4 89 8010 NCCI 12 
45 SVCP 2360 2     
 
Table 4 list New IPOS in  the SSM. A careful look would reveal the strategy of the CMA to include 
relatively small and family companies as well. For example, the number of the companies listed in 
early years used to be very limited and large in size whereas in recent years, listed companies are 
larger in number and smaller in average size. 
New IPO’s Listing 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
No of IPO’s 1 - 2 5 10 26 
Value of Issues(Million 
S.R) 
10،200  - 1،300  7،715  10،446  18,036 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Million 
S.R 
51,000 - 43،263 84,764 39,769 209،215 
% of 
total 
market 
15% - 4% 3% 3% 11% 
Source: Bakheet Financial Group 
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Appendix for chapter 3 
 
The following graphs depict the daily cross-section average of all observations for the event 
window (-30,+30) for 2179 earnings announcements.  
Figure 1: Daily estimated Average Bid-Ask Spread using the model of  
George et al. (1991) 
 
 
Figure 2 : Daily Overnight Indicator measured as: 𝑶𝑵𝑰𝒕 =   𝒍𝒐𝒈
𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕
𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒕−𝟏
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Figure 3: Cross –section Average Volatility measured: 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕 =
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑯 −𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳
𝑷𝒊,𝒕
𝑳  
 
 
Figure 4: Daily average Turnover (number of stocks divided by the number of outstanding shares). 
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Figure 5: Average Number of trades per day 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Abnormal Returns for all earnings announcements (2,437) before data cleaning  
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Appendix  for chapters 4 & 5 : 
 
Table 5 list main variables that have been used in the regression model along with brief description for 
the price impact regression and for the liquidity function regression: 
Variable Description 
PerImpct Permanent Price Effect 
TotImpct Total  Price Effect 
TemImpct Temporary  Price Effect 
Lnsize The natural logarithm of the number of shares trades(volume) 
Volatility Standard deviation of trade to trade returns on the trading day prior to 
the block trade. 
Intrurnover The natural logarithm of total dollar value of on market stock turnover 
on the trading day prior to the block trade. 
Mktreturn The market index (TASI)return on the day of the block trade 
Momentum The cumulative daily return to the stock on the five trading days prior 
to the block trade. 
BAS1 Relative Spreads 
BAS2 Quoted Spreads 
BAS3 Effective Spreads 
T1 Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for  trades in the first hour, 
otherwise 0 
T2 Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for  trades in the Mid-day 
trading, otherwise 0 
T3 Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for  trades in last hour of the 
trading day ,otherwise 0 
Infobas Information asymmetry  component of the spread estimated using 
Huang and Stoll (1997) model 
size Natural logarithm  of the Market value of common shares 
Number of trades Number of trades per day per firm 
Trade sign Dummy variable taking the value of (1) for buy trades and (0) for sell 
trades 
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Table 6: report estimated coefficient of a   trade indicator model for the price change in block trades, 
using Huang and Stoll (1997) three way model:   
   ∆𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐢.𝐭 = 𝛃𝟏 ,𝐢𝐐𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐 ,𝐢𝐐𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛃𝟑 ,𝐢𝐐𝐀,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐞𝐭 
Effective spread is estimated from this model as two times the first two coefficients,2(β2,i +
β1,i) which is the relationship between price change and trade sign for a particular trade and 
the previous trade. 
VARIABLES impact 
  
buysell 0.00295*** 
 (5.78e-06) 
Lag(buys ell) 0.00189*** 
 (5.78e-06) 
MktDirection 0.00163*** 
 (1.44e-05) 
Constant -0.00148*** 
 (1.32e-05) 
Observations 4221746 
R-squared 0.114 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The  trade indicator model is used  to infer about the components of the bid-ask spread, we are 
more interested to find the information asymmetry component. The estimated signs of the 
adverse selection cost component are positive for all stocks and are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Prices are adjusted in reaction to net buyer-seller initiated order flow. We report 
here aggregate coefficients for all-stock model to show general inference about the information 
asymmetry in the market. The market direction variable which is aggregate cumulative sell–
buy indicator shows also a positively significant coefficient indicating market pressure increase 
the price change 
 
Table 7 shows time of the day variation patterns of the open to close prices. Intraday open to close 
indicator is a measure of price volatility , spread and information asymmetry. Open to close shows 
diurnal patterns where the gap is at its highest in the first trading hour then open to close decline and 
then increase by the end of the trading hours.   
VARIABLES opncls 
  
t1 0.0105*** 
 (0.000427) 
t2 -0.0128*** 
 (0.000379) 
Constant 0.162*** 
 (0.000320) 
Observations 4221870 
R-squared 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: trading Hours in the SSM, old and new trading hours are reported here. Trading hours are 
broken into three categories to study the time of the day effect on prices and trading activity.  
Trading Hour session Time 1 Time2 Time3 
Old system two 
session 
1(10:00-12:00) 
2(16:30-18:30) 
10:00-11:00 11:00-17:30 17:30-18:30 
01/01/2005- 3/10/2006     
New System One session 11:00-12:00 12:00-14:30 
14:30-15:30 
 
28/10/2006     
 
New system for trading Hours from  28/10/2006-currenet 
 Time 1  = taking the value of one if the block trade occurs in the first trading hour, that is 11:00-
12:00 in the new system.  
 Time 2 = taking the value of one if the block trade occurs during the trading day, midday, which 
is 12:00-14:30 in the new system. 
 
Time3 = taking the value of one if the bock trade occurs during the last trading hour, which is 
(14:30-15:30) in the new system .
 
  
Old trading hours from 01/01/2005 to 03/10/2006 
 Time 1  = taking the value of one if the block trade occurs in the first trading hour, that is from 
10:00-11:00. 
 Time 2 = taking the value of one if the block trade during the trading day ,midday, that is from  
11:00-17:30 of which  four  hours  and thirty minutes are afternoon break. 
 Time
3
= takes the value of one if the block trade occurs during the last trading hours, which is 
17:30-18:30. 
 
 
Table 9:Order Flow ration distribution reported here for each company(ticker) for the entire 
sample ,124 companies. 
 
ticker orderflow=0 
between 
midpoint    
and ask 
orderflow=1 
between   
midpoint and 
bid 
orderflow=.5 
1010 4341 168 4172 113 47 
1020 9898 849 9753 768 161 
1030 2276 49 2373 57 10 
1040 650 22 584 37 6 
1050 1188 37 1092 25 3 
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1060 877 21 719 20 1 
1080 1337 35 1331 28 8 
1090 4313 303 4454 271 41 
1120 18976 6482 17274 6088 1486 
1140 12100 4324 15502 5506 3253 
1150 3463 76 10160 82 365 
1210 855 80 1005 117 439 
1310 1327 101 1733 122 773 
2001 225 126 836 128 187 
2010 34761 12752 32387 12504 3913 
2020 12048 2584 11527 2313 434 
2030 1258 624 780 471 48 
2040 6693 1607 5970 1370 1346 
2050 22453 6457 21134 6136 2125 
2060 24718 5434 24071 5000 769 
2070 16223 3121 15346 2735 2709 
2080 17041 3844 16179 3337 2707 
2090 3205 722 2907 598 379 
2100 25231 5311 22863 4716 8516 
2110 24125 5059 22004 4603 3085 
2120 17958 3845 16862 3601 1511 
2130 28135 6346 25505 5534 5396 
2140 28480 5453 26623 4910 5579 
2150 12856 2713 12141 2376 985 
2160 15973 2047 14812 1962 1784 
2170 28338 8422 24896 7637 4694 
2180 9761 3783 8857 3287 2404 
2190 33424 10167 30313 8935 1122 
2200 8526 1179 8069 1032 866 
2210 35738 7685 32387 7115 2263 
2220 17279 3937 16438 3576 1869 
2230 25576 5070 24122 4566 3990 
2240 4346 803 3774 666 371 
2250 25505 6886 24654 6461 539 
2260 12726 2845 12586 2654 1108 
2270 11522 1640 11449 1552 3080 
2280 6010 2258 6287 2507 1442 
2290 11169 1045 16920 1197 3892 
2300 5417 1512 5364 1629 686 
2310 9284 1151 13086 1204 649 
2320 4855 809 4925 873 2379 
2330 8327 81 8810 101 1553 
2340 8315 891 7357 836 1179 
2350 14473 62 17897 68 1376 
2360 1924 392 1795 337 800 
2370 1428 411 1418 431 161 
2380 6710 113 7935 126 1293 
3010 4160 1463 3925 1192 86 
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3020 5803 1094 5590 914 573 
3030 4575 868 4165 748 216 
3040 1137 156 823 99 43 
3050 2906 422 2857 346 101 
3060 2403 341 2143 292 73 
3080 2188 181 1983 130 48 
3090 11833 3385 11257 3069 355 
4001 409 6 571 9 120 
4010 17904 2094 16392 1813 3833 
4020 16231 3274 15614 2960 1719 
4030 31019 4813 29132 4577 1967 
4040 35435 8294 32229 7762 4697 
4050 23900 2094 21934 1960 5992 
4061 3842 1327 3170 1177 1160 
4070 20076 4146 18759 3769 3511 
4080 16707 4298 16017 3823 937 
4090 27378 8785 24543 8462 782 
4100 18000 2967 16768 2626 4231 
4110 24694 4981 22266 4391 7393 
4130 23652 7784 20603 7025 1841 
4140 11974 2136 11812 1939 1156 
4150 33772 6722 29760 5992 6875 
4160 20638 4935 18555 4392 6758 
4170 17438 3089 15932 2710 5775 
4180 27791 6327 25350 5575 1049 
4190 835 162 685 145 44 
4200 12058 2937 11349 2988 1956 
4210 3165 447 3690 533 1122 
4220 11597 52 22574 56 2156 
4230 5191 669 5849 877 2424 
4240 6971 1492 7413 1572 1288 
4250 4693 18 6087 16 646 
4260 442 96 463 132 133 
4270 411 1 420 4 36 
4280 3235 9 3375 11 47 
4290 403 137 411 173 52 
4300 2979 36 3058 41 490 
5110 47846 4443 44937 4404 3717 
6001 685 14 788 16 102 
6010 19337 5197 17838 5037 1485 
6020 35230 7438 31217 6739 8120 
6030 32289 5550 28706 5053 8787 
6040 18771 3297 17196 2984 5157 
6050 12930 3562 11698 3157 5408 
6060 17651 4059 16370 3463 5227 
6070 25239 4047 22640 3606 6874 
6090 28223 3496 26297 3196 4950 
7010 21969 6049 21096 5751 2411 
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 7020 9829 4103 11670 4629 1765 
7030 7649 154 13758 181 624 
8010 5998 1210 6203 1195 256 
8020 3194 618 3145 691 943 
8030 5448 160 4695 154 1508 
8040 825 308 641 360 240 
8050 2133 576 1971 678 835 
8060 2129 130 2038 142 670 
8070 2205 169 1959 160 760 
8080 1015 446 954 420 317 
8090 1893 118 1635 128 571 
8100 831 279 785 256 297 
8110 1111 272 1123 295 363 
8120 1510 64 1404 61 429 
8130 267 128 287 155 51 
8140 1528 290 1502 317 595 
8150 1563 390 1496 499 601 
8160 588 19 559 28 130 
8170 779 4 626 7 92 
8180 780 6 594 6 139 
8190 456 13 364 6 34 
8200 628 0 884 6 41 
8210 682 6 672 6 75 
subtotal 1414693 290387 1366710 270404 221041 
% 0.397024895 0.081495327 0.383558761 0.07588722 0.062033798 
 
total  3,563,235 
   
